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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
“We know our will is free, and there’s an end on’t”1  
 
 It has been five hundred years since Martin Luther dueled with Desiderius Erasmus and 
the Catholic Church over the issue of man’s freedom.  Erasmus asserted that even in our fallen 
state, “...from the time of the apostles down to the present day, no writer has emerged who has 
totally taken away the power of freedom of choice save only Manichaeus and John Wyclif.”2  
Luther in response denied that the will “… did anything or nothing in matters pertaining to 
salvation.” 3  Luther’s charge merited specific rebuttal in the Council of Trent’s statement, that 
while free will without divine grace cannot enable a man to live justly and merit eternal life:4 
If anyone says that man's free will moved and aroused by God, by assenting to 
God's call and action, in no way cooperates toward disposing and preparing itself 
to obtain the grace of justification, that it cannot refuse its assent if it wishes, but 
that, as something inanimate, it does nothing whatever and is merely passive, let 
him be anathema.5  
 With the secular influences of the Enlightenment the context of free will slowly changes 
from the question of whether fallen man had true freedom in the face of an omnipotent God to 
the question of whether it is even sensible to talk about freedom in a worldview dominated by 
the issue of deterministic laws.  Thomas Hobbes would define free will as “the absence of all the 
 
1 James Boswell, The Life of Samuel Johnson, 1769, (AETAT. 60. Project Gutenberg), 
https://www.gutenberg.org/files/1564/1564-h/1564-h.htm 
2 Desiderius Erasmus, On the Freedom of the Will, in Luther and Erasmus : Free Will and Salvation 
trans. E. Gordon Rupp. Philip S Watson, (Library of Christian Classicism Philadelphia: Westminster 
Press, 1969), 43. 
3 Martin Luther, The Bondage of the Will, in Luther and Erasmus : Free Will and Salvation, trans E. 
Gordon Rupp. Philip S Watson, (Library of Christian Classics, Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1969), 
116. 
4 Enchiridion Symbolorum Definitionum Et Declarationum De Rebus Fidei Et Morum Forty-Third 
Edition, eds Heinrich Denzinger. Peter Hünermann. Helmut Hoping. Peter Hünermann. Robert Fastiggi. 
and Anne Englund Nash,. (Ignatius Press, San Francisco 2001), 1552. 
5 Denzinger, 1557. 
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impediments to action that are not contained in the nature and intrinsical [sic] quality of the 
agent.”6   Under the overwhelming influence of a materialistic framing of the concept, the 
current secular philosophical views of freedom include those who question whether 
consciousness is itself real much less human freedom.7   
 Against these developments, Catholic teaching has maintained its commitment to the 
fundamental importance of human freedom with its inextricable entanglements with grace and 
the reality of the lived life.  Servais Pinckaers’ approach to human freedom as “freedom of 
excellence” contra “freedom of indifference” is the focal point of this thesis. It utilizes Thomistic 
views of freedom to reframe contemporary Catholic conversation, and even clear terminology 
from the accumulation of Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment debris.    
 We will argue as its major thesis that in Pinckaers’ formulation of freedom of excellence, 
with its explicit re-adoption of metaphysical principles such as man’s final end and a denial of 
sola materia, is not only consistent with Thomistic approaches to freedom but also a more 
satisfying theory of human freedom than those found within the contemporary philosophical 
debate.  Further, we will demonstrate that such a theory of freedom is compatible with 20th and 
21st century developments in science, mathematics and the neuroscience of human behavior 
relevant to questions of human consciousness and freedom. 
 We follow Pinkaers8 in rejecting the theory of freedom of “indifference” centered on an 
autonomous will choosing between equally attractive or equally unattractive alternatives.  His 
 
6 Thomas Hobbes and John Bramhall, The Questions concerning Liberty, Necessity, and Chance: 
Clearly Stated and Debated between Dr. Bramhall, Bishop of Derry, and Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury. 
(Early English Books Online. London: Printed for Andrew Crook. 1656), 38. 
7 Steve Ayan, “There is No Such Thing as Conscious Thought” December 20, 2018.  
Scientific American online. https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/there-is-no-such-thing-as-
conscious-thought/# 
8Servais Pinckaers, Sources of Christian Ethics, trans. Mary Thomas Noble (Washington: Catholic 




work can be taken narrowly as a critique of this view of freedom—a view that that is closely 
related to the current libertarian view of the will—but we will argue that Pinckaers’ critique and 
counter proposal is a far more fundamental move.  Freedom of excellence is more than simply a 
different theory of how to establish freedom rooted in our volition.  It enlarges the focus of 
freedom from the atomic decision involved in a single human act to include the effects arising 
from the integration of that act and the full sequence of subsequent acts that feed back into the 
very being of the individual.  It is in the connections—the feedback between act, the will and the 
intellect that affects future actions—where we should focus when we ask what freedom is, and 
that is the domain of Pinckaers’ freedom of excellence.   
 We will take Pinckaers’ freedom of excellence in two directions, forward in time to 
engage with the contemporary free will debate and its intersection with science including 
relevant material from the neurosciences, and backward in time to investigate its foundations in 
Thomas Aquinas.   In taking Pinckaers forward we will argue that contemporary philosophical 
approaches have been undermined by the abandonment of the metaphysics of man’s final ends, 
the felt need to maintain a false homage to an exclusively materialistic basis to man’s being,  and 
the failure to fully assimilate the fundamental limitations of the concept of determinism.  We will 
demonstrate that freedom of excellence is inconsistent with a modern libertarian view of 
freedom, incompatible with an exclusively materialistic view of the mind, but is compatible with 
current understanding of the physical universe and specifically the neurosciences. 
 In taking Pinckaers backward, his claims that freedom of excellence is rooted in Aquinas 
theories of the human act will be examined in detail.  We will demonstrate that freedom of 
excellence is indeed founded in Aquinas and is strongly associated the role played by virtue in 
the establishment of inclinations and habits in the Christian life.  Aquinas’ view of the will and 
its freedom should be seen as neither simply voluntaristic nor intellectualist.  It is not a simple 
4 
 
attribute of the human soul but is properly seen as constitutive of the entire human being.  Its 
capacity enlarges as man approaches his final end—the process of sanctification as it is known in 
the west or divinization as it is termed in the east—the restoration of the image of God resting in 
the beatific vision of God. 
 Chapter 2 contains a review of the contemporary philosophical theories of man’s freedom 
in which libertarian and compatibilist theories dominate.  The major critiques of each position 
presented are from a contemporary perspective in which an underlying exclusively material and 
deterministic universe is presumed.  Determinism is identified as the critical framing semantic 
dominating the discussion between libertarian and compatibilist. The key libertarian requirement 
of same past, different future is contrasted with the compatibilist’s same past, same future.  The 
libertarian seeks to find some way to find a crack in a determinist world view by seeking a role 
for randomness in our mental processes whereas the compatibilist redefines what freedom to 
means to be merely feeling free, while celebrating the deterministic machinery that necessitates 
what we think and how we decide.  Chapter 2 concludes with the observation that the conflicting 
contemporary theories of man’s freedom are at an impasse. 
 Chapter 3 introduces Pinkaers’ formulation of freedom of excellence in preparation to the 
anticipating it as a solution to this impasse.  Pinckaers formulates freedom of excellence in the 
context of refocusing 20th century Catholic moral teaching on Thomas’ teachings on virtue.  He 
argues that a proper understanding human freedom extends beyond a focus on the atomic act of 
the will; that the appropriate scope for understanding human freedom lies in the entire series of 
acts because individual actions fold back and effect changes (for good or for ill) the very 
machinery of the will.  Pinckaers’ argues for the role of habit and then virtue—especially the 
moral and theological virtues--in understanding how human freedom is preserved and enlarged 
in the reception and exercise of these virtues in our life. 
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 Pinckaers’ exposition relies on readers sharing his deep understanding of Aquinas 
accordingly, Chapter 4 supplements Pinckaers’ presentation with a concise tour of Aquinas’ 
view of the relationship between freedom, the will, intellect, habit, virtue and ultimately our 
divine life of grace.  Aquinas frames his discussion explicitly in terms of our final ends.  He 
demonstrates a rich and nuanced view of the will in terms of its complex interplay with both the 
intellect and the entire being of the human, its feedback between the consequences of an act and 
its subsequent effect of future acts.   This integrated view of the will encompasses the roles of 
habit, inclination and virtue.  Aquinas fits these concepts together in a dynamic process that 
includes human interaction with divine participation and cooperation via the reception and 
exercise of these divinely infused virtues, in an integrated view of an individual moving towards 
their final end.    
 Chapter 5 asks questions about the status of an individual’s freedom at the point when 
they achieve their final end in the beatific vision.  Is such a person still free to sin and if not, why 
not and are they then still free? We review several traditional responses to these questions and 
argue that Aquinas’ assertion for man’s maximal freedom in this state is a natural conclusion of 
our freedom of excellence.  Freedom of excellence is indeed irreversible with regard to sin, and 
its irreversibility is intrinsic and natural to that state contra Ockham’s teaching that only by a 
constantly applied divinely supplied extrinsic constraint is man prevented from nilling God.  
Concluding the chapter, we argue that there are physical analogs that can aid in our 
understanding how such intrinsic irreversibility can make sense. 
 Chapters 2 through 5 set the stage for the central arguments of the thesis.  In Chapter 6 
we argue that freedom of excellence fully addresses the impasse identified in Chapter 2.  We 
review the developments in science, especially in the neurosciences, that bear directly on the 
question of man’s freedom and provide the physical machinery responsible for the materialistic 
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and deterministic presumptions of the libertarian and compatibilist arguments of Chapter 2.   We 
demonstrate that none of this evidence is incompatible with a freedom of excellence, including 
so-called criterial causation and even random events, due to the intellect’s ability to reflect and to 
use comprehension of its final end as a compass to guide subsequent actions.  We argue that 
personal identity in its most meaningful sense cannot subsist in a purely materialistic 
metaphysical framework.  And we argue that the appropriate response to that conclusion is not 
the existential despair that afflicts many of the brightest and best of contemporary philosophers, 
but it is instead to expand our metaphysical foundations.  We show how the concept of 
determinism, so central to arguments between libertarians and compatibilists, is emptied of much 
of its traditional meaning considering recent developments in chaos theory.   
 We conclude by setting freedom of excellence firmly in the context of our final end.  We 
assert that those decisions most central and most important to us as human beings are 
incompatible with either a libertarian or compatibilist theory but are at the core of the concerns 
of freedom of excellence. The choices of fidelity to spouse, to friend, to fellow soldier are 
choices we want to make again and again and result from virtues we acquire in part as gifts, and 
then practice in our daily life.  Herein lies the true locus of freedom.  We conclude with an 
attempt at capturing a snapshot of what it could mean to achieve our final end and imagine the 




Chapter 2. A Tour of Contemporary Views of Free Will 
What is generally meant by free will from the contemporary view 
Boswell: “The argument for the moral necessity of human actions is always, I 
observe, fortified by supposing universal prescience to be one of the attributes of 
the Deity." Johnson: "You are surer that you are free, than you are of prescience; 
you are surer that you can lift up your finger or not as you please, than you are of 
any conclusion from a deduction of reasoning. But let us consider a little the 
objection from prescience. It is certain I am either to go home tonight or not; that 
does not prevent my freedom." Boswell: "That it is certain you are either to go 
home or not, does not prevent your freedom; because the liberty of choice between 
the two is compatible with that certainty. But if one of these events be certain now, 
you have no future power of volition. If it be certain you are to go home to-night, 
you must go home." Johnson: "If I am well acquainted with a man, I can judge with 
great probability how he will act in any case, without his being restrained by my 
judging. God may have this probability increased to certainty." Boswell: When it is 
increased to certainty, freedom ceases, because that cannot be certainly foreknown, 
which is not certain at the time; but if it be certain at the time, it is a contradiction 
in terms to maintain that there can be afterwards any contingency dependent on the 
exercise of will or anything else." Johnson: "All theory is against the freedom of 
the will; all experience for it.9 
 James Boswell and Samuel Johnson illuminate a transition in the Enlightenment’s 
concerns regarding human freedom away from the concerns of Erasmus and Trent.   After the 
Protestant fracturing, philosophical development regarding freedom became separated from its 
moral context and increasingly focused on the issue of whether freedom can exist at all in largely 
materialistic universe.  This development was accompanied by a diminished metaphysics that 
radically altered the structure of discussions surrounding human freedom.  We are not concerned 
with the details of this process but will survey the principle current philosophical views of 
human freedom and how it can be understood to exist.10  A characteristic of the current debate is 
an almost complete lack of consensus regarding the state of the will, freedom, the mind or even 
the reality of human consciousness.  We will spend less time on those views that are self-
 
9 James Boswell, The Life of Samuel Johnson, 1761.  Project Gutenberg,  
https://www.gutenberg.org/files/1564/1564-h/1564-h.htm 
10 This chapter covers the major approaches discussed in the literature represented in summary form 
from sources such as Robert Kane The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, (Oxford University Press, 2005)  
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limiting,11 and focus attention on contemporary discussions that assert humans do in some sense 
possess free will. 
Personal Responsibility and Freedom. 
  Neither Greek nor Jewish and early Christian writers focused on the explicit issue of 
what made a decision free but were instead concerned with what actions the individual should 
perform and be held responsible for—both before man and God.  Early Greeks such as Aristotle 
held that a broad spectrum of actions were ‘up to us’; but the basis for this view varied widely 
especially in later antiquity. Stoics saw an orderly universe following laws in a careful 
predetermined path whereas the Epicureans believed in a universe founded on randomness where 
the atoms themselves could “swerve” in a chaotic unpredictable dance of chance. But both 
agreed that many acts were still ‘up to us’ and they grounded the basis of freedom and morality 
in the consciousness of the individual.12  But what does it mean for something to be ‘up to us’ if 
the action is simply the unfolding of a predetermined path or resulting from the vagaries of 
chance?   
 For the Christian believer, the question of freedom was further complicated by the 
understanding that human nature was tainted by the Fall.  Theologically the Church teaches that, 
while man needs external assistance to enable free moral choices to follow and obey God, man’s 
ability to freely choose can still be presumed.  With Martin Luther and especially John Calvin, 
the issues of God’s omnipotence and transcendence were central.  Can there be room for human 
freedom if every movement occurs as consequence of God’s direct action?  Can there be room 
 
11 What is the point in responding to a philosopher who does not believe he possesses consciousness 
and that his self-awareness is an illusion?   
12 Albrecht Dihle, The Theory of Will in Classical Antiquity, Sather Classical Lectures, (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1982), 41. 
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for a meaningful freedom if the choices of man are known in advance—indeed known from 
before the very beginning of time?13   
 With the Protestant approaches ascendant in the Enlightenment, thinkers like David 
Hume eliminated of the concept of final causes in nature from philosophic thinking, and with 
Immanuel Kant there arose paradigms influenced by scientific revolution.  Isaac Newton frames 
questions of freedom within a physicalist, materialistic view of the universe. Concerns about the 
relationship of freedom to the machinery of the universe replace concerns regarding the 
relationship of human freedom to the Divine.  Arguments about theological determinism are 
replaced by physical determinism.  Facing the loss of the metaphysics of final ends, Thomas 
Hobbes redefines freedom as the ability of an individual to act as one wishes in an attempt to 
maintain compatibility with the now merely material universe. 
Contemporary approaches to determinism and liberty 
 Table 1, adapted from Robert Kane,14 provides a useful way to categorize the diversity 
present in contemporary approaches. It demonstrates that the core issue is the challenge 
presented by the post-Enlightenment view of a world running according to definite rules—the 
deterministic world.  The column and role highlighted contrasts the positions held by a freedom 
of excellence. 
 
13 Boethius’ reconciliation of the issue of Divine foreknowledge and human freedom in its classical 
formulation represents the mainstream Catholic understanding.  This view characterizes God, and 
therefore his knowledge, as being beyond space and time.  For Calvin, his conflation of language about 
God’s foreknowledge and therefore lack of human freedom implies a God whose knowledge is part of the 
time flow.  The embedding of God in spacetime taken to its logical endgame has led some libertarian free 
will Protestants to propose the doctrine of Open Theism, where God is denied the possibility of any more 
foreknowledge than that in principle available to a very smart supercomputer operating in current time. 
See Clark Pinnock, The Openness of God: A Biblical Challenge to the Traditional Understanding of God, 
(Downers Grove, Ill: InterVarsity Press, 1994). 
14 Robert Kane, “Libertarianism” in Four Views on Free Will,  eds. John Martin Fischer, Robert Kane, 
Derek Pereboom, and Manual Vargas, (Great Debates in Philosophy. Malden, MA ; Oxford: Blackwell 




 Is commonsense 
thinking about free 
will and moral 
responsibility correct? 
Is free will compatible 
with determinism? 
Is moral responsibility 
compatible with 
determinism? 





Libertarianism Yes No No Yes No 
Compatibilism Yes Yes Yes Yes No 




Yes in part. Yes Not applicable — 
only a single universal 
agent 
Yes No 
Freedom of Excellence Yes External to the mind 
there is no 
determinism 
 
Internal to the mind 
there is “coherency” 
Argues the question is 
ill posed. 
Metaphysics presumes 
at minimum some 
dualistic view of man 
Yes 
Both at an 
individual decision 
and most centrally, 
based on cumulative 
effects of choices. 
Yes 
 
 For contemporary thinkers, reduced to a materialistic metaphysic, a key question 
regarding freedom is how the uncaused choice make sense in a deterministic materialistic-only 
universe? 15  But if those choices are caused then does not the existence of a deterministic causal 
chain leading up to the decision preclude holding individuals responsible for those “caused” 
decisions? The last column asks sharply the question—is this the freedom that we want?  This is 
a question we will return to time and again as we look at theories of freedom.  We will take brief 
note of both the hard incompatibilism and the universalist consciousness views but primarily 
focus on the two approaches that claim to defend man’s freedom, specifically his free will, in 
their separate ways. 
  
 
15 Causality for the modern is most closely associated with the efficient cause of Aristotelean four 
causes; material cause, formal cause, efficient cause and final cause.  We argue for the damaging effects 
on our modern understanding of human freedom resulting from an alienation of final causes. 
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Free Will as Illusion—the Hard Incompatibilism 
 For philosophers such as Thomas Hobbes, John Locke and Étienne Bonnot de Condillac, 
the human mind was reducible to that of a machine, albeit a complex machine.16  This line of 
reasoning has led some contemporary scientists to assert that free will does not exist and if we 
think we possess it, we are suffering from an illusion of our brains. One of the most famous 
taking this position was no less than Albert Einstein. 
If the moon, in the act of completing its eternal way around the earth, were gifted 
with self-consciousness, it would feel thoroughly convinced that it was travelling 
its way of its own accord on the strength of a resolution taken once and for all.  So 
would a Being, endowed with higher insight and more perfect intelligence, 
watching man and his doings, smile about man’s illusion that he was acting 
according to his own free will.17  
For Einstein, his commitment to a universe that runs according to fixed laws overrides his own 
internal experience.  He is willing to exile his personal perceptions to the land of illusion. 
 Contemporary proponents of free will worry that diminishment in societies’ belief in 
individual autonomy opens the door for those desiring to leverage forms of social determinism in 
order to create utopia.18  Such yearning is on display in Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World 
where lower-class workers under the influence of drugs can do what they want, but what they 
want is constrained: such as playing miniature golf on weekends before returning to their 
assembly line work each Monday.19  Alternatively, in the world of B.F. Skinner’s Walden Two, 
citizens live in a utopian rural commune sharing duties of farming and raising children but are 
able to pursue the arts and sciences in their abundant leisure time.  But as Frazier, protagonist of 
the book and founder of Walden Two is proud to admit—-individuals can do whatever they want 
 
16 Kane, “Libertarianism”, 8. 
17Albert Einstein quoted in D. Home and A. Robinson, “Einstein and Tagore”, Journal of 
Consciousness Studies 2(2), 1995. 
18 Robert Kane,  A Contemporary Introduction to Free Will (Oxford, England, New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2005), 3-4. 




because they have been behaviorally conditioned for those desires since birth.20  Frazier defends 
this approach because he believes science has eliminated the option of individuals envisioning 
themselves as the author of their actions.  According to Frazier, we may think we could be 
originators of our wills but in the end this idea is simply an incoherent concept.  Instead, Frazier 
put in place a system constructed to maximize, from his perspective and that of his fellow ruling 
class, the happiness of the individual subject to the constraints of the scientific world.21  This 
view of human nature eliminates as irrelevant the concept of freedom, especially one that 
comprehends a role for a self-reflective reason that interacts with the will and the world around it 
to yield a choice.   
 Frazier argues for a sophisticated conditioning program to yield both the desired conduct 
and feelings in individuals.  Humans are simply more complicated versions of domesticated 
animal stock.  Society needs to keep the sheep healthy and contented but need not be concerned 
with notions of individual agency.  Among the drawbacks of this approach is that it eliminates 
the role for regret, grief, frustration, or meaningful self-reflection that would lead to a 
recognition when one performs an evil act.  It substitutes “I could not help it” or “I did not mean 
it” for the possibility of genuine repentance.22  Even from a naturalistic perspective, this radically 
restricts opportunities for positive change—even change Frazier might otherwise laud. 
  
 
20 B.F. Skinner, Walden Two, (Macmillan Paperback, New York: Macmillan, 1962), 115. 
21 Any similarities the reader might see regarding the ruling class of Walden Two and today’s ruling 
elites should be resisted.  Else one might end up being required to attend mandated re-orientation training.  
Of course, in this country such a requirement couldn’t possibly come to pass.  
22 Gerrity Benignus, Nature, Knowledge and God; an Introduction to Thomistic Philosophy, 
(Milwaukee: Bruce Pub. Co., 1947), 273-274. 
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Free Will as evidence of panpsychism 
 Erwin Schrödinger, one of the founders of quantum mechanics, resolves the dilemma 
arising from his subjective experience of freedom, that he saw in conflict with a deterministic 
universe, by the adoption of panpsychism: 23 
My body functions as a pure mechanism according to the laws of nature.  Yet I 
know by incontrovertible direct experience, that I am directing its motions of which 
I foresee the effects, that may be fateful and all-important, in which case I feel and 
take full responsibility for them….The only possible inference from these two facts 
is ...that I——I in the widest meaning of the word, that is to say, every conscious 
mind that has ever said or felt “I” –am the person, if any, who controls the ‘motion 
of the atoms’ according to the laws of nature.24   
 This leads to Schrödinger to believe that his subjective experience is grounded in a 
singular universal consciousness.  Thus, his infamous declaration “...hence I am God 
Almighty,”25 a view he apparently held his entire life. 
 The view that there is a singular monadic consciousness pervading all of reality and that 
our empirical experiences are but the epiphenomena of this cosmic entity, like all solipsistic 
theories of being, has the quality self-consistency.  But it is not an explanation for the reality of 
freedom per se and abandons the concept of the individual free will.  In the case of Schrödinger, 
it could at least be understood as an attempt to explain the subjective qualia of freedom while 
diffusing the responsibility for its actualization into the aether.   
 It should be noted that panpsychism is not a 20th century development but appeared in 
medieval times as Averroes’ theory of monopyschism that Albert the Great, Robert Kilwardby, 
 
23 Panpsychism is a form of solipsism where, like solipsism, there is only a singular consciousness.  
But in solipsism “you” are the only consciousness, and everything else including the external universe 
exists only in your mind.  Whereas in panpsychism the universe is the singular consciousness and we all 
merely participate in it—a slightly less narcissistic view than classic solipsism. 
24 Schrödinger quoted in Schrodinger, Life and Thought, Walter John More (Cambridge ; New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989), 400. 
25 Schrödinger quoted in Schrodinger, Life and Thought, 401. 
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St. Bonaventure and Thomas all inveighed against.26  Thomas, in De unitate intellectus contra 
Averroistas, attacks monopsychism as at odds with traditional philosophic teaching and because 
the mind is dependent on the body.27 
 For the hard incompatibilist and the panpsychic freedom is either eliminated or 
transformed into the unrecognizable.  The remaining sections of this chapter will survey views of 
human freedom that actively argue for freedoms existence but differ in regard to how it can be 
understood and constituted with a strictly deterministic solely material universe. 
Libertarianism 
 Contemporary libertarian philosophy takes the position that materialism is true and that 
even if determinism is largely true free will exists.  Most libertarians resolve this tension by 
constraining the role of determinism in regard to free will decisions.  Furthermore, we will see 
that the contemporary position of libertarian freedom aligns closely with Ockham’s ‘freedom of 
indifference’ or the ‘choice of contraries’ that will be introduced in Chapter 3. 
 Libertarians describe the world in terms of alternatives for an individual to choose 
between as they pass through time.  At any decision point where free will could be exercised the 
libertarian would require alternate choices be available.  The picture of how this unfolds is seen 
in in Kane’s famous Garden of Forking Paths.28        
 
26 Ralph McInerny, Thomas Aquinas Against the Averroists On There Being Only One Intellect, (West 
Lafayette, Ind: Purdue University Press, 1993),  8. 
27 McInerny, 147-152. 





 The minimum characteristic at a decision cusp is the existence of at least two alternatives 
to decide between.  This could be two equivalent alternatives like picking between Crest or 
Colgate toothpaste or it might be the decision to either do or not do an immoral act.  For the 
libertarian, all the issues underlying freedom boil down to the matters confronting the individual 
at that particular decision cusp. 
 Libertarians tend to frame their arguments against their chief philosophic rival, 
compatibilism, which is the view that free will exists but is compatible with a deterministic 
universe.  A compatibilist would assert that in a deterministic universe, if an individual were 
given a do over in the same universe at the same point in time, like in the movie Groundhog 
Day, they would make the same choice again, and achieve the same result.  This can be reduced 
to the pithy principle same past, same future29.  In this kind of universe, no matter how often Bill 
Murray relives his single day, the day must end the same each time.30  
  
 
29 Robert Kane, A Contemporary Introduction to Free Will Fundamentals of Philosophy, (Oxford, 
England. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 33. 
30 While many philosophers adhere to such a principle it evidently does not make for a good movie 
plot.  Both in Groundhog Day and in the Tom Cruise movie Live Die Repeat, The Edge of Tomorrow, the 




The Libertarian Dilemma  
  
https://www.classcentral.com/course/edx-libertarian-free-will-neuroscientific-and-philosophical-evidence-12605 
Figure 2.  
 The libertarian transforms this principle into its opposite: same past, different possible 
futures.  Libertarians would laud the changed future that Bill Murray eventually achieves in 
Groundhog Day as a demonstration of true human freedom.  To put this thinking in agency-
specific language, Kane articulates The Indeterminist Condition—the agent should be able to act 
and act otherwise (choose different possible futures), given the same past circumstances and laws 
of nature.31 For libertarians like Kane, if there is a causal (in the modern, not scholastic, sense) 
chain of events leading to a given choice to go left or right in Figure 2. then that decision would 
be unfree—thus the quest for an “indeterminate” explanation that breaks the causal chain.  But if 
there exists an indeterminant explanation for such a choice why would that decision be 
considered free?  And why would such a decision even be a desideratum?  Compatibilist critics 
call this question the libertarian coherency challenge,32 and we will look at the several ways 
libertarians have responded.  
 
31 Robert Kane, A Contemporary Introduction to Free Will, 38. 
32 Daniel Dennett, Elbow Room : The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting. (New ed. Cambridge, 
Massachusetts; London, England: MIT Press, 2015), 1-21. 
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Immaterial Mind  
 Perhaps the oldest model that holds the potential for evading a deterministic universe is 
the notion of an immaterial mind.  Specifically, a view of the mind that is separate from the 
physical substrates (i.e. the brain) but that can interact with the material body at the point of 
decisions and action initiation.  A sketch of two of the many ways mind and body might relate in 
this approach are given in Figure 333 where P stands for physical states, M for mental states. 
 
 
adapted from https://www.wikiwand.com/en/Mind%E2%80%93body_dualism 
 
Figure 3. 
 For the interactionist dualist, the physical and mental states are distinct with the mental 
states freed from the physical laws governing the physical states.  But the interactionist believes 
the two kinds of states can interact. The challenge with this theory is to explain the basis for 
interaction.  For the epiphenomenalist dualist, there are both mental and physical states, but they 
act as distinct worlds where state progression in each is mirrored with progression in the other 
without interaction between the two worlds.34   
 
33 We should note these are varieties of Cartesian dualism.  A distinct variety less familiar to the 
modern is Aristotelian hylomorphic dualism held by Aquinas which we will briefly detail in Chapter 6. 
34 Epiphenomenalism allows for a distinct mind but asserts that it is a mere side effect of the body and 




 The most notable of recent proponents for a form dualism to explain the mind and its 
freedom were the philosopher Karl Popper, and John Eccles, Nobel Laureate in neurophysiology. 
They prefer describing themselves as trialists with their categorizations of reality into three 
worlds.35  World 1 is the world of physical objects and states; the world of physics and biology, 
and the material substrates humans build upon that world such as machines, books and works of 
art and music.  World 2 are the states of consciousness; it includes the world of subjective 
knowledge, the experience of perception, thinking, the emotions, dispositional intentions, 
memories dreams and creative imagination.  And their World 3 is the world of knowledge in the 
objective sense; it includes world of philosophical, scientific, mathematical, historical theories 
and thinking about such.   
 Dualist theories are supposed to provide the body with a get-out-of-jail-free card enabling 
the will to break the chains of deterministic causation.  But critics assert dualism is just kicking 
the can down the road:   
The dualist approach to free will makes a fundamental philosophical mistake.  It 
sees a problem and tries to solve it by throwing another kind of ‘thing’ into the 
arena… [but] If we cannot understand how human beings are free [in a libertarian 
sense], we cannot understand how [a disembodied mind] can be free either.36 
 We note that such a critique carries the implicit presumption that explanations for a 
decision voids the possibility of such a decision being free.  In Chapter 3 we will argue that this 
presumption is not accepted, and we will demonstrate in Chapter 6 the necessity of at least a 
form of dualism in support a meaningful notion of personal identity. 
Noumenal Self 
 Kant accepted the Newtonian mechanistic physics of his day and its deterministic 
implications.  In his Critique of Pure Reason he bows to Descartes’ turn to the subject leading to 
 
35Karl Popper,  John C. Eccles, The Self and Its Brain (New York: Springer International, 1977), 36. 
36Simon Blackburn quoted in Robert Kane, A Contemporary Introduction to Free Will, 42. 
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the development of positivism.37  But he believed in the reality of human freedom and in its 
necessity for moral agency.  His solution was to compartmentalize the world of space and time to 
the domain of science and reason,38 and the world of the things as they are “in themselves” to the 
noumenal domain.39  He concluded free will belonged to the latter and could not be explained by 
the rules of the world of space and time that are constrained by the laws of nature.  In contrast, to 
act in accordance with moral laws was for Kant a self-legislating act: we can choose to obey or 
not. 
 Kant’s noumenal-self explanation led to both theological and philosophical 
subjectivism.40  His grounding the basis of belief in the moral needs of man did not result in  
either a satisfactory explanation of either freedom or a solid foundation for moral agency. But 
instead, it led to an understanding of dogmas not as statements of fact but as formulas expressing 




38 Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Pure Reason, Project Gutenberg, 
http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/4280. 
39 Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Practical Reason. Project Gutenberg, 
http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/5683. 
40 Benignus, 330. 




 “A staff moves a stone, and is moved by a hand, which is moved by a man”42  
 Agent causation theory of freedom asserts that the normal physical causation chains are 
epistemically incomplete.  Roderick Chisholm is the contemporary philosopher most associated 
with this approach.43  Chisholm concedes that for ordinary entities deterministic causation rules, 
but argues that agent caused event chains are of a different order of causality. He categorizes the 
movement of the staff on the stone as transeunt causations, and the movement of the hand by the 
man as immanent causation.44  
If we consider only inanimate natural objects, we may say that causation, if it 
occurs, is a relation between events or states of affairs.  The dam’s breaking was an 
event that was caused by a set of other events—the dam being weak, the flood being 
strong, and so on.  But if a man is responsible for a particular deed, then…there is 
some event [his deed or action]…that is caused, not by other events or states of 
affairs, but by the agent, whatever he may be…If what I have been trying to say 
[about immanent causation] is true, then we have a prerogative which some would 
attribute only to God: each of us when we act is a prime mover unmoved.  In doing 
what we do, we cause certain events to happen, and nothing—-or no one—causes 
us to cause those events to happen.45 
 For agent-causation, free actions caused by the agent are not a circumstance, an event or 
a state of affairs—instead agents are a distinct category—a thing or substance or a part of a 
substance with a continuing existence.  Free actions are agent-caused and hence undetermined by 
events.  Those supporting agent-causation would point out the priority of immanent causation by 
asserting it is only by understanding our own causal efficacy that we can we grasp the notion of 
 
42Aristotle, Physics, VII, 5, 256a, 6-8, trans. R.P. Hardie, R.P. and R.K. Gaye, 
http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/physics.html.  
43 Roderick Chisholm, Person and Object: A Metaphysical Study (London: Routledge, 2004), Chapter 
II. 
44 At least one key difference between a Chisholmian agent and a human agent in the Aristotelean 
sense is that the Chisholm considered his agent purely material. 
45 Chisholm, 34. 
21 
 
cause at all since “the notion of cause may very plausibly be derived from the experience we 
have … of our own power to produce certain effects.”46  
 Agent-causalists argue that the cause of a free choice is neither prior events, thus 
avoiding determinism, nor random occurrences but the choice is caused immanently by the agent 
themselves.  Chisholm accepts the conclusion this leads to an infinite regress of agent-causation, 
which for contemporary philosophy is an unpalatable outcome.47  We will point out in Chapter 6 
that this infinite regress is a fundamental aspect of self-consciousness.  While agent causation 
has not attracted many modern philosophers, we will reclaim aspects of agent-causation with 
Thomas’ view of the will as its own self-mover, albeit in a secondary sense, as God is the 
ultimate cause of every created motion.48   
Depending on Chance 
 Libertarians, attempting to avoid a strict deterministic causal chain leading to a decision, 
seek ways to enlist chance as part of the decision process.  In this approach the ultimate free 
decision is influenced one way or another by a random event.  The incept for this idea would the 
case of a decision where it was difficult to choose between two options either because of almost 
equal attraction or almost equal repulsion.49  
 
46 Richard Taylor quoted in “Human Freedom and the Self” in Free Will, 31. 
47 Kane, A Contemporary Introduction to Free Will, 50. 
48 ST, I-II, q. 9, a. 6, trans. English Dominican Province, 632-633. 
49 In Chapter 3 Ockham’s “freedom of indifference” will be introduced.  It is possible to interpret the 
“indifferent” choice as an early attempt to enlisting equal randomness as a key ingredient in a free 
decision—at least for a decision that is a close call.  If we define a probability distribution for a choice 
between two outcomes, the point at which the choice is “too close to call” is the point where the choice is 
equally likely.  This point turns out to also be the point of maximum entropy and corresponds 
mathematically with the point of maximum disorder in the system--see Thomas Cover "Chapter 12, 
Maximum Entropy",  Elements of Information Theory (2 ed,  Wiley, 2006).  The point of maximum 
freedom is therefore the point of maximum disorder.  An outcome that suggests something has gone 
wrong with this proposal. 
22 
 
 There has been a cottage industry among physicists and philosophers50 proposing that 
mental events (and free will) could follow from a variety of quantum effects such as quantum 
domain entanglement and nonlocality.51  However, most neuroscientists consider it improbable 
for quantum effects to occur given the “warmth”52 of the brain, although the possibility has not 
been entirely foreclosed.53  While it is barely possible that quantum effects may be part of our 
brain’s functioning, the role it could play in free will appears limited to providing a source of 
randomness in the neural machinery.  What does such a spontaneous event accomplish?  If these 
undetermined mental “nudges” occur and are not under the control of the human agent is this the 
kind of freedom we want? 
 Kane’s proposals in this area represent the most nuanced of attempts to incorporate 
chance as an enabler of free decisions.  He prunes from consideration all but a small handful of 
decisions where there is the possibility of free will, conceding the rest as predetermined by the 
laws of the universe.  He focuses attention on those decisions by which we make ourselves into 
the kinds of persons we are, namely the “will-setting” or “self-forming actions” that are required 
for ultimate responsibility.  “These undetermined self-forming actions occur at those difficult 
times of life when we face competing visions of what we should or should not 
become…[Examples would be] when we are torn between doing right or acting from ambition, 
 
50 S. Hameroff, “Biological feasibility of quantum approaches to consciousness” 
in The Physical Nature of Consciousness, ed. P. van Loocke,  (Amsterdam: John Benjamins), 1-62;  
Roger Penrose, Shadows of the Mind: A Search for the Missing Science of Consciousness,  
(Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 1994). 
51 Quantum entanglement is an experimentally verified phenomenon where paired particles state 
remains dependent on one another.  This means that even if they are separated widely in space measuring 
one particle determines the state of the other.  The explanations for this verifiable occurrence trespass on 
issues such as faster than light communication, and even reverse time causality.  Hameroff and Penrose 
use these phenomena to explain how microscopic effects could have macroscopic consequences.   
52 Literally warmth.  Quantum coherence and entanglement is easiest to produce at extremely low 
temperatures—like within a degree Kelvin of absolute zero (~459.67 °F). 




or between acting on powerful present desires versus acting on long-term goals.”54  Kane 
identifies as the key characteristic of these occasions that we are faced with tension and 
uncertainty in our minds about what to do:   
It is at such times that our brains [move away from] thermodynamic 
equilibrium…[there is] a stirring up of chaos in the brain that makes it sensitive to 
micro-indeterminacies at the neuronal level…What we experience internally as 
uncertainty about what to do on such occasions would then correspond physically 
to the opening of a window of opportunity that temporarily screens off complete 
determination by influences of the past.55 
 Kane further proposes that, consistent with recent advances in neurosciences, such 
decisions might involve competing neural networks of interconnected neurons circulating signals 
in feedback loops, each processing information for one alternative.56  He then appeals to chaos to 
act as an amplifier of randomness that will result in one of the networks “winning”.  And in 
either case he argues that whichever outcome succeeds the individual will view the decision as 
“theirs.”   For Kane such a choice should be considered neither “inadvertent”, “accidental”, 
“capricious”, nor “merely random”, because in all these cases the choice will be willed, and it 
will be experienced as willed by the person making it.57  
 While Kane has minimized the footprint of the libertarian argument, it reveals several 
very unsatisfactory features when put under the microscope.  First, he is claiming for freedom 
only those decisions where there is essentially a close call between two choices, a limitation we 
will not accept for the freedom of excellence.  Second, the decision regarding this close call is 
understood as originating as a non-conscious event that has been amplified into a preference by 
some random neural process and is explicitly described as not the result of a deliberative choice.  
Finally, Kane’s validation of it being a free decision is that the person has mental experience of 
 
54Kane, “Libertarianism”, 26. 
55Kane, “Libertarianism”, 26. 
56Kane, “Libertarianism”, 28.   
57Kane, “Libertarianism”, 29.   
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having adopted the final preference and final decision is therefore “their” decision.  We will see 
this “ownership” argument is also claimed for compatibilism, but we assert such reasoning is 
fails to extend beyond Boswell’s “We know our will is free, and there’s an end on’t.”58 
Compatibilism 
 Compatibilists assume a deterministic and strictly materialistic universe, but argue that 
free will exists.  Not surprisingly their definition of free will differs from the varieties of 
libertarianism.  A compatibilist argues that freedom is the ability of an individual to act as one 
wishes.  So, if a person acts as they wish they possess free will.  This argument was articulated 
by Hobbes: 
He is free to do a thing, that may do it if he have the will to do it, and may forbear 
if he have the will to forbear.  And yet if there be a necessity that he shall have the 
will to do it, the action is necessarily to follow; and if there be a necessity that he 
shall have the will to forbear, the forebearing also will be necessary59  
This argument was further elaborated by David Hume: 
What is meant by liberty when applied to voluntary actions?  We cannot surely 
mean that actions have so little connection with the motives, inclinations, and 
circumstances that one does not follow with a certain degree of uniformity from the 
other, and that one affords no inference by which we can conclude the existence of 
the other.  For these are plain and acknowledged matters of fact.  By liberty, then 
we can only mean a power of acting or not acting according to the determinations 
of the will; that is, if we choose to remain at rest, we may; if we choose to move, 
we also may.  Now this hypothetical liberty is universally allowed to belong to 
everyone who is not a prisoner and in chains.  Here then is no subject of dispute.60 
 
58The argument that when a person makes a decision (regardless of its cause) they take ownership of it 
is made by libertarians, and compatiblists alike and is also coherent with freedom of excellence.  But from 
the perspective of freedom of excellence it is an obvious consequence of having an intellect. 
59 Thomas Hobbes and John Bramhall, The Questions concerning Liberty, Necessity, and Chance, 
(Early English Books Online. London: Printed for Andrew Crook 1656), 42. 
60 David Hume,  An Inquiry concerning Human Understanding; with a Supplement,  
An Abstract of a Treatise of Human Nature, Edited with an Introduction by Charles W. Hendel. (The 
Library of Liberal Arts, 49. Indianapolis: Bobbs- Merrill, 1955), VII, Part I, 104. 
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Compatibilism thus argues that: 1) we must have the power or ability or desire to do what we 
want; and 2) we need an absence of constraints such as physical coercion or compulsion that 
would prevent us from doing what we want.   
 Thomas had already raised an objection to this argument: “it is not whether we bring 
about what we will, but whether our will is free.”61  There are acts of individuals who are 
brainwashed or addicted that we and the compatibilist might wish to exclude from being 
considered free.  But how would a compatibilist differentiate the causes leading to such a state 
from acts from the ordinary deterministic workings of the universe?  If some are unfree due to 
deterministic causes how can a compatibilist argue any are free? 
 Compatibilists concede that conditioning processes as seen in Brave New World or 
Walden Two are examples of deterministic processes that undermines the ability of individuals to 
exercise free will.  They concede that persons, other agents, whether behavioral engineers or 
snake oil salesman, are using these techniques as means to their ends.  But they would assert that 
nature and its deterministic laws are not such agents. As evidence that determinism can co-exist 
with individual freedom and thus individual responsibility a compatibilist would point to one of 
the Frankfurt examples.62  
 Let us imagine that there is a Mr. Smith who is considering for whatever reason whether 
or not to kill a Mr. Jones.  But consider another entity, a controller external to the situation, that 
is able to recognize Mr. Smith’s intention before the decision is actuated and has the wherewithal 
to prevent Mr. Smith’s killing Mr. Jones but will otherwise not interfere with Mr. Smith’s 
 
61 Quoted in Chisholm, 66.  Chisholm does not give a reference and I have been unable to verify this 
quote in Aquinas’ primary materials, particularly in ST, I, q. 82 and 83. 
62 Harry Frankfurt, “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility” Free Will  ed Gary Watson, 2nd 
ed, (Oxford Readings in Philosophy, Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 172. 
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decision making.63  Under this scenario Mr. Smith will be unable to kill, but Frankfurt argues 
that if Mr. Smith decides not to kill it will be a free will decision, and that this will is operating in 
a completely deterministic setting.  Harry Frankfurt constructed this and variations on this 
scenario as an attack on the libertarian principle of alternate possibilities (PAP) that is: 64  
(1) An agent is responsible for an action only if said agent could have done otherwise. 
(2) An agent could have done otherwise only if causal determinism is false. 
(3) Therefore, an agent is responsible for an action only if causal determinism is false. 
Frankfurt argues that since we intuitively laud the outcome where Mr. Smith decides not to kill, 
and that because his decision to not kill is not coerced even though the deterministic rules of the 
scenario would have prevented the alternative, therefore PAP is false.  Since PAP is false, the 
opposite must be true, agents can be free and morally responsible in a completely determined 
scenario. 
 The most basic criticism of this argument is that Frankfurt is simply begging the 
question.   There is nothing in the scenario that prevents Mr. Smith from either making the 
decision to kill or not to kill: it is just that he will be prevented from the act of killing.  Frankfurt 
cannot argue such an inhibition affects the internal decision making one way or another, it only 
affects the external outcome.  Therefore, this example is irrelevant with regards to whether Mr. 
Smith’s decision making was free or was unfree. 
 
63 These ‘controllers’ are simply devices for establishing the scenario.  Issues of how the controller can 
read Mr. Smith’s intentions or how it could interfere with Mr. Smith’s actions are irrelevant to the line of 
the argument. 
64 Frankfurt, 829–39. 
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 Compatibilists argue that determinism should not be confused with fatalism—the view 
that whatever is going to happen is going to happen.  John Stuart Mill makes this distinction 
because we participate in forming who we are: 
A fatalist believes…not only that whatever is about to happen will be the infallible 
result of the causes that preceded it, but moreover that there is no use in struggling 
against it; that it will happen however we may strive to prevent it…thus fatalists 
believe that a man’s character is formed for him and not by him.  This is a grand 
error.  He has, to a certain extent, a power to alter his character…His character is 
formed by his circumstances…but his own desire to mold it in a particular way is 
one of those circumstances, and by no means the least influential.65 
 Compatibilists such as Dennett argue that determinism does not mean that we are 
machines like watches or insects responding automatically to the stimuli of our environment.  
Instead, we are beings—formed by the blind hand of evolution to be sure—that reason and 
deliberate, reflect on our values, and make plans.  In none of these things does determinism make 
free will untrue.  It is these capacities and not the lack of determinism that makes us free.66 
However, these assurances of freedom ring hollow in the libertarian view since, for the 
compatibilist, each of these capacities, including reason itself, is formed deterministically by 
environmental factors beyond our control.  
 Compatibilism is a “quagmire of evasion” according to William James and a “wretched 
subterfuge” according to Immanuel Kant, but aspects of its arguments are attractive and deserve 
salvaging.  Dennett rightly acknowledges the many amazing aspects of our mental characteristics 
contributing to the reality of freedom.  We will demonstrate in Chapter 6 that compatibilism’s 
most serious deficiencies arise from its metaphysical poverty, especially the elimination of final 
ends and an insistence on a purely material universe.   
 
65 John Stuart Mill, A System of Logic, Book VI, Chapter II, § 3 
https://www.gutenberg.org/files/27942/27942-pdf.pdf. 
66 Daniel C. Dennett, Elbow Room : The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting, (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts ; London, England: MIT Press, 2015), Ch 4 
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Current Philosophical Impasse 
 Peter Tse has declared the philosophical arguments regarding human freedom at an 
impasse.67  Strawson is pessimistic regarding a solution.  “The principal positions in this debate 
are clear…No radically new option is likely to emerge after millennia of debate.” 68  We have 
reviewed the major positions regarding free will in contemporary philosophical thought and must 
agree with each position’s critics in finding them unpersuasive explanations for human freedom. 
 We are now ready to propose a quite different approach to what free will and freedom 
means.  But to appreciate this proposal it will be necessary to turn the clock back: back before 
the scientific revolution, before the Enlightenment, before we lost the anthropology and the 
metaphysics needed to untangle Tse and Strawson’s Gordian knot.   
   
 
67 Tse, 3. 




Chapter 3. Freedom of Excellence: Pinckaers’ View of Moral Theology 
 We now turn away from the post Enlightenment world of Chapter 2 and return to the 
world where the metaphysics of Erasmus and Luther are still relevant.  Here we will find a more 
complete and satisfying theory of human freedom that Servais Pinckaers calls freedom of 
excellence.  This view of freedom re-emerges from its Thomistic roots as a consequence of his 
work aimed at revitalizing the foundations of moral theology by restoring the proper balance for 
the role of virtue.  This chapter will focus on developing Pinckaers’ formulation of freedom, with 
a deeper exploration of its Thomistic foundation in Chapter 4.   
An Adequate Anthropology 
Pinckaers’ approach to human freedom starts with an anthropology which focuses on two 
key aspects.  The first is a refusal to accept the rupture between human and divine, freedom and 
grace, natural and supernatural that has been the un-reflected legacy of the Enlightenment.  This 
refusal to be swallowed up by the modern “turn to the subject” allows him to maintain a critical 
space for the role of human participation with the divine, even in the presence of corruption 
caused by sin, and to insist that this natural harmony between human and divine is the goal of 
God’s restoration of His image in us.  It is in the outworking of God’s grace that leads us to what 
is most concretely and truly human.69 
 Pinckaers’ second anthropological theme is a refusal to atomize the moral act.  He 
defines this atomization when a theory of freedom focuses only on the individual discrete action, 
an action disconnected from its past or its future.  He uses terms such as “experience” to include 
more than simply a memory of past actions but the full span of impressions, emotions, and 
 
69 Pinckaers, 90. 
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accumulated memories under the umbrella of intelligence in the context of moral science. 70  
Moral reasoning is not simply reasoning over a priori principles, but the recognition that moral 
actions affect the very being of the individual in a way that conditions future actions.   
Pinckaers reemphasizes the integrative role of the virtues in his anthropology by tying 
together individual human action into the longitudinal horizon of experience.  He then moves to 
the foundational context of defining virtue, Christ’s Sermon on the Mount, using Paul as an 
interpretive filter.  Paul’s teaching arose from the intersection of Jewish views of morality 
grounded in the covenant with God, and with Greek philosophy that was anchored in the pursuit 
of wisdom.  But Paul recasts these elements in light of the “New Law” of the Gospel and in the 
historical reality of the person of Jesus Christ.  The morality of the Christian is now realized in 
personal union with Christ through the fully expressed virtues of faith and love: 
This moves the heart beyond the visible horizons, beyond suffering and death to 
where Christ is seated with the Father…this hope creates a new dimension with the 
human heart where the moral life unfolds…Henceforth every virtue, each action of 
the believer will be modified from within by this relation of faith and the life of the 
risen Christ.71 
For faith gives birth to a change in the very personality of the believer and not just a forensic 
change of status.  Pinckaers argues that Paul holds up the humility of Christ obedient, 
crucified and risen, calling us a to life in Christ, to become imitators of Christ, making us 
dependent on the faith, hope and charity that binds the believer to Christ.72 
In this Pauline context, Pinckaers finds that the expectations expressed by Christ in the 
Sermon of the Mount are for all Christians.  He rejects the view that Christ’s description of 
human behavior is an expression of an ideal for the few—the religious73—but not relevant for 
 
70 Pinckaers, 92. 
71 Pinckaers, 116. 
72 Pinckaers, 121. 
73 This is a reference to the consecrated religious.   
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the practice of the ordinary believer.74  Pinckaers uses Augustine’s commentary on the Sermon75 
to reclaim for moral theology the role of happiness rather than obligation as key to understanding 
the Sermon.76  He argues that if we understand ethics as simply a matter of obligation then we 
cannot assimilate the lessons the Sermon has for us. “The Lord’s teaching penetrates the depths 
of human nature far too intimately to be viewed as a body of strict commands imposed by an 
external law.”77  It concerns the works the Holy Spirit wishes to accomplish in all of us through 
the power of His grace with our ‘humble and docile’ cooperation:  “The Sermon gives us what 
the Spirit promises and calls us to hope before telling us what to do.”78  Therefore, Pinckaers 
holds the Sermon on the Mount as the model of moral teaching addressed to all, beginning with 
the gift of the Beatitudes in fulfilment of the Old Testament, deepening the precepts of the 
Decalogue, and penetrating to the heart where actions are conceived, and virtues formed.79  
A Thomistic Framework 
If we think of the Sermon on the Mount as the formal cause of Pinckaers’ teachings on 
Christian ethics, Thomas Aquinas’ teaching is the efficient cause in the sense that it is Thomas’ 
systematic formulation that provides Pinckaers’ theory of freedom the detailed structural 
description of human personhood.  While some later theologians blame Aquinas for a moral 
theology based on natural law shorn of its connection to scripture and tradition, Pinckaers’ 
refutes this claim.   
Pinckaers argues that in Aquinas’ moral teaching there are three towering peaks: our 
journey in search of happiness which culminates in the vision of God, the way of the theological 
 
74 Pinckaers, 136-37. 
75 Augustine, Commentary on the Lord’s Sermon on the Mount with Seventeen Related Sermons,  trans 
Dennis Kavanagh, ( Baltimore: Catholic University of America Press, 1951). 
76 Pinckaers, 141. 
77 Pinckaers, 160. 
78 Pinckaers, 160. 
79 Pinckaers, 165. 
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virtues which render God present to us, and finally the evangelical or New Law which is the high 
point of all legislations issuing from the wisdom of God and communicated to human beings.80  
Should these peaks be separated from one another we are left with “a moral teaching that is 
focused only on human acts, a smattering of passion, and a small sampling a virtue…[in this] we 
have witnessed the decapitation of St Thomas.”81 
Pinckaers views as the capstone of Aquinas’ teaching in the prima secundae and secunda 
secundae of the Summa his treatise on the evangelical law.  Aquinas starts with the grace of the 
Holy Spirit engendering faith, hope and charity in the human intellect and will.  These graces 
enlarge the natural virtues ruled by reason: first prudence and justice, then fortitude or courage 
and temperance.  Aquinas follows Augustine and Gregory the Great in having the Spirit add to 
each virtue a gift that perfects it.82  This ordering toward supernatural happiness is augmented by 
infused moral virtues that are added to the acquired virtues to fit us to a supernatural end.  
“These qualities penetrate to the interior of the natural virtues, enabling them to act in view of 
supernatural happiness.”83  
Pinckaers viewed the received ‘manualist’84 tradition of his earlier years as conceiving of 
moral law as only an expression of the divine will, centered in natural law and expressed in the 
Decalogue but deemphasizing Aquinas’ articulation of the evangelical New Law.  Pinckaers 
 
80 Pinckaers, 172. 
81 Pinckaers, 171. 
82 Pinckaers, 178, ST, I-II, q. 68, a. 1,  877-888. 
83 Pinckaers, 179. 
84 As Brian Besong describes in “Reappraising the Manual Tradition.” American Catholic 
Philosophical Quarterly 89, no. 4, 2015: 557–584, that since Vatican II many Catholic moral theologians 
have been antagonistic to the prior practice of priests use of ecclesiastically-approved manuals or 
handbooks whose contents chiefly involved general precepts of morally good and bad behavior as well as 
the extension of those precepts to particular cases. One source of antagonism was from theologians such 
as Charles Curran, Bernard Häring, and James Keenan, who dissented from the moral conclusions defined 
by the Magisterium appearing in these manuals.  A second source of opposition arose from the orthodox 
branch of the ressourcement movement of the Nouvelle Théologie.  Servais Pinckaers was of this latter 
group. His objections were not due to disagreement with the conclusions of the manuals but their loss of 
an explicit anchoring in the virtues. 
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describes Aquinas’ view of the law as a work of wisdom, first engaging the intelligence and then 
the will.85   The Old Law, centered in the Decalogue and expressed in natural law, finds its full 
expression in the evangelical law of the New Testament.86 
Aquinas, following in Augustine’s footsteps, frames the meaning of the evangelical Law 
by the distinction between interior and exterior actions, concluding that there is no new teaching 
in the Sermon at the level of exterior actions:  
The entire teaching of the Sermon centered on the regulation of the interior acts, of 
the will, intention, love and desire.   While the evangelical law had an external 
origin in Christ’s revelation, as a grace of the Holy Spirit it penetrates to the interior 
of the person becoming the very source of the virtues.87 
Calling attention to Aquinas’ conception of ethics as focused mainly on virtue and only 
secondarily on precepts, was part of Pinckaers’ quest to renew of the foundations of moral 
theology.  Precepts function as the guidepost to what was necessary to make virtuous action 
possible, but as virtue increases the need for precepts decreases.  “This is precisely why the 
New Law is called the law of freedom…the action of the Spirit through the virtues creates 
within us a spontaneous, personal movement toward good acts.”88  This in turn opens a 
wider field for freedom’s initiative within a corresponding less explicit role for precepts.  
Pinckaers asserts this makes the New Law non-reducible to either natural law or the 
Decalogue.89  But if this is the view of Aquinas, who appears to be systematizing but 
otherwise consistent with Augustine as well as Paul and the witness of Christ in His 
Sermon, then how did this view become lost or at least deemphasized by the time of the 
 
85 Pinckaers, 181. 
86 Pinckaers, 181, ST, I-II, q. 106, a. 4 p 1106-1107. 





era of the manuals?  It is in answering this question that Pinckaers develops his view of 
freedom. 
Freedom of Indifference 
Pinckaers traces the root cause back to the scholastic divide between Dominican and 
Franciscan interpretations of the definition of Peter Lombard’s proposition that “Free will is that 
faculty of reason and will whereby one chooses the good with the help of grace, or evil without 
the help.”90  Aquinas understands this freedom as proceeding from reason and will which unite 
in the moment of the choice, and are rooted in the inclinations to truth and goodness.91  While 
Aquinas affirms the primacy of the intellect, he defines the first and formal element of the 
beatitude in terms of the intellect, the Franciscans maintained primacy of the will and substituted 
love for intellect as the formal element of beatitude.  Mahoney argues that the fusion of Aquinas 
with Franciscan nominalism becomes one of the standard “Thomistic” views that undergirds the 
later theology established by figures such as Francisco Suárez.92   
While Mahoney considers nominalism to come to fullness with Suarez, Pinckaers points 
to William of Ockham for its inception.  For Ockham, freedom was radically autonomous, 
separated from all that was foreign to it: reason, sensibility, and natural inclinations as well as 
external factors.  Pinckaers argues that further atomization occurred as this view of freedom 
became embedded into western theological and philosophical thought: freedom was separated 
from nature, law and grace; moral doctrine from mysticism; reason from faith; and the individual 
from his societal community.93 
 
90 Peter Lombard, Sententiarum Liber Secundus, XXIV, Chapter 3, quoted in Pinckaers, 331 
91 Pinckaers, 331, ST, I, q. 83, 417 but as Pinckaers notes it is preceded by q.79, and q.80 for good 
reason. 
92John Mahoney, The Making of Moral Theology: A Study of the Roman Catholic Tradition (Oxford, 
OX : New York: Clarendon Press ; Oxford University Press, 1987),  226. 
93 Pinckaers, 337. 
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Ockham held that freedom preceded reason and will in such a way as to move them to 
their acts.  “I call freedom the ability by which I am able indifferently and contingently to posit 
diverse courses, such that I am able to cause or not to cause the same effect, with no difference 
existing somewhere else outside this power.” 94  Pinckaers summarizes this view: “Thus freedom 
consisted in an indetermination or radical indifference in the will regarding contraries, in such a 
way that actions were produced in a wholly contingent way.”95  Thus freedom of indifference is 
the ability of the will to be indifferent to opposite choices and is the primary understanding of 
freedom that underlays modern views as “a conscious pressure of self upon self” that Pinckaers 
argues ultimately leads to the self-willed man of Nietzsche.96   
Pinckaers holds Ockham  responsible for creating a breach between freedom and the 
natural inclinations.  This breach led to the development of moral theories of obligation rather 
than a moral science anchored in virtue.  This is in contrast with Aquinas’ moral theory in its 
natural predisposition toward beatitude and the perfection of the good as our ultimate end.97  For 
Aquinas, a person can never be prevented from desiring this end.   But for Ockham, being is now 
subject to the contingent choice of freedom instead of an individual being ordered towards 
beatitude.  Inclinations have been displaced to a lower level of activity which leads to an almost 
complete reversal of their role:   
The consideration of the nature and spiritual spontaneity of the human person was 
banished from the horizons of thought.  Inclinations appear as a threat to the 
freedom and morality of actions because they are interior and influenced us from 
within.98 
 
94Ockham, Quad 1, q. 16 quoted in Thomas Osborne, Human action in Thomas Aquinas, John Duns 
Scotus, & William of Ockham (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press. 2014), 52. 
95 Pinckaers, 332. 
96 Pinckaers, 332. 
97 ST, I, q. 60, a. 1, 297-298. 
98 Pinckaers, 333. 
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The nominalistic freedom of indifference leads to a fundamental rupture in the source of action 
in the human soul.  Not only is the relationship between the will and the natural inclinations 
transformed but its relationship to human sensibility is as well.  While Aquinas held that the 
passions could acquire a positive moral value, for freedom of indifference passions diminish the 
scope of freedom giving rise to rigorism.99 
 In addition to the diminished role of the natural inclinations, Pinckaers argues that the 
very idea of habitus is opposed to the freedom of indifference, for in habitus there is a stable 
determination of action.100  The stronger a habitus grows the more it influences subsequent 
actions and the more it would seem to reduce freedom of indifference’s scope.  We will see in 
Chapter 3 that for Aquinas, habitus relates to the rational choice of what appears to be good and 
thus reinforces human freedom.101   
 We then see how the virtues came to be deemphasized in the manualist tradition.  
Pinckaers concedes the manualists make nominal room for the virtues, but he asserts that under 
the influence of freedom of indifference, ethicists came to treat virtue as simply a label, a logical 
category that enumerates moral obligations but left only Law as their organizing principle.102  In 
diminishing the role of the inclinations and habitus, nominalism fractures the continuity of act 
 
99 Pinckaers, 335. 
100 Pinckaers, 336. 
101 The claim of a direct minimization of habitus in Ockham may be unfair, see Magali Roques,  
“Ockham on Habits” in The Ontology Psychology and Axiology of Habits(Habitus) in Medieval 
Philosophy, (Springer, Switzerland, 2018), 263.  Ockham does push the role of habitus away from the 
intellect, and shift predisposition of willing usually associated with habitus to the term inclinations, which 
he then calls the “act before the act” see Oswald Fuchs, The Psychology of Habit according to William 
Ockham,( St Bonaventure Franciscan Institute, 1952), 70.  But more importantly he severs the causal 
relationship that Aquinas asserts between the interior and exterior act—they merely occur at the same 
time. (see Osborne, 199). When combined with his view that an act is only bad because of divine 
command, we see a further separation in the role habitus can play regarding virtue, see Osborne, 180. 
102 Pinckaers, 336. 
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with act.  In contrast, for Pinckaers inclinations and habitus establish a pattern of acts that ‘have 
continuity ordered to finality’:  
Human acts were linked from within the interior and formed an organic whole 
where the present flowed from the past and opened into the future…On the contrary 
if freedom depends in its entirety on an indifferent choice between contraries then 
each of our actions is an atomic act, separated in any meaningful sense from all 
antecedent or posterior actions.103   
Continuity is shattered, each act becomes an isolated atom—a monad of activity. It 
is like viewing a person’s life through a series of strobe light flashes where nothing 
in between the flashes is considered important and in which the individual events 
have no real connection…  It is the atomic age of moral theology.104   
 This is a view of personhood that disintegrates its component elements.  Free action 
follows upon free action without unifying principles fusing them into an essential whole. 
Consideration of final ends still plays a role in the calculus of individual actions but given its 
anchoring in a single act it cannot avoid a foreshortened view of finality.  As Ockham scholar G. 
de Largarde puts it: 
…if the human person’s basic dignity lies in the power to act at any given moment 
in the way he chooses, then personality is something we cannot grasp.  Only the 
successive, varying actions of the person matter…actions continue with its bizarre, 
uncoordinated contours.  Human discontinuity is one of the basic tenets of 
Ockham…and this leads directly to a moral system in which only actions are taken 
into consideration.105 
Pinckaers does not mince words regarding the implications of this development: 
 Make no mistake: the demolition—and the word is chosen with precision—of St. 
Thomas’ moral teaching by Ockham and the [subsequent] nominalists was no 
unfortunate accident, no regrettable error stemming from weakness of intellect 
and of moral concepts.  We can see in it the direct, clearly deduced, and fully 
deliberate result of placing humanity in a center position.  This was the core of 
freedom of indifference… Beneath freedom of indifference lay hidden a primitive 
passion—we dare not call it natural:  the human will to self-affirmation, to the 
 
103 Pinckaers, 337. 
104 Pinckaers, 336. 
105 G. de Legarde, La naissance de l’esprit laique au declin du moyen age, (Vol 6. L’individualism 
ockhamiste, Paris 1046), 46-47 quoted in Pinckaers, 338. 
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assertion of a radical difference between itself and all else that existed.106   
 
Freedom of Excellence—what we want from freedom 
 Dennett in his influential book Elbow Room, observes that an adequate theory of freedom 
is inevitably tied to the kind of free will we need, and specifically want.107  To help with more 
clearly identifying the kind of freedom that we need and that we should want, we will start with 
Pinckaers’ example of learning to play the piano.108   
Anyone, whether they know how to play or not, is ‘free’ to bang out notes on the piano. 
But to play the piano with excellence is not accomplished in the single isolated act of the will but 
arrives at the end of a long journey that consists of countless individual acts.  It starts with a child 
that possesses a basic musical predisposition such as an attraction to play and the physical 
potential to succeed.  With the aid of a teacher and regular practice exercises a child learns the 
rules of the art.  Lessons and practice can be viewed as a constraint on the freedom of 
indifference, but with effort and perseverance the child progresses in rhythm, accuracy, sight 
reading and musicality.  But growing in musicianship is far more than merely avoiding breaking 
the laws of music.  With abilities forged over many years of practice, growth, and learning the 
emergent musician possesses an enlarged musical freedom, a “freedom of excellence.” This 
freedom enables the exploration of the musical world not previously open to him or her, and in 
fact could not have even been imagined when they first approached the instrument and were only 
‘free’ to bang notes on it. 
  Moving from the arts to the moral order, Pinckaers considers the virtue of courage.  The 
virtue of courage enables us to act when otherwise setbacks would weaken our resolve.  Contrast 
 
106 Pinckaers, 338. 
107 Dennett, Elbow Room, Chapter 7 
108 Pinckaers, 355. 
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the courageous with the coward: the coward can boast that he is as free as the wind but Pinckaers 
would describe him as closer to being a slave because he does not know how to resist pressures 
or circumstances as he ought.109  But it makes no sense to think about choosing courage as a 
choice among possible alternatives as you would in a freedom of indifference. The development 
of courage is progressive, acquired through repeated victories of self-conquest.  It is seen by 
example, then personally appropriated, and grows through dogged effort to render service and 
overcome.110   
 These examples demonstrate the core differences between the freedom of indifference 
and the freedom of excellence.  Freedom of excellence emerges as an outcome of the harmonious 
and continuous interaction between our interior and exterior worlds contra an atomic monadic 
will.  Freedom of excellence is rooted in our basic inclinations and primal moral sense that 
Aquinas asserts are universal: the sense of the true and good.111  Pinckaers describes this 
freedom as finding its inception in the morality of attraction rather than obligation.   He draws on 
the analogy of a child growing into adulthood to describe the unfolding of this freedom: first in 
discipline, then in the development of virtue, and finally in the development of moral maturity, 
following the three stages of Aquinas.112 
 Like the child beginning to learn the piano, moral education begins with grappling with 
the ‘discipline of life’ rooted in the moral laws.  At this point we might perform actions for their 
immediate reward, or to avoid punishment.  But even in this stage we should understand our role 
as ‘beginners in the order of charity’.113  Pinckaers would agree with Ockham and the later 
voluntarists that the role of the law at this stage is to help offset those inclinations that are 
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opposed to charity.  But he would insist, along with the mystics, that this is merely a first step 
along the journey, necessary in order that God may act and reveal himself more fully in our next 
steps.  The second stage is characterized by a deepening of what Pinckaers calls ‘an active 
interiority’; it is this stage where the virtues are formed organically with a personal intention to 
act in accord with the good of these virtues.  Again, unlike the atomic language of a freedom-of-
indifference based morality, there are no grand isolated acts that characterize this stage.  Instead, 
this stage unfolds little by little, act by act as we grow in virtue.   
It should be said that the notion of virtue does not consist in the superlative with 
respect to itself, but with respect to its object, because by virtue a man is ordered to 
the utmost of a power, which is to act well; hence, the Philosopher says in Physics 7 
that virtue is the disposition of the perfected to the best. However, one can be more 
or less disposed to this optimum, and in this respect, virtue receives more or less.114 
What formerly guided us—the desire of reward, or fear of punishment—yields to the love of 
virtue for its own sake.  Equally important for Pinckaers is the exterior relationships we form in 
this stage in the friendship and love for others.115 Instead of the virtues being unnecessary and 
un-causal for freedom, they are at the very core of what we mean by true freedom.  
Pinckaers describes this development “as a personal capacity for action which is the fruit 
of a series of fine actions, a power for progress and perfection”.116  This is the core of Pinckaers 
entire argument:  
Virtue is contained within a timespan and within the action performed, and within 
the timespan virtue develops the person and his actions; it transforms the passing 
moment.  While freedom of indifference holds us fixed within the instant, moral 
progress requires our perseverance in the active intention that orients our life 
toward a goal, a higher reality that gives it its full value.  No progress can be made 
without the ongoing, patient and courageous effort that directs all our successive 
actions in one direction, the goal we long for and love supremely.117 
 
114 St. Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones Disputatae de Virtutibus, Disputed Questions on the Virtues, q2, 
a.11 ad. 15, trans. Ralph McInerny, (St Augustines Press, South Bend Indiana, 1999). 
115 Pinckaers, 363. 
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117 Pinckaers, 364. 
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It is with the second stage that we are ready for the Sermon of the Mount, which the Fathers 
describe as penetrating through the external actions of the Law into the heart.118  Pinckaers likens 
this stage to the ‘illuminative path of the mystics’, in whose contemplative life and practice of 
the virtues through the enlightenment of the Holy Spirit, “infuses freedom and strength into the 
soul, directing us ever more powerfully to God, while deepening our attachments to our 
neighbors in effective pure love.”119 
 The third stage is that of moral maturity, the adulthood of the moral life consisting of the 
mastery of excellence and creative fruitfulness.  This is the freedom that Aquinas describes in the 
beginning of the prima secundae,120 as spiritual maturity by the perfection of love of the Father 
and Christ, and the contemplative life ordered to the vision of God.  It leads to man becoming 
“[the] perfect man, unto the measure of the age of the fullness of Christ.” (Eph 4:13)121  It is a 
self-mastery that presumes moral education and development of the virtues within us.  Pinckaers 
describes the role of the virtues acting like a sheaf of interior energies that allow us to draw 
together our faculties, ideas, desires, and feelings and direct them to their higher end:  “This 
deepening interiority does not isolate us but draws us into the world to lead us to a vocation, 
whether great or humble, in service of family, city, and Church.”122  This corresponds to the 
perfecti of Aquinas, the New Law of St Paul, which Pinckaers summarizes as the grace of the 
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Chapter 4. Finding Freedom of Excellence in Aquinas 
 
 Pinckaers asserts that a proper understanding of freedom of excellence arises from a 
correct understanding of Aquinas.  He presumes the reader is both familiar with and agrees with 
his interpretations.  We will explore Aquinas in regard to these arguments and demonstrate that 
Pinckaers’ interpretations are justified.  Pinckaers also argues the wrong turn taken in the 
understanding of human freedom after Aquinas was due to the views of Ockham and his 
subsequent interpreters,123 but examining that argument in any further detail is beyond our scope.  
 We will demonstrate that Aquinas view of the relationship between the will and the 
intellect possesses a complex interplay which extends to the habits, inclinations and finally the 
virtues.  We see in Aquinas support for the notion that freedom grows because of the positive 
change that occurs in both the intellect and the will subsequent to appropriate human acts.  The 
mechanisms for this are explained in part by human interaction with divine participation in at 
least one mode by the infused virtues, as an integral aspect of the individual moving towards 
their final end.   We argue this integrated view of human action that is developed by Aquinas is 
precisely what Pinckaers has termed the freedom of excellence. 
 
123 Thomas Osborne, Human Action in Thomas Aquinas, John Duns Scotus, & William of Ockham, 
(Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press,  2014);Simon Gaine, Will there be Free 
Will in Heaven?: Freedom, Impeccability and Beatitude, (London ; New York: T & T Clark, 2003). 
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Aquinas and Appetites, Inclinations and Final Causes 
 The term goodness pervades Aquinas’ writing on both God and man as a property of 
being.124  “The goodness of a thing consists in it being desirable…desirability is consequent of 
perfection…and perfection depends on how far it has achieved actuality”125 thus the act of being 
is the first perfection of every created being.  God, being the only self-subsisting being, pure 
simplicity, is good: not just good but Goodness itself.  For all other created beings, being and 
essence are the composition of substance and accidents.126  “Since no creature is essentially its 
own being, no creature has by its nature all the perfection for which it is capable.  For this 
reason, every creature is oriented toward an ultimate end distinct from itself, and so must attain 
that end through its actions.”127 
Accordingly, since all things are destined and directed by God to good, and this is 
done in such a way that in each one is a principle by which it tends of itself to good 
as if seeking good itself, it is necessary to say that all things naturally tend to good. 
If all things were inclined to good without having within themselves any principle 
of inclination, they could be said to be led to good, but not to be tending toward it. 
But in virtue of an innate principle all things are said to tend to good as if reaching 
for it of their own accord. For this reason it is said in Wisdom (8:1) that divine 
wisdom "ordereth all things sweetly" because each one by its own motion tends to 
that for which it has been divinely destined.128  
 The appetites are a crucial intermediary in the causal sequence that begins with the 
mind’s conception of its final end.  The appetites are the engine pulling us forward to the 
completed actions that realize that end.129  These inclinations form a key connection in 
understanding how Aquinas connects particular willing acts into a coherent series ordered to a 
 
124 ST, I, q. 5, a. 1, 23-24. 
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final end.  We will explore specific aspects of Aquinas’ interconnection between the most 
important appetite, the appetite of the intellect or the will, and the intellect itself.  We will 
demonstrate the critical role the virtues play for Aquinas in connecting human action to moral 
theory. By that point it will be clear that Pinckaers is thoroughly justified in claiming Thomistic 
roots for his formulation of freedom of excellence. 
Voluntarism versus Intellectualism?  
 Aquinas considers the will and intellect as two powers (potentiae) that, although they are 
ordered to each other, are distinct from each other and from the soul.130  The will chooses an 
object that is shown to it by the intellect, and while the intellect moves the will Aquinas 
considers the will the efficient cause of the subsequent act.  Aquinas relates this distinctness by 
reference to the sense appetites which humans share with animals as distinct from the soul.  He 
acknowledges the situation for humans is more complex as humans have an intellect, so he 
argues by analogy, there is an appetite for the intellect which follows on the knowledge 
presented by the intellect and this intellectual appetite is the will.131   
 Aquinas understands the human act to emerge out of the interaction between its appetites 
and the intellect.  Every intellect, human or angelic, can grasp the good and will it.  Every nature 
has a natural inclination, and the natural inclination is towards the good.132  Since the will’s 
formal object is the good, whatever the will wills must be judged good by the intellect that 
presents the object to the will.  Therefore, in Aquinas’ view, a person cannot do evil for evil’s 
sake; instead, each person’s action is taken based on their understanding of their final end.  
However, there is a broad split among Thomists as to the particulars of the relationship between 
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will and intellect.  This division roughly corresponds to the difference between holding Aquinas 
was a voluntarist or whether he was an intellectualist. 
 Voluntarism in the context of the medieval schools asserts that at the concrete level of the 
act, the will has superiority over the soul’s other powers, particularly the intellect.133  By 
contrast, the intellectualist position holds that the will’s activity is under the intellect’s control.  
This section follows the analysis of Jeffrey Hause that argues Aquinas position is a synthesis of 
both positions.134  Intellectualists can cite Aquinas that “Hence the whole root of freedom is 
located in reason”135 and that “Only that which has an intellect is able to act by free judgment, 
insofar as it knows the universal nature of the good, from which it is able to judge this or that to 
be good.”136  These statements seem to create a strong current for voluntarists to swim against.  
However, Aquinas provides suggestions of voluntaristic leanings in indicating the will is free 
from determination, determination other than its nature to will to happiness and the good in 
general.  He also asserts that the will has the ability to will or not will an act that the intellect 
presents it,137 a key differentiator of man from animal in that animal cannot refrain from acting 
but man can and further that:  
If the will be offered an object which is good universally and from every point of 
view, the will tends to it of necessity, if it wills anything at all; since it cannot will 
the opposite.  If, on the other hand, the will is offered an object that is not good 
from every point of view, it will not tend to it of necessity…any other particular 
goods, in so far as they are lacking in some good, can be regarded as non-goods: 
and from this point of view, they can be set aside or approved by the will, which 
can tend to one and the same thing from various points of view.138 
 
133 Jeffrey Hause, "Thomas Aquinas and the Voluntarists", Medieval Philosophy & Theology 6, no. 2 
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This ability suggests that while the will cannot act against the final judgement of the intellect, the 
option of inaction remains, suggesting the will has a ‘pocket veto’ over the alternatives presented 
to it by the intellect. 139   
 The argument against this view by an intellectualist would be that nothing in the will’s 
ability to not will in this or similar statements suggests that this has occurred in opposition to the 
intellect’s judgement.  Certainly, Aquinas makes clear that the will’s is guided by reason:  
…but every being that possesses intellect and reason, acts by free choice, namely 
inasmuch as the choice, in virtue of which it acts, follows on the apprehension of 
the intellect or reason which extends to many things.140  
Furthermore, that is free which is not tied down to any one definite course. But the 
appetite of an intellectual substance is not under compulsion to pursue any one 
definite good, for it follows intellectual apprehension, which embraces good 
universally. Therefore the appetite of an intelligent substance is free, since it tends 
toward all good in general.141   
Aquinas specifically links the ability of the will to either will or not will with reason in holding a 
human being responsible for their acts.  “Now man is master of his acts, and especially of his 
willing or not willing, because of his deliberate reason, which can be bent to one side or 
another.”142 
 The will can choose between different goods or different means to good. This includes 
the ability to choose apparent goods that are not good.143  This is the path on which evil acts 
occur, which for Aquinas are always willed under the ratio of goodness even though the 
particular act is in fact not good.144 The will is indetermined in regard to choices between 
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different and even incompatible goods since no good in this life exhausts what it means to be 
good: “…just as now we desire of necessity to be happy, it is therefore clear that the will does 
not desire of necessity whatever it desires.”145  
 If Aquinas does not support a voluntarism of exercise, then perhaps he supports a 
voluntarism of specification?  He makes a distinction between an act’s exercise and 
specification: 
The will is moved in two ways: first, as to the exercise of its act; secondly, as to 
the specification of its act, derived from the object.  As to the first way, no object 
moves the will necessarily, for no matter what the object be, it is in man’s power 
not to think of it, and consequently not to will it actually. 146 
 
When in Aquinas the will selects from the various options presented by the intellect, the 
intellectualist would interpret that reason draws a further conclusion about which option is 
preferable and the will chooses that option.   Whereas voluntarists such as Eleonore Stump and 
others147 would argue that practical judgement does not settle the object of choice. John Finnis 
concedes that reason shapes the alternatives but asserts we should understand Aquinas to mean 
that “where practical reasoning is followed by choice, reasoning must have left something open 
to choice.”148  Finnis buttresses this point from Aquinas: 
Choice includes something that consent has not, namely, a certain relation to 
something to which something else is preferred: and therefore after consent there 
still remains a choice.  For it may happen that by aid of counsel several means have 
been found conducive to the end, and through each of these meeting with approval, 
consent has been given to each: but after approving of many, we have given our 
preference to one by choosing it.149  
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 An intellectualist response to this is that nowhere does Aquinas say that it is up to the will 
alone or that it is independent of the intellect to determine its own activity, but that Aquinas 
implies or states that human beings have control of their acts through both reason and will.150  
The will is said to have dominion over its own act not to the exclusion of the first 
cause, but inasmuch as the first cause does not act in the will so as to determine it 
of necessity to one thing as it determines nature; wherefore the determination of the 
act remains in the power of the reason and will.151 
Even in the case where the will has a role in causing a choice between equally attractive options 
that the intellect presents to it, Aquinas still maintains a role for reason above simple presentation 
of the alternatives.  In commenting on Plato’s reference to two food dishes being equally 
desirable and equidistant he says: “If two things are proposed (to the will) which are equal in one 
respect, nothing prevents our considering in one of them some quality which makes it stand out, 
and (so nothing prevents) the will’s being inclined to that one rather than to the other.”152  
Will as Self-Mover and as a Mover of the Intellect 
 This evidence argues against Aquinas as a voluntarist of either exercise or of 
specification.  We have already seen that Aquinas asserts the formal relationship that the will is 
guided by reason, but is it determined by reason?  If it is the latter, then Aquinas could be 
accused of simply evaporating any fundamental role for the will and should therefore be 
considered a pure intellectualist.  But Aquinas makes clear that while the role of choice lies with 
the will, will is not untethered from reason: 
Choice is the final acceptance of something to be carried out. This is not the 
business of reason but of will; for, however much reason puts one ahead of the 
other, there is not yet the acceptance of one in preference to the other as something 
to be done until the will inclines to the one rather than to the other. The will does 
not of necessity follow reason. Choice is nevertheless not an act of the will taken 
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absolutely but in its relation to reason, because there appears in choice what is 
proper to reason: the comparing of one with the other or the putting of one before 
the other. This is, of course, found in the act of the will from the influence of reason: 
reason proposes something to the will, not as useful simply, but as the more useful 
to an end.153 
 What keeps Aquinas position from collapsing to pure intellectualism?  Aquinas 
subscribes formally to the Aristotelian concept of the will as a cause of itself, subject as we 
will see to certain caveats:   
Free decision is the cause of its motion, because a human being through free 
decision moves himself to act.  But it does not of necessity belong to liberty that 
what is free should be the first cause of itself, as neither for one thing to be cause 
of another need it be the first cause. God, therefore, is the first cause, Who moves 
causes both natural and voluntary.  And just as by moving natural causes He does 
not prevent their acts being natural, so by moving voluntary causes He does not 
deprive their actions of being voluntary: but rather is He the cause of this very thing 
in them; for He operates in each thing according to its own nature” 154 
The will of a being is a self-mover, but not a first cause–this capability is derived from God’s 
indirect causality.  Aquinas ties this need for self-movement into moral theology because he 
requires self-movement for works that a person might do to be ascribed to merit, and as we will 
see later self-movement is not all that is required.   
If the will were so moved by another as in no way to be moved from within itself, the act 
of the will would not be imputed for reward or blame…it does not thereby forfeit the 
motive for merit or demerit.155 
 Crucially, Aquinas describes actions the will has in feedback to the intellect.  After all, 
the will is the efficient cause of the action, this action moves the entire person including the 
intellect156 and that “the will wills the intellect to understand.”157  Robert Pasnau argues this 
explicit feedback between the will and the intellect is the equivalent for Aquinas of higher order 
 
153 QDV, q 22, a.I5,  reply c, 90. 
154 ST,  I-II, q. 83, a.1, ad 3 , 418. 
155 ST,  I, q. 105, a.4, ad 3 ,  518. 
156 ST,  I, q. 82, a.4, c, 416. 
157 ST,  I, q. 82, a.4, ad 1, 416. 
50 
 
volitions.158 Humans, unlike the animals, not only are able to make judgments about our 
judgments but we have “volitions that direct our volitions.”159  Whether the volitions that direct 
our volitions is simply will acting on will, which we have seen Aquinas allows for, there is also 
the direct influence of the will on the intellect in terms of focus:  “But the will has the power to 
apply or not to apply its attention to something.”160 
 Our general inclinations provide a push to our intellect to consider a range of options.  If 
and when specific circumstances occur, options outside of that range are foreclosed and the will 
moves us within a narrower confine with no further cognition occurring regarding the foreclosed 
options.  Aquinas’ theory of will and intellect therefore is not simply focused on the single act 
but includes the long-term dispositions that affect our day-to-day actions.  Aquinas views the 
relationship between will and reason as a continual feedback and feedforward process where 
intellect guides will, will moves intellect, and in so doing both are changed over time. 
The will does not simply endorse the passing judgments of reason, in a neutral 
fashion, but subjects those judgments to the higher-order aims that shape who we 
are.  The will, in other words, contains habits or dispositions that influence the 
course of its operations may tell us to cheat, but the will can insist on honesty; 
reason may counsel silence, but the will can urge us to speak.  In such cases it is 
the will that is in control, in virtue of its fixed dispositions and desires, which hold 
independently of reasons dictates—considered in the short term.  The will cannot 
entirely repudiate reason, but the will shapes reason just as much as the reason 
shapes the will.161  
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Figure 5.   Will driving Intellect or Intellect driving Will?   
 While the will is the efficient cause of motion for the intellect, we have seen Aquinas’ 
view includes a rich and nuanced interaction between the will and the intellect.  Figure 5 reflects 
abstractly why classifying Aquinas as either a voluntarist or an intellectualist misses the mark.  It 
is not possible in such a relationship to assign a driver role when both may be able to influence 
the other even while retaining distinct functions.  However, as Pasnau asserts, it is this 
interaction over time with conjunction with the habits and dispositions that completes Aquinas’ 
description of the rich relationship between will and intellect.  We briefly note that this 
Thomistic view of will and intellect is certainly consistent with Pinckaers, but to go further in 
supporting a Thomistic foundation for freedom of excellence we need to connect Aquinas’ 
theory of will with his moral theory. 
Dealing with Weakness of the Will and the Passions 
 Aquinas makes this association with his moral theory by asserting the virtues of justice 
and charity as dispositions of the will.162  Aquinas’s “rational appetite” should then be 
understood as not simply a calculus of reason but as reflecting our deepest commitments as 
human beings.  However, we have not yet seen how to explain those actions which appear 
wrong, wrongheaded or just plain evil.  We will first need to review how Aquinas weaves 
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together the will and reason with dispositions, inclinations and the virtues.  It will be in dealing 
with temptation and failure where Aquinas explicates a primary and ongoing role for Divine 
action in terms of the “infusions” of the virtues of charity and justice. 
 Aquinas’ claim that the will is a rational appetite has been severely criticized in light of 
the apparently irrational actions of the will.  Hobbes would complain that: 
The Definition of the Will, given commonly by the Schools, that it is a Rational 
Appetite, is not good. For if it were, then could there be no Voluntary Act against 
Reason. For a Voluntary Act is that, which proceedeth from the will, and no 
other.163 
Hobbes wishes to have the will accounted for even when he believes it is grounded in 
“…Ambition, Lust…Aversion or Feare”164 because for Hobbes like Aquinas the role of the will 
is critical in ensuring the “voluntary” nature of the act for which the person can therefore be held 
morally accountable. 
 In part, Aquinas accounts for wrong actions originating from nonrational desires such as 
lust by pointing to the inclinations, especially those of the body.  “But only the wise resist bodily 
inclinations; and they are few in comparison with the foolish, because according to Ecclesiastes 
(1:15) ‘the number of fools is infinite.’”165  Aquinas will largely hold that such nonrational acts 
affects the will indirectly through the intellect while the origin of the nonrational desires arise 
through the sensory apparatus of the body.   
 Aquinas describes two effects of the sensory system on the person–the whole person 
including the immaterial intellect.  He defines the sensory appetite as having concupiscible and 
irascible powers—through the concupiscible “the soul is simply inclined to seek what is suitable, 
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according to the senses, and to fly from what is hurtful…whereby an animal resists these attacks 
that hinder what is suitable, and inflict harm is called irascible.”166  While Aristotle appears to 
allow these bodily powers to directly move the body to action bypassing the will, Aquinas has 
these powers both affecting intellect and will in a way that is sometimes irresistible.  Aquinas 
will state in one place that the irascible and the concupiscible are subject to reason,167 but 
elsewhere the perhaps more realistic assessment that “Sensuality cannot be cured in this life 
except by a miracle.”168  
 Aquinas believes this imperfect state of affairs is the consequence of original sin.  Prior to 
the Fall Adam and Eve were in control of these appetites, but subsequent to the Fall we possess a 
concupiscence that can be controlled but not absolutely. 
However, this corruption of the "fomes"169 does not hinder man from using his 
rational will to check individual inordinate movements, if he be presentient to them, 
for instance by turning his thoughts to other things. Yet while he is turning his 
thoughts to something else, an inordinate movement may arise about this also: thus 
when a man, in order to avoid the movements of concupiscence, turns his thoughts 
away from carnal pleasures, to the considerations of science, sometimes an 
unpremeditated movement of vainglory will arise. Consequently, a man cannot 
avoid all such movements170 
 Aquinas describes two kinds of actions against reason that result from this state.  The first 
is the notion of incontinent willing.  Aquinas follows Aristotle in describing such actions 
occurring in an individual who acts for the perceived short term (usually in the context of a 
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sensual pleasure), and therefore is ignoring the implications of the long term.  “For what is here 
and now pleasant seems absolutely pleasant and good if it is not related to the future.”171   
 Aquinas has an active role for reason in resisting such tendencies.  He allows for the case 
“that some sins are committed from weakness” contra Socrates who taught “that no one having 
knowledge sins from weakness” which Aquinas held is clearly contrary to our daily experience.  
He instead argues that the intellect can be impeded or diverted:  “When concupiscence, or anger, 
or something of this kind, is intense, man is impeded from the consideration of knowledge.”172   
But for Aquinas “the will [provides] the power to direct or not direct attention to a thing”, giving 
a special blame for the will in this case.  But Pasnau suggests it might be more true to Aquinas to 
say that such an individual lacks sufficient disposition within the will to hold the person’s 
attention away from passion’s object.173  
 A second and a far more serious action against reason, is the intemperate action.  This is 
not a description that should be applied to a particular act but is used to describe the situation 
where there is malice against the good consistently.  Such a person “knowingly chooses the 
bad”.174  The incontinent individual is one, who after failing to control his passion that acted 
through the sensory appetite and his reason and will, fails to choose to the good, but is after the 
act regretful in having failed to control his passion.  This is not the case with the intemperate 
individual, whose will is “out of order when it loves more the lesser good.”175 The intemperate 
loves his sensory-appetite-inspired passions more than he loves God.  This failure is one of not 
having a proper disposition: 
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when someone is so disposed by habit or passion that something seems either good 
or bad to him under this particular aspect, the will is not moved of necessity: 
because it has the power to remove this disposition so that the thing does not seem 
so to him; for example, when a man calms his wrath so as not to judge something 
in anger. Passion however is more easily removed than habit.176 
 Dispositions matter to the human act, but dispositions do not necessitate. Dispositions can 
be changed and even removed although not as easily as passions, and results might be slow in 
coming.  The implication is that this type of change develops over time for those with enough 
intelligence and perseverance to stay on the right path.  Hence, right action takes a certain 
measure of wisdom since “only the wise resist…[but] the number of fools is infinite.”177  It is the 
training up of these dispositions of the will that help manage the incompletely controlled 
passions.  For Aquinas, this is precisely the role of the virtues. 
The Role of the Virtues in the Will and Reason 
 A virtue is a habit which “denotes a perfection of a power.”178  Aquinas focused on the 
moral and intellectual virtues in their distinctiveness to support his analysis of the theological 
virtues of faith, hope and charity.179  These virtues directly relate to establishing right 
dispositions of the will, although Aquinas will assert all the virtues impact the will or the reason.   
 Following Dreskinski,180 for Aquinas the moral virtues are habits “by which we work 
well,”181 “and by which we live righteously.”182  “Virtue is numbered among the highest goods 
insofar as through it man is ordered to the highest good, which is God, and for this reason no one 
uses virtue badly.”183  Each moral virtue is associated with an aspect of the appetitive part of the 
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soul.184  The virtue of temperance perfects the concupiscible appetite;185 the virtue of courage 
perfects the irascible appetite;186 the virtue of justice perfects the will.187  And closely associated 
with the moral virtues is the intellectual virtue of prudence, which Aquinas defined as “the right 
reason of things to be done,”  which involves deliberation about the means to a good end, and 
that in turn depends on the rectitude of the appetite.188 
 Aquinas follows Aristotle in asserting that it is by habituation and practice we acquire 
these virtues.189  We do not start out life possessing adequate courage for every situation in 
which it is needed, but by taking advantage of opportunities we can grow in this virtue.  
Similarly, one can become temperate by the practice of regulating the appetite that promises 
pleasure—an appetite that could otherwise hinder the development of honesty and the full 
expression of our beauty.190 
  While Aquinas suggests that humans can, in and of themselves, develop ordinary virtues, 
only God can transform human beings by His gift of the moral virtues.191  These virtues are 
habits “which God works in us, without us.”192  In addition to the moral virtues for which one 
can prepare with prior acts are the infused theological virtues of faith, hope and charity that are 
supernatural—that are above the natural capacities of the human.  These virtues direct us 
“towards a happiness surpassing man’s nature...by a kind of participation in the Godhead.”193   
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The virtue of faith, perfects the intellect, as “a habit of mind, whereby eternal life is begun in us, 
making the intellect assent to what is non-apparent.”194  The virtue of hope, perfecting the will, 
reflects the movement of the will “towards certain spiritual union.”195  And the virtue of charity, 
“which is the mother and root of all the virtues”196 also perfects the will and is the uniting of man 
to God in true friendship.197   
 But distinctive of the theological virtues, it is with charity that God additionally infuses 
the moral virtues.198  Hobbes may scoff at the idea of a full-fledged habit being the correct 
metaphor for infused virtues, “the words in-poured virtue, in-blown virtue, are as absurd and 
insignificant as a round triangle,”199 however, Aquinas’ view preserves a significant role for the 
person beyond being simply a passive receptacle.  
 Aquinas defends the notion, in the context of charity, that the infused virtues can be 
deepened and increased in the individual in a process analogous to the habituation of the 
acquired virtues.200  He describes charity as being in motion towards its end, thus it can be “ever 
more [increasing] in the subject.”201  Its very nature is to cause the individual to act in ways that 
lead to a more fervent and deepened love, thus increasing our inclination to love God and our 
neighbor.  Each act of charity disposes a person to greater charity in the future resulting a 
virtuous feedback process in regards to our moral growth.202  Conversely, “when a man fails to 
make use of his virtuous habit in order to moderate his own passions or deeds…wherefore virtue 
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is destroyed or lessened by cessation from act.”203  Failure to exercise the infused virtues 
weakens their power, and in the specific case of charity, mortal sin “destroys it entirely…since 
when sinning mortally a man acts against charity”204 
The Priority of Grace in Ordering the Will 
 We have demonstrated the prior role God has in the development of virtue, but the 
relationship between these virtues and will and grace is more fully developed in Aquinas’ 
Biblical commentaries.205  Aquinas is perfectly clear regarding the proper ordering of these 
activities vis a vis salvation: 
To create anything is to produce it from nothing; hence, when anyone is justified 
without preceding merits, he can be said to have been created as though made from 
nothing (quasi ex nihilo factus).  The creative action of justification occurs through 
the power of Christ communicating the Holy Spirit206 
 While Aquinas makes this justification a consequence of our new creation through the 
Holy Spirit, we are also inwardly renewed so that we can carry out these works that are prepared 
for us.  “Let anyone imagine that good works are prepared for us by God in such a way that we 
do not cooperate in their realization through our free will, he [Paul] annexes ‘that we should 
walk in them’, as though he said: thus has he prepared them for us, that we might perform them 
for ourselves through our free will.”207  We are co-workers in carrying out these good works 
with God.  Aquinas identifies this process with justification and justification with salvation: 
There are four things which are accounted to be necessary for the justification of 
the ungodly, viz. the infusion of grace, the movement of the free-will towards God 
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by faith, the movement of the free-will [away from]208  sin, and the remission of 
sins.  The reason for this is that …the justification of the ungodly is a movement 
whereby the soul is moved by God from a state of sin to a state of justice.  Now in 
the movement whereby one thing is moved by another, three things are required: 
first the motion of the mover; secondly, the movement of the moved; thirdly, the 
consummation of the movement, or the attainment of the end.  On the part of the 
Divine motion, there is the infusion of grace; on the part of the free-will which is 
moved, there are two movements—of departure from the term whence, and the 
approach to the term whereto; but the consummation of the movement or attainment 
of the end of the movement is implied in the remission of sins; for in this is the 
justification of the ungodly completed.209  
 It might be possible to say that Aquinas’ view of justification subsumes Luther’s view of 
justification but crucially it includes the right ordering of the one justified.  As Matthew Lamb 
has said, “No one insists more strongly than Aquinas on the sinner’s absolute dependence on 
God to justify him; but he equally insists that God’s justifying word effects what it says.”210 
 Aquinas writes that a core part of this process for the human is the appropriate ordering 
of the will—the free will: 
Christ works in two ways.  In one way, he works without us, as in creating the 
heavens and the earth, raising the dead to life…In the other way, he works in us but 
not without us: the result of this is faith, by which the impious are brought to 
life…The reason for this is that whoever believes is producing the same result since 
what is produced in me by God is also produced in me by myself, that is, by my 
free choice (liberum arbitrium).  Thus the Apostle says: ’It was not I’, that is, I 
alone, ‘but the grace of God which is with me’211  
Aquinas provides a nuanced view of how to consider an action and outcome whose primary 
agent is God but still preserve a role for the secondary agent—that is us. 
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For always an action is attributed more to the principal agent than to a secondary 
agent; consider (for example) that we say that an axe does not make the chest, but 
the artificer through the axe.  However the will of man is moved by God to the 
good.  Whence above (8:14) it was said: ‘They who are led by the Spirit of God, 
these are children of God.’  And for that reason the interior or exterior operation of 
man is not to be attributed to man chiefly, but to God (Phil. 2:13)…And therefore 
it must be said that God moves all things, but by diverse modes, insofar as, namely, 
whatever thing is moved by God [is] according to the mode of its nature.  And thus 
man is moved by God for willing and for running through the mode of free will.  
Thus, therefore, to will and to run is man’s, as of one acting freely: however, it is 
not of a person as the one moving chiefly, but of God.212  
 But this grace that infuses and aids in preserving and elevating our will, in what ways is 
this grace to be infused?  For Aquinas this was the role of the sacraments.  The sacraments of the 
New Law are a cause of grace, are an opportunity for the infusion of grace for building of the 
virtues, and the restoration of the will.  And all this is made possible by the incarnation of Christ 
and especially Christ in his humanly body:  
Nor is Christ only the pattern; He is also the efficient cause of our resurrection, for 
the things done by Christ’s humanity were done not only by the power of His human 
nature, but also by virtue of His divinity united in Him. Just as His touch cured the 
leper as an instrument of His divinity, so also Christ’s resurrection is the cause of 
our resurrection, not merely because it was a body that arose, but a body united to 
the Word of life.213 
The sacraments of the New Law are ordained for a twofold purpose: namely for a 
remedy against sins; and for the perfecting of the soul in things pertaining to the 
Divine worship according to the rite of the Christian life.214  
We must needs say that in some way the sacraments of the New Law cause grace. 
For it is evident that through the sacraments of the New Law man is incorporated 
with Christ. 215 
And just as the soul's powers flow from its essence, so from grace there flow 
certain perfections into the powers of the soul, which are called virtues and gifts, 
whereby the powers are perfected in reference to their actions.216  
 
212 In Rom, 9:14-18,  in Commentary on St. Paul’s Epistle to the Romans, trans. Steven Boguslawski , 
(upcoming from Paulist Press, quoted in  Aquinas on Doctrine : A Critical Introduction), 146. 
213 Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on Saint Paul’s First Letter to the Thessalonians, translated by 
Michael Duffy, (O.P. Magi Books, Inc., Albany, N.Y., 1969),  Chapter 4-2. 
https://isidore.co/aquinas/english/SS1Thes.htm#42. 
214 ST, III, q. 63, a. 1,  c, 2355. 
215 ST, III, q. 62, a. 1,  c, 2349. 
216 ST, III, q. 62, a. 2,  c, 2351. 
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 The sacraments and the ongoing graces they infuse are the final link in the chain that 
Aquinas has woven regarding the virtues, the will and reason.  It is in the reception of the grace 
flowing from Christ through the sacraments, both the non-repeated sacrament of baptism, and the 
continuing sacrament of the Eucharist, that there occurs the ordering of the will and the intellect 
that is the habituation process at the core of the human journey toward his final end.  We argue 
this habituation process is to be identified with Pinckaers’ freedom of excellence. 
Freedom of Excellence is fully Thomistic 
 We have demonstrated Pinckaers’ articulation of the freedom of excellence contra the 
freedom of indifference is well supported in the writings of Aquinas.  We can assert that for 
Aquinas freedom arises not only from the isolated will in the context of a single atomic act, but 
from the entire process of humans developing habitus in the gifts of grace, charity and wisdom 
as we participate in the uncreated and divine life of the Trinitarian Persons.  Daria Spezzano 
summarizes this interplay perfectly in his claim that this is what in the East is meant by 
deification: 
These activities lie at the heart of the dynamic interface where the divine elevates 
human nature and activity.  [In this process] Thomas’ stresses both the absolute 
primal causal primacy of God—operatively and cooperatively working through the 
grace of the Holy Spirit—and the proper instrumental causality of the graced human 
subject, whose intellect and will [growing and] informed by the theological virtues 
and gifts are actively engaged in the full freedom of their movement towards the 
end of beatitude.217 
 This schema of freedom is complex and considers the person’s intellect, the person’s 
will, the person’s habits, each of which change with each successive act.  These changes in the 
whole person enable further progress towards man’s final end and these changes are mediated 
from the incarnation of Christ by the Spirit in ‘diverse modes’, some which explicitly include 
sacraments of the Church as vessels of this grace.  This leads to an ever-enlarging true freedom 
 
217 Daria Spezzano, The Glory of God's Grace : Deification According to St. Thomas Aquinas  
(Sapientia Press of Ave Maria University, 2015), 4-5. 
62 
 
that accompanies the movement of the graced human being towards his beatitude.  This is what 
Paul describes as “conformed to the image of God” (Rom 8:29)218 is what the East calls 
deification, that is congruent to Aquinas’ “participation of the Holy Spirit.”219  It is a consistent 
theme of the Fathers East and West and corresponds to the promise in Athanasius of the 
restoration of our Imago Dei.   This is the core of what true freedom looks like.  But before 
returning to the current debate there is one additional and crucial theological implication of 
freedom to cover. 
  
 
218 The Holy Bible: Revised Standard Version, (Catholic ed. San Francisco: Oxford University Press: 
Ignatius Press, 2006). 




  Chapter 5. Freedom and the Issue of Reversibility 
Neither are we to suppose that because sin shall have no power to delight them, free 
will must be withdrawn.  It will, on the contrary, be all the more truly free, because 
set free from delight in sinning to take unfailing delight in not sinning.  For the first 
freedom of will which man received when he was created upright consisted in an 
ability not to sin, but also in an ability to sin; whereas this last freedom of will shall 
be superior, inasmuch as it shall not be able to sin.220 
 This section deals with a question of freedom that is of primary concern to those rooted in 
a Christian theological framework.221   Is Augustine correct?  Will we still have freedom in 
heaven and if so is that consistent with never sinning again?  One way the problem is posed is: 
(1) The redeemed in heaven have free will. 
(2) The redeemed in heaven are no longer capable of sinning. 
 This section generally follows Timothy Pawl and Kevin Timpe,222 except for the 
application of freedom of excellence to this question where we more closely follow the 
exposition of Gaine.223  Because of overlap, we elide Pawl and Timpe’s five approaches to this 
question into three distinct approaches.224  
 
220 Augustine, The City of God. Trans. Marcus Dods, (Christian Classics Ethereal Library), XXI.30, 
https://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/npnf102.iv.html.  
221 A complementary question regarding the state of freedom in heaven is the same question regarding 
Adam and Eve prior to the Fall, and a similar question regarding the fallen angels.   If Adam and Eve (or 
the fallen angles prior to their fall) were experiencing the beatific vision and sinned will this not limit 
what we can and will say about the beatific vision?  Aquinas explores this issue in depth ST, Ia q94, q95, 
q96, that while Adam and Eve knew God with more perfect knowledge that we do now, they did not 
experience the beatific vision. ST, Ia, q94, a1, 478.  And in ST, Ia, q62 and the subsequent answers 
Aquinas argues that although angels were created with a natural beatitude and in a state of sanctifying 
grace, they were not created in the beatific vision. However, by using this grace their first act of charity 
immediately merited and were granted the beatific vision.  The fallen did not perform that first act of 
charity and thus could and did fall. 
222Timothy Pawl, Kevin Timpe, “Incompatibilism, Sin, And Free Will in Heaven.” Faith and 
Philosophy 26, no. 4 (2009): 398–419. 
223 Gaine,  especially Chapter 8 
224 Beside dropping one of the two Thomistic solutions from their paper, we also declined reviewing 
the Molinistic solution.  Molinism’s arguments regarding God’s “pre-volitional” and “volitional” 
knowledge is a complex and unnecessary enterprise, especially if one takes Boethius’ view of God’s 
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 The first solution is labeled as a concessionary strategy in addressing the question of how 
both (1) and (2) can be true.  This approach concedes their incompatibility and then works from 
there.  This strategy can be seen among theologians holding libertarian views of freedom.  G.B. 
Wall accepts the orthodox view that evil will not and cannot exist in heaven, but he comprehends 
his libertarian view of freedom as inconsistent with (2).  Thus, he denies (1).  J. Donnelly argues 
that human freedom, as a defense for the explanation of sin, is too important to be given up in 
heaven.  He too comprehends that his libertarian concept of freedom cannot allow (1) and (2) to 
both be true.  He adopts the opposite solution and argues it must still be possible for man to sin 
in heaven.225  Given that we have argued that libertarian approaches to freedom based on a 
freedom of indifference are unattractive in general,  we will not respond directly to these two 
arguments except to note that rejecting (2) is clearly incompatible with long standing Church 
teaching on the impeccability of the saints.226 
 A second approach is to hold a theological compatibilist view of freedom.  This view 
takes the position that being free is consistent with God determining the person’s will to not sin.  
Since the person is free and will never sin, then (1) and (2) are satisfied.  This is an approach 
endorsed by both John Calvin and Jonathon Edwards.227   
 
relationship to space time seriously.  Aquinas in his commentary on Aristotle’s Peri hermeneias asserts 
“God lays down necessary causes for the effects that he wants to be necessary and he lays down causes 
that act contingently—that can fail of their effect—for the effects he wants to be contingent” quoted in 
Davies, Brian. The Thought of Thomas Aquinas (Oxford: Clarendon, 1992), 176.  This concise statement 
has not been improved upon by the mountain of ink, paper and hot air created in the wake of the De 
Auxilis controversy. 
225 G.B. Wall, “Heaven and a Wholly Good God’, Personalist 58 (1977) 352-357, and J. Donnelly, 
“Eschatologic Enquiry”, Sophia 24 (1985) 16-31 cited in Gaine, 2-13.  For Donnelly after a person sins in 
heaven they lose heaven. 
226 In contrast Pawl and Timpe assert that they could not find a magisterial statement with regard to (1) 
so perhaps Wall could be considered still orthodox in his approach. 
227 Bruce Reichenbach, “Evil and a Reformed View of God”  International Journal for Philosophy of 
Religion 24 (1988) 67-85. 
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 While this view is thought of as a particularly Reform approach, it resonates with the 
solution first proposed by Ockham long preceding the Reformation.228  Ockham’s freedom of 
indifference, holds that perpetuity is achieved by an additional act of God to constrain man’s 
ability to sin.  Ockham asserts that the will in heaven continues to be inherently capable of 
nilling the blessed beatitude even upon fruition of the vision of God.229  But since he is orthodox, 
adhering to the impeccability (and its perpetuity) of the blessed, he must resolve the tension 
between freedom and impeccability. Ockham accomplishes this by invoking God’s total 
causality to formally exclude the possibility of the blessed either nilling God or nilling what He 
wills.230  Thus, Ockham solves the problem of a will that is still capable of nilling God by 
recourse to an “extrinsic” solution.  Ockham will assert that the blessed are freer in heaven, like 
Augustine, but he will invoke God’s total causality to suspend the free activity of the will in this 
one respect.   
 A third solution addressed in this section is the answer given by the Thomistic freedom of 
excellence.  Freedom of excellence explicitly asserts that as we grow in our inclinations, habits, 
and the virtues, especially the theological virtues of faith, hope and charity that direct us to our 
final destiny, the degree of freedom we possess increases.  However, as we saw in Chapter 4, 
there is an expectation for ups and downs in the acquisition of all the virtues, even those 
theological virtues that God actively infuses in us. 
 Prior to achieving heaven, we must address the reality of reverses in the progress we 
make towards our final end.  We might take one step back after we have taken two steps forward 
on our journey and so on.  Any path we take as a cumulative sum of our choices can be undone 
by a sequence of choices that unwind the progress made.  While it might take time, no matter 
 
228 Gaine, 71-83. 
229 Gaine, 73. 
230 Gaine, 78. 
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how far a moral agent may proceed on a given path towards God and away from self—freedom, 
particularly for the freedom of indifference or any variation of libertarian freedom, these courses 
could be reversed as long as the human agent still has a free will.  Notwithstanding, it has been 
the ancient teaching of the Church that the impeccability of the saints is perpetual, which is a 
technical way of saying that once a person has achieved the beatific vision they will no longer 
sin.  But are they then no longer free?   
 Aquinas’ approach to resolving the tension between (1) and (2) is quite different than 
Ockham, because Aquinas holds the ability to do evil is not essential to having free will:   
The second diversity to which free will can extend, is considered according to the 
difference of good and evil; but this diversity does not pertain to the power of free 
will essentially (per se) but is related to it incidentally (per accidens), inasmuch as 
it is found in a nature capable of defect. For since the will of itself is ordered to 
good as to its proper object, that it tends to evil can occur only from this that evil is 
apprehended under the aspect of good; which pertains to a defect of the intellect or 
reason, from which liberty of choice has its origin; but it does not belong to the 
nature of any power that it be defective in its act, for example it does not pertain to 
the nature of the power of sight that a person sees indistinctly; and therefore nothing 
prevents us from discovering the existence of a free will which so extends to good 
that in no way can it extend to evil, either by nature, as in God, or by reason of the 
perfection of grace, as in the saints and the blessed angels.231  
Aquinas does not require the will to be shackled by this Divine constraint.  For Aquinas the 
beatific vision is not an object that replaces the will’s self-motion, but that in the beatific vision 
the will is moved efficiently to its exercise by its natural inclination.   
With respect to the specification of the act, the will can in a sense be determined in 
this one special case, because the intellect presents to it an object that is completely 
good in every way and is in itself the universal good.232    
If every created good is in some way ordered to God, the logical end of this ordering is the 
supreme good of seeing God.  In this good there can be nothing that is deficient.  Aquinas has 
said the will is free with respect to the exercise regardless of the object and he has denied that 
 
231 QDM q.16, a.5.   
232 Osborne, 13. 
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someone with the beatific vision can turn his sight away from God: “The will of the man who 
sees God in His essence of necessity adheres to God, just as now we desire of necessity to be 
happy”233  
 Under freedom of excellence the achieving of man’s end is not accompanied by a 
diminishment of man’s freedom in agreement with Augustine:  “Now the fact that they will not 
be able to take delight in sin does not entail that they have no free will.”234  The saints have been 
freed from the delight in sinning for a delight in not sinning—a delight in which there is no 
turning away—it is indeclinabilem.   We can agree with Aquinas and Augustine that moving 
towards our final end increases our freedom but what is “sticky” about achieving this state such 
that there is no conceivable way to reverse course once we have achieved the final end?  Aquinas 
asserts the nature of the vision itself is such a guarantee of irreversibility.  
 Can we find analogs in other fields to help us understand how such a thing could be?  The 
most common examples of irreversibility that occur in the physical world happen in the domain 
of statistical thermodynamics.  Take the example of a gas escaping from a pressurized container.  
Never does an open container become pressurized again because of gas molecules spontaneously 
moving from the room back into and repressurizing the container.   While this behavior is never 
observed in fact, the equations of statistical mechanics that govern such gas movements do have 
a small (extremely small) probability associated with just that occurrence.   But arguing 
irreversibility while acknowledging even microscopically small probabilities is qualitatively not 
in line with the absolute confidence in perpetuity projected by Aquinas’ writings so we must 
look to better parallels.  
 
233 ST,  I, q. 82, a.2, , 371. 




 We can draw analogically from the world of modern astrophysics as in the case of black 
holes.  As seen in Figure 6, the black hole represents a singularity in the space-time continuum 
where intense gravitational forces are so severe that there exists a defined region around the 
entity where even light itself cannot escape its massive gravitational fields.  This area is called 
the event horizon and according to  
                                   
Figure 6. 
equations of general relativity once anything––particles, light or information itself––passes the 
boundary of the event horizon it becomes impossible to return.   Up until that cusp point, with 
sufficient forces, it would be possible to envision return from nearly the edge of the event 
horizon.  But once at and past that point objects irreversibly pass from view. 
 We might then describe analogically the growth of freedom of excellence for human 
beings along their journey to final ends as seen in Figure 7.  The inverted black hole at the right 
side represents our final end, and the everted black hole at that left our final destination if we 






Figure 7. 235 
 There is for most of us a slow uneven path that describes our development in the virtues, 
whose full expression will be our heritage in the beatific vision. The possibility of reversal 
towards that goal exists here in the present world.   Yet for many of us, there comes a time when 
aided by God’s actions, our disordered passions are ordered, our disordered bodies are recreated 
to their intended state, and we achieve our final end.   
 This transformation could include several distinct and explicit operations of God, such as 
a special rare gift of grace here on earth to enable us to live sinlessly, the gift of the purgation by 
the fire of the Holy Spirit, and the reunion of our transformed souls with our recreated bodies in 
the Resurrection.  The summation of these processes can be described analogically by the fall up 
into and through a final event horizon at the right end of Figure 7.  Such a process would possess 
irreversibility as naturally as the irreversibility of light falling past the event horizon of a black 
hole with regard to return to normal space time. 
 
235 This is a graph of my table tennis USATT rating over the last five years—a result of persistent 




 The left side of Figure 7 describes the horrible counterpart of that irreversible change for 
the individual that chooses again and again the path leading away from their true destiny.  
Aquinas describes this as the consequence of sin caused by the will as it withdraws from 
God,236 or Augustine’s description of this path as the move towards pride.  Christ promises 
forgiveness seventy time seven, but Scripture also describes a God that cries, “Ephraim is joined 
to idols—Let him alone!” (Hosea 4:17).  This is perhaps the sin against the Holy Spirit described 
by Matthew 12:32.  C.S. Lewis describes this sin in literary terms as a trip where people 
voluntarily keep traveling farther and farther away from Heaven until only nothingness is left.  
All because these people would prefer their imitation selves to the true reality of who they are to 
become in Heaven.237 The left path describes this final falling as an irreversible spiral into the 
depths of Hell itself.   
 This short chapter has demonstrated that there is a consistent view of freedom that 
continues to exist--not just exist but exuberantly exist--in the beatific vision.  We have 
established that the Thomistic view does not suffer from the cramped difficulties of the 
libertarian position but provides an understanding for how freedom can exist in its fullness.  To 
understand how this state could stay perpetually impeccable we appealed analogically to the 




236 QDM, q. 3, a. 1. 
237 C.S. Lewis, The Great Divorce (New York: Macmillan Company, 1946). 
71 
 
Chapter 6. Freedom of Excellence as a Response to Contemporary Debate 
 
 Now that we have a fully developed Thomistic view of freedom of excellence we are 
prepared to respond to the contemporary views of human freedom.  Table 2 represents the crucial 
differences that are useful as a context for the choice of arguments this chapter will tackle and 
will be revisited by the chapter’s end. 
Table 2.  
 Libertarian asserts 
constitutive 
Compatibilist asserts Freedom of Excellence 
asserts 
If same past, different outcome 
must be possible for freedom to 
exist 
Yes—key No No 
If a decision can be explained in 
terms of an antecedent causal 
chain it cannot be free 
Yes No No 
Requires external indeterminant 
element 
Yes No No238 
An act requires self reflection to 
be free 
Yes No Yes-key 
Free acts occur posterior to a 
nonconscious act 
No Yes Can accommodate but doesn’t 
concede its relevance 
Free act is a consequence of self 
moving will 
No for majority view, yes for 
agent-causality 
No Yes-key 
Freedom is compatible with a 
monistic materialistic universe 
Yes—but requires indeterminant 
element 
Yes—key No—key,  hylomorphic dualism 
Freedom constituent of 
individual’s final end  
No for secularists No for secularists Yes—key 
Freedom consistent with 
impeccability 
No—always possibility of 
reversion to even in beatific 
vision 
Yes — only because of 
continuing extrinsic divine cause 
Yes—key. intrinsic 
characteristic of the beatific 
vision 
 
 We note the crucial Thomistic presumption missing from both contemporary libertarian 
and compatibilist views that human beings, like every created entity, have final ends.  This key 
metaphysical assumption provides a natural context for discussions of man’s moral agency that 
struggle to find purchase in contemporary thinking about man’s freedom.  A central implication 
that the notion of a final end has for any theory of freedom is its restoration of “directionality” to 
decision making.  Final ends provide a perspective that looks past the immediate antecedents and 
consequences arising from an individual act and on to its ordering to the final goal.  In contrast, 
 
238 Libertarians require some indeterminant element “external” to the will for freedom to exist. This 
requirement is not required for Freedom of Excellence which guards its freedom with a self-moved will. 
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the classic libertarian principle that man is only free that when presented with the same choices, 
he could choose some other course, creates an inherent instability in attempting to cohere a series 
of free actions towards any consistent goal much less a final end.   
 This instability can be demonstrated in a revisit to Kane’s “Garden of Forking Paths.”  
From the perspective of freedom of excellence, the freest choice is one that takes into account 
the ultimate goal of the person’s final end.  However, if this decision leads to there being fewer 
choices of paths to take as the person journeys through the garden, the libertarian would assert 
that the individual’s freedom is decreasing.  While the libertarian would seek for some 
indeterminacy as part of decision-making given their same past different outcome principle, the 
compatibilist would suggest what we mean by freedom is only coherent if it makes sense to the 
person making the choice.   Does it make sense for our decisions to reflect our inclinations, our 
values? Does it make sense for our decisions to be considered sensible to ourselves as we reflect 
on the decision? The answer the compatibilist would make is yes, yes, and most definitely yes.  
The strongest arguments the compatibilists bring is their understanding that all the faculties of 
the man’s body and brain including dispositions, genetic variability, and reasoning ability should 
and can be considered as contributing to a particular decision without removing human freedom.   
 On this point freedom of excellence can agree with the compatibilist and judge the 
libertarian argument at its core to be incoherent.  However, while those holding to a freedom of 
excellence and those holding the compatibilist view of freedom may share certain assertions, we 
cannot share the compatibilists presumption of an exclusively deterministic solely material 
universe.  We will demonstrate that this view leads to a minimization of the individual 
experience of our mental qualia, leads to an incoherent theory of personal identity, and ultimately 
calls into question even the reality of personal consciousness.  
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 This chapter will review work done in empirical decision making from psychology and 
neurobiology that has been used to claim support for a compatibilist view of freedom.  We will 
explore the current fashion among some neurobiologists to find freedom in the behavior of our 
neural circuits after an event in the brain they consider nonconscious and therefore not free.  We 
will show how their results can be interpreted as consistent with freedom of excellence while not 
conceding the necessity of adopting a posteriori views of decision making.  We will also 
consider certain remarkable developments in mathematics and science that put sharp constraints 
on the underlying metaphysical presumptions of materialism in eroding the underpinnings of 
standard notions of determinism.   
 Merely demonstrating that freedom of excellence is consistent with external evidence is 
insufficient.  We will show that notions of individual identity cannot be reconciled with a 
materialistic universe and that explanations for individual consciousness flounder unless based 
on a richer metaphysical framework than what is condoned by many contemporary philosophers.  
We will demonstrate that with a shift to Thomistic metaphysics, freedom of excellence provides 
a theory of freedom that is coherent, consistent with the current empirical evidence, and is a 
freedom worth having.   
Accommodating Empirical Studies on Decision Making—the challenge of James and Libet. 
 Since the late 19th century, a variety of writers have challenged the view that human 
decision making is under conscious control.  If these challenges are true, it would render any 
theory of human freedom very odd indeed.  William James meditated on what we mean by will 
by reflecting on what is usually the first decision of the day—how do we get out of bed? 
We know what it is to get out of bed on a freezing morning in a room without a fire, and 
how the very vital principle within us protests against the ordeal.  Probably most persons 
have lain on certain mornings for an hour at a time unable to brace themselves to the 
resolve.  We think how late we shall be, how the duties of the day will suffer; we say, ‘I 
must get up, this is ignominious,’ etc.; but still the warm couch feels too delicious, the 
74 
 
cold outside too cruel, and resolution faints away and postpones itself again and again 
just as it seemed on the verge of bursting the resistance and passing over into the decisive 
act.  Now how do we ever get up under such circumstances?  If I may generalize from my 
own experience, we more often than not get up without any struggle or decision at all.  
We suddenly find that we have got up.  A fortunate lapse of consciousness occurs; we 
forget both the warmth and the cold; we fall into some reverie connected with the day’s 
life, in the course of which the idea flashes across us, ‘Hollo! I must lie here no longer’—
an idea which at that lucky instant awakens no contradictory or paralyzing suggestions, 
and consequently produces immediately its appropriate motor effects.  It was our acute 
consciousness of both the warmth and the cold during the period of struggle, which 
paralyzed our activity then and kept our idea of rising in the condition of wish and not of 
will.  The moment these inhibitory ideas ceased; the original idea exerted its effects.239   
According to James, first our thoughts arise, there is then a link from thoughts to the impulsive 
power to our motor operations, and finally the feeling of will and effort is derived from the 
interplay between opposing thoughts. But most crucially he observes that there did in fact not 
appear to be a conscious step of a specific decision that occurred—at least not of one that he was 
consciously aware. 
 These ruminations of James were followed up a generation later by Gilbert Ryle240 whose 
attempts at introspection end with him doubting that there is a “there” there.  Ryle denies the 
reality of most subjective conscious experiences and instead explains them as non-conscious 
dispositions to behave in particular ways that are associated with an epiphenomenon of a sensory 
state that projects the illusion of that reality in our minds.241  This view became influential 
among later 20th century philosophers who credit Ryle as ending the traditional concept of the 
mind. 
 
239 William James, The Principles of Psychology, (2nd ed. Great Books of the Western World Vol I-II. 
Chicago: Encyclopædia Britannica, 1990), 524-5. 
240 Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind, (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1949), Chapter VI.  Ryle 
inaugurates the philosophical deconstruction of the mind as well as ridicule of all things dualistic. 
241 Ryle is thus suggesting many of our conscious “thoughts” are equivalent in some sense to the key 
mistake referenced in Oliver Sacks, The Man Who Mistook His Wife for a Hat and Other Clinical Tales. 
(New York: Summit Books, 1985). 
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 James’ view that there is a discontinuity between the reflective thought and act appears to 
receive reinforcement from the 1983 classic neurobiology experiment of Benjamin Libet.242  The 
critical experimental measurements from this experiment is displayed in Figure 8.  The key 
experiment has subsequently been repeated and confirmed by other laboratories.243  The 
conventional interpretation of this experiment is that not only is the act and thought disconnected 
in some sense but that they are apparently temporally reversed!  Whether that claim is upheld the 
experiment is taken as evidence for prior nonconscious activity preceding the first conscious 
intent of a human act, thus presumed by compatibilists to vitiate a prospective meaningful role 
for the intellect. 
 
Figure 8.  
 In the experiment, subjects watch a clock hand and at a time of their choosing depress a 
switch and are asked to note when they were aware of their desire to depress the switch.  
Consistently for group after group, ½ second prior to the subjects denoting the time of their 
 
242 Benjamin Libet, Anthony Freeman, Keith W. Sutherland. The Volitional Brain: Towards A 
Neuroscience Of Free Will (Imprint Academic, Exeter UK, 1999), 49. 
243 Libet, 49-50. 
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awareness of their intention to act, there was an increase in voltage indicating something was 
happening in the brain preceding first conscious awareness of the intent to act.  At least this 
appears to be the case in terms of the recorded responses of the individuals. 
 Compatibilists have used this evidence to argue for a deterministic prior to the human’s 
decision making.  They argue that if there is evidence for activity in the brain prior to conscious 
awareness, there had to be factors that drove the decision to act other than a deliberation of the 
individual’s conscious reasoning capacity.  The compatibilist argues that this is what is behind 
the curtain of all supposedly “free” decisions.  There is a web of possibly unknown causes that 
follow deterministic laws and which ultimately lead to an act.  The individual then concludes that 
this decision was the result of their own doing, even though they may be unaware the decision to 
act occurred prior to the “thought” where they thought they had made the decision. 
 There are several responses available in defense against this attack on the role of 
conscious deliberation.  First, in response to James and Ryle, Karl Popper points out that others 
that have taken a much more systematic approach to introspection do not take James’ or Ryle’s 
naïve observations as worthy of serious consideration.  Popper cites work from the 
contemporaneous Wurzburg School which had already established a significant body of 
reproducible work regarding systematic studies into introspection.244  But Popper could have 
also pointed to centuries of experience with spiritual disciplines systematized by the Desert 
Fathers such as Evagrius245 where many can attest to the reproducible changes in life practices 
resulting from serious and disciplined introspection.   
 
244 Karl Popper, and John C. Eccles, 106-107. 
245 Robert E. Sinkewicz, Evagrius of Pontus the Greek Ascetic Corpus (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2003), specifically his Prakitos sections on the “Eight Thoughts” 66,  and “On Thoughts” 214, 
which demonstrate an amazingly modern insight in developing practical introspective disciplines in 
furthering and deepening a person’s spiritual prayer life.  These disciplines should be partitioned from 
some of his theological views. 
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 And finally, we do not have to accept the conventional interpretation that has been drawn 
from the experimental evidence of Libet.  The key interpretive claim is that the awareness of the 
intent was preceded by the rise in the electrical potential.  But while the established time the test 
subject depressed the switch was an external measurement, and the established time the electrical 
potentials began to rise was an external measurement, the estimate of when their intent was 
formed was based on the individual’s internal sense of time.  There is simply no way to get 
around this methodological issue at the very basis of the experiment that depended on mixing 
external with subjective estimates of the occurrence in time of an event. 
 But the conventional interpretation of this experiment, however unsupported from the 
actual data, does raise an interesting question.  Is it possible to defend a role for freedom, 
particularly freedom of excellence, even if we concede the existence of a category of acts that 
arise disconnected from prior conscious deliberation?  Libet himself argues that while the 
initiation of voluntary action is not free, because it is not under the control of the conscious 
mind, the control of the intentions to act after they have arisen, may be free.  We are not 
conceding these acts occur except under fairly unusual circumstances,246 but there has been 
intense interest in this kind of postulated mental/brain activity in relation to proposals such as 
“criterial causation” that focus on making room for freedom in the behavior of neural networks 
after a given event occurs.  We will demonstrate that freedom of excellence’s ability to connect 
actions towards a final end can accommodate even these posteriori views of human acts.  We 
will start by showing through a mathematical analogy how freedom of excellence can integrate 
even a “random” act and order it to the individual’s final end.   
  
 
246 Acts that occur while sleep walking, or other drug or disease induced abnormal states belong in this 
category.  The field of obsessive-compulsive disorders are the standard exemplars of this class. 
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Final ends can guide even random acts. 
 We will demonstrate the power of final ends from an example drawn from the field of 
mathematics known as optimization theory and illustrated by the challenge of designing a 
passenger jet for successful manufacturing.  There are many ways to consider how best to go 
about balancing all the various parameters we have control over in deciding how to manufacture 
the jet.  But a common consideration would be to determine what combination of decisions (or 
parameter values) that will minimize the overall cost of construction for a jet of a given carrying 
capacity and speed.247  
 Mathematically this problem can be described as a multidimensional surface that 
represents all combinations of possible values in our various individual decisions, with the 
“height” of the surface being the cost of manufacture for each combination of decisions.  The 
combination of variables at the “lowest” point on the surface tells which combination of 
decisions will result in the lowest cost to manufacture.  The problem is finding that point.   
 We can simplify this problem if can imagine there are only two variables we need to 
control.  In this case you can imagine their combination to be like the coordinates on a normal 
two-dimensional map.  Then let the height of the ground at any given map coordinates represents 
the cost of the jet construction.  Imagine a topographic map with contour lines that in a normal 
map represent the same altitude of the ground, but in the case of our jet manufacturing process 
are contours of constant manufacturing cost.  If you had such a map you could inspect it directly 
to find the lowest point.  That point will identify the combination of parameters where your 
manufacturing costs will be lowest—what the mathematicians call the minima of the surface.   
 
247 If you own and operate the jet after its manufacture you might be interested in different cost 
measure—what design would give us the least expensive cost (usually from fuel) in transporting that 
capacity between two points? 
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 Figure 9 is such a topographical map where you want to end up down at the bottom of dip 
(marked by the +) in the ground that represents your lowest cost.  You start your journey high up 
on the lip of this dip; high meaning it is more expensive.  If you had this map in hand you could 
simply go straight downhill to your destination like the path seen on the right labeled “Gradient 
Descent”.  The fastest way to get to the desired bottom is to go straight down the steepest grade 
to the bottom of the dip. 
 
Figure 9. 
 But what if you do not have such a map and you don’t have much in the way of the 
ability to use your vision to see even one step towards your goal?  But you do know the dip is 
your goal and we allow that you can determine after a step is taken whether it is a step uphill or a 
step downhill (or that you stepped and didn’t go up or down).  And we will allow you to also 
have rough idea of how steep the step was.  Assume you are blind but that you still have your 
body’s proprioceptors working properly.  You could employ the following effective strategy: 
 1) flip a coin248 to decide which cardinal direction to take one step either north, 
 south, east or west at random.   
 
248 Since there are four cardinal directions on this two-dimensional map we need the equivalent of a 




 2) After the act of taking a step, assess whether you went somewhat uphill or 
 somewhat downhill or stayed the same.   
 3) If you went uphill change direction exactly opposite and take two steps.   
 4) If you went downhill, continue to go downhill one more step.   
 5) If you did not change direction flip a coin (this time a normal two headed coin) 
 and pick a cardinal direction perpendicular to your previous step and then again to 
 take one step.  
 6) After each of the outcomes of each step note whether you are going uphill, 
 downhill or staying level and re-apply rules 2-5 until no matter what direction you 
 step you find you are going up hill.   
 The left side of Figure 9 demonstrates a use of this strategy. Optimization theory 
guarantees this algorithm will get you to your dip under a broad range of mathematical 
assumptions about the elements going into your cost calculations, in other words, it is 
guaranteed to work effectively under a broad variety of lumpy bumpy hills and valleys249 
such as the more complex terrain seen in Figure 10250 to find its final goal.  This 
algorithm works by applying practical reasoning to the consequences of a random act 
with a clear goal in view, and by having a clear criterion of whether the act was “good” 
or “bad” according to its outcome. 
 
249 Bernard Widrow and Eugene Walach, “On the Statistical Efficiency of the LMS Algorithm with 
Nonstationary Inputs,” IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, Vol. IT-30, No2. March 1984.    






 We are not claiming in this example that introducing random events is the most desirable 
approach to decision making—it is not even the best choice in our mathematical analogy.  As 
seen in Figure 9 on the right side, if you can see your way straight down to the cost minimum 
you get there faster and with less effort than using our 4 and 2 headed coin flipping algorithm.  
However, we have demonstrated that a theory of human action that incorporates explicitly the 
notion of a final end, and takes seriously the idea that humans will attempt to steer towards that 
final end, can accommodate even blindly random events, regardless of whether internal or 
external in origin. 
 This emphasis on connecting an act to a subsequent act where the conscious intellect and 
will are engaged is a crucial feature of freedom of excellence in responding to claims 
compatibilists have made regarding the strong evidence in the neurosciences that any kind of 
directed sequence of decisions has ability to result in changes in our neural substrates.  These 
changes in turn can affect the outcome of subsequent neural behaviors.  Compatibilists use this 
evidence for a deterministic basis for freedom.  We will argue instead that it points to one of the 
82 
 
ways our intellect and its comprehension of our final ends can effect changes in our total being in 
terms of future decision making.   
Criterial Causation as a physicalist model for a compatibilist view of human freedom. 
 The neuroscientist Peter Tse has demonstrated that specific patterns of information inputs 
can result in self-modification of neural circuits.251  The changes induced then result in 
modifications such that if the same inputs are presented to the neural circuits their future 
behavior is changed.  This occurs not in a random fashion but in a focused fashion that can 
incrementally allow given subsets of complex neural networks to achieve “better performance” 
in measurable ways.  A classic example of this behavior is the visual sub systems that are 
responsible for turning the complex mass of neurological signals coming from our retinas into 
geometric interpretations such as edge detection in the images we visualize.  These sub systems 
can get better and better at “seeing” lines in our visual fields by giving those neural networks 
images that contain “edges” in the visual field over months and years.  Tse describes this process 
as “criterial causation,” because it is caused just by a pattern of information being processed by a 
given neural network.  The key is that the processing of the pattern of information feeds back 
into that network and effects changes that take effect for a future input to the network.  Tse 
asserts this behavior is a physical basis for understanding the existence of human freedom, but a 
human freedom that is rooted in a physicalist and compatibilist model.   
 Let us take a deeper look at the material evidence he takes for supporting his claim.  Later 
we will address the coherence of his interpretation.  The basic schematization of the neuron in 
Figure 11. supports signaling from the dendritic end through the axon to the axon terminal where 
the signal is turned into neurochemicals that bridge the gap to the dendrites of the next neuron. 
 






 This simple neuron supports a “feed-forward” pattern of signaling.  Feed-forward means 
the flow of electrical or neurochemical signaling moves in one direction only, starting from 
dendritric end and flowing to the ends of axons, where they would normally interdigitate with the 
next set of dendrites and send the signal merrily along to the next neuron.  The term “feed-back” 
pattern of signaling is used if there exist any connections where, either immediately or eventually 
through other intermediary neurons, a signal that originally started at the dendridrtic end of the 
neuron in Figure 11 finds its way back to that same dendritic end. 
 Consider large scale networks of hundreds of these neurons cooperating in a feed-forward 
network to turn an upstream event (i.e., to the left of Figure 11) into an action, by progressive 
processing through layers of neurons.  This type neural network, described in Figure 12, is 
extremely important in the visual cortex of our brain where they are hierarchically organized and 
perform feature extraction for various aspects of the image as it is interpreted in the brain. 252 
 
252 The term “feature extraction” is a common term in neurobiology borrowed from the signal 
processing community.  It refers to the overall process of taking the raw retinal neuronal discharge signals 
and the turning them into the concept such as the letter “a” as understood by our minds—at least for those 





 But critical for Tse, and those like him seeking a physical model for human freedom 
rooted completely in the neural circuits of the brain, is the existence of feed-back neural circuits.  




Here we have a group of ordinary neurons on the left organized in some kind of feed-forward 
network.  But we see an interesting group of neurons that intercalate between the output of the  
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feed-forward neurons on the left and feed at least part of their output signal back to the input of 
those same arrays.253   
 Figure 13. demonstrates the behavior that most interests Tse.  Feedback that sends signals 
back into the upstream network has been demonstrated experimentally to create persistent long-
lasting effects.  While Figure 13. looks relatively simple, keep in mind that the physical 




 Tse makes the case that these networks respond to patterns in the input, patterns which 
are effectively information flows, and then after the input pattern hits these neurons, if the 
criteria for the pattern is met, then a real physical and persistent change occurs in that very neural 
network.  For example, in the case of the visual cortex where the network gets better at detecting 
edges by being given edge patterns from the retina, this effect is not proportional to the amount 
of energy that is being input to the neuronal circuit but is based on the pattern coming into the 
 
253The arrays of feed-forward cells on the left of Figure 13 are receiving their primary input from other 
cells (not shown).  The “feedback” signal that is shown is an added signal to the normal flow. 
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neural network.  Tse calls this behavior “criterial causation” and claims it can be used as a way 
to explain how both the flow of external sensory information or internal perceived states of 
sensory experience, can actualize real physical and persistent changes on the biology of the brain 
and thus persistently affect future reception of related patterns of information.254 This type of 
feedback causing persistent neural network changes has been observed by multiple 
researchers.255 
 Tse would be unimpressed with the concerns of either James or Ryle regarding their 
claims of the absence of self-aware thoughts prior to taking an action.  For Tse, the key to 
freedom is found in the changes in the neural processing that occurs after some neural subsystem 
fires off.  Tse uses the idea that the “criteria” that affects the neural circuit is really an 
information pattern and therefore is not a priori hard wired into our being and therefore not 
subject completely to the deterministic behavior of the neurons themselves.  He argues this 
notion provides the necessary wiggle room for allowing the individual to steer his own ship. 256  
It is Tse’s version of attempting to describe how then the brain can act as a self-moved mover but 
not violate any materialistic presumptions.257 
  
 
254 Tse, 31-78 
255 L.F. Abbot, and W.G. Regehr,  “Synaptic Computation”  Nature, 431(2004), 796-803;  
C. Chavkin, “Dynorphins are endogenous opiod peptides released from granule cells to act neurohumorly 
and inhibit excitatory neurotransmission in the hippocampus” Progress in Brain Research, 125(2000), 
363-367; R.M. Fitzsimonds, and M.M. Poo, “Retrograde signaling in the development and modification 
of synapses,” Physiological Reviews, 78(1998), 143-170;  T.F. Freund, I. Katona, and D. Piomelli,  “Role 
of endogenous cannabinoids in synaptic signaling.” Physiological Reviews, 83(2003), 1017-1066. 
256 Tse, 156-168. 
257 Criterial causation could be viewed as an attempt to create, within the constraints of materialism, a 
system with equivalencies to Aristotelean matter and form where information patterns act in lieu of form. 
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Freedom of Excellence and neurobiological findings 
 This empirical evidence from the neurosciences can be readily assimilated to the 
framework of freedom of excellence.  When we talk of habits, inclinations, and dispositions from 
a Thomistic perspective, we expect persistent changes accrue to aspects of our bodies, our 
sensory apparatus, in addition to the immaterial aspects of our being as well, as a consequence of 
our decisions and associated acts. The evidence that Tse and others have accrued demonstrating 
how changes can persistently accumulate in our neural pathways subsequent to our actions does 
not challenge the relevance or importance of the role of conscious reflection, systematic 
deliberation prior to a given neural event, but provides increased clarity around how the 
consequences of our decisions and thus our actions affect the physical components that will 
contribute to future decisions. 
 We have demonstrated that freedom of excellence can allow progress towards a final end 
even when incorporating random acts.  In the case of the evidence referenced by Tse, we can see 
the material incarnation of the way decisions can become incorporated in our material being.   
This ability can be interpreted as evidence of how our very bodies are designed to enable growth 
along specific paths—secular evidence to be sure—but consistent with the fundamental 
Thomistic view that we have built into our neural pathways the capability of pursuing final ends.  
 We claim that these empirical studies are completely consistent with the qualitative 
process Pinckaers describes regarding freedom of excellence and the virtues.  Our acts, whether 
they arise in a fashion fully visible to our intellect through careful deliberation over alternatives, 
or arising randomly, or even “unconsciously” from the subsystem of our brains neural circuits, 
are all able to be reflected on by our self-awareness.  A self-consciousness that is able, in the 
light of the person’s final ends, to create another act, and then another.  These studies suggest 
that a sequence of actions modifies our very neural networks and is consistent with a view that 
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they modify our inclinations and habits.  In any case, they have the potential to propel the 
individual forward towards his final end.  
 The consequences to the neural circuitry of these events do not have to be limited to 
external sensory flows as suggested by Tse and others.  It can be the consequence of thinking 
itself. We therefore maintain the distinction Tse and other physicalists make of posterior versus 
prior activation of a neural network is arbitrary.  Any serious deliberation that could involve 
neural processing could result in the same physical effects.  There is simply no need to foreclose 
the role of prior or concurrent intellection with regard to this kind of evidence.  On the other 
hand, these experiments confirm intuitions about how we work as human beings that extend at 
least as far back as Aristotle who recognized the role of practice is pursuing the virtuous life.  
How we think, what we think, how we decide, what we decide, how we act, what we do has the 
potential for making persistent changes to our being including our physical bodies. 
Contra Compatibilist Determinism 
 We look next at the impact of developments in 20th century mathematics that erode one 
of the pillars of all materialistic theories of freedom, namely, the notion of a universe governed 
by deterministic laws.  Secular compatibilists argue free decisions are completely determined by 
the laws governing the material substrate, mainly our central nervous system, that is solely 
responsible for making those decisions.  For theological compatibilists, human decisions are 
determined directly by God.258  While these positions are unacceptable a priori for a Catholic, 
there are arguments that undermine compatibilism other than theological unacceptability.  This 
section argues that the concept of a deterministic causality is a relic of the early phase of the 
Enlightenment, and its meaning has been eroded by developments in our understanding of the 
physical world primarily in the 20th century. 
 
258 Antony Flew, "Compatibilism, Free Will and God." Philosophy 48, no. 185 (1973): 231-44. 
89 
 
 What does determinism in this context actually mean?  Most discussions still live in the 
semantic shadow of Laplacian determinism. 
We may regard the present state of the universe as the effect of its past and the 
cause of its future. An intellect which at any given moment knew all of the forces 
that animate nature and the mutual positions of the beings that compose it, if this 
intellect were vast enough to submit the data to analysis, could condense into a 
single formula the movement of the greatest bodies of the universe and that of the 
lightest atom; for such an intellect nothing could be uncertain and the future just 
like the past would be present before its eyes.259 
The threat of this view to free will seems clear: all doctrines of determinism, whether theological 
or physicalist imply that given the past and certain deterministic laws (or actions of an 
omnipotent God) there is only one possible future.  Whatever happens is therefore necessary and 
cannot but occur.   
 The first hint that Laplace’s ‘billiard ball deterministic collision chain’ view of causality 
would need revision was when it was recognized that there were other species of physical actions 
relevant to physical change such as chemical or energy transformations.  Even in the 19th century 
the developing understanding of thermodynamics meant dealing with enormous numbers of 
entities in a physical system that required statistical descriptions that no longer supported the 
notion of meaningful determinism at the level of individual gas molecules. 260  But it was the 
arrival of the revolution in quantum physics that allowed serious doubts regarding the Laplacian 
view of determinism to arise. 
 Some would argue developments in quantum mechanics only challenged an 
epistemological view of determinism.  That is, in the context of physics, those issues which we 
can establish by measurements, i.e., by experimentation, still allow for the more important 
ontological view of determinism of the underlying physics to be maintained.  While Einstein 
 
259 Marquis Pierre Laplace, A Philosophical Essay on Probabilities, translated into English from the 
original French 6th ed. by Truscott, F.W. and Emory, F.L.  (Dover Publications, New York, 1951), 4. 
260 Oliver Penrose, Foundations of Statistical Mechanics, (New York: Pergamon Press, 1970). 
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conceded the practical consequences of the formulas of quantum mechanics that were able to 
time and again be verified by experimental apparatus, he sought to include “hidden variable” 
theories to explain the seemingly bizarre implications of non-locality demonstrated in quantum 
systems.261  In other words he refused to accept the idea that quantum mechanics threatened the 
deterministic foundations of “what was really happening” in these experiments. But with the 
publication of the Bell’s inequality theorem that no physicalist theory based on hidden variables 
could provide such explanations,262 and the subsequent experiments that have confirmed Bell’s 
theories, the physical determinists have been thoroughly routed, at least for domains for which 
quantum behaviors are relevant.  
 For the current generation of physicists there is no disagreement that the physical states 
of the fundamental particles of the universe, such as location or momentum, are fundamentally 
incapable of complete joint specification.263  What this means from an experimental perspective, 
is that there is a level in physics in which we cannot specify in detail what is occurring to the 
entities that are residing at that level except probabilistically.  This characteristic is not due to a 
lack of high-quality recording equipment, not due to a lack of creative imagination on the part of 
the physicist in constructing their experiments, but is baked into the fundamental behavior of the 
universe at that level of granularity.  That is what the theories directly suggest and all we can say 
about whether it is truly true or not, in the ontological sense is that every experiment that has 
been created here to date agrees with the theory.264  Since at present it seems unlikely that 
 
261 Albert Einstein, B. Podolsky, and N. Rosen, “Can quantum-mechanical description of physical 
reality be considered complete?” Physical Review 47(1935), 777-780. 
262 John Bell, "On the Einstein Podolsky Rosen Paradox"  Physics, 1 (1964) (3): 195–200. 
263 For more mind-bending behaviors of quantum mechanics including the ability of vacuum to 
spontaneously birth paired particles or quantum entanglements that span galaxies see John Gribbin, 
Schrodinger's Kittens and the Search for Reality: Solving the Quantum Mysteries (1st American ed. 
Boston: Little, Brown &, 1995). 
264 In anticipation of the section on chaos, it might be surprising that the best agreement that has ever 
been achieved in physics in agreeing between theory and experiment are those regarding QED—quantum 
electrodynamics.   According to my professor of quantum mechanics Dr. Claude Barnett, this best proven 
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quantum mechanics is relevant at the level of the biological substrate of the brain, the challenge 
it presents regarding causality could be sidestepped for events relating to human freedom.  But as 
we shall demonstrate in the next section, developments in non-linear mathematics put the causal 
determinists much deeper into the epistemological hole. 
Chaos 
For want of a nail the shoe was lost. 
For want of a shoe the horse was lost. 
For want of a horse the rider was lost. 
For want of a rider the message was lost. 
For want of a message the battle was lost. 
For want of a battle the kingdom was lost. 
And all for the want of a horseshoe nail.265 
 Until the rise of computation devices, the modern development of mathematics mostly 
focused on the subset of mathematics called linear that dealt with functions266 that behaved in the 
following way.  If you supplied these functions (or in general weighted combinations of these 
functions) with small inputs you got small outputs, if you supplied them with somewhat larger 
inputs you got somewhat larger outputs and so on.  In a fashion that can be precisely defined 
linear mathematical relationships are well behaved and allowed mathematicians, physicists and 
engineers to frequently obtain so-called closed form solutions.  These characteristics were 
critical in the days of pen and paper tooling. 
 
theory is only to 6 decimal places of precision, suggesting there is significant room for discrepancies 
between theories and experimental measurements in future experiments. 
265 This “standard” version can be found in Oxford Dictionary of Nursery Rhymes, ed. Iona and Peter 
Opie, (Oxford, 1951), 324, and Benjamin Franklin is credited with very similar version.   One of the 
earliest versions in English is “'The losse of a nayle, the losse of an army'. The want of a nayle looseth the 
shooe, the losse of shooe troubles the horse, the horse indangereth the rider, the rider breaking his ranke 
molests the company, so farre as to hazard the whole Army” is from 1629 in The Works of Thomas 
Adams: The Sum Of His Sermons, Meditations, And Other Divine And Moral Discourses, 714 
266The equation y = f(x) is recognizable as a common way to referencing functions.  For 
mathematicians it is actually a mapping from one domain to another and has many interesting abstract 
attributes even without saying much about the actual details of what f(x) is.  Examples would include 
behaviors such as whether it possesses a derivative, whether it can be integrated between x=-∞ and +∞, 
and whether it is linear. 
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 Such equations include some of the most incredibly important equations in the history of 
mankind such as James C. Maxwell’s equations267 that in their compact and expressive form, 
along with the equations of special relativity wholly describe the behavior of the macroscopic 
electromagnetic universe.  While generally ignored even nowadays by non-specialists, non-linear 
equations crop up everywhere in terms of our attempts to systematically describe and predict the 
material universe.  Understanding for this class of mathematics is best done visually, i.e., 
graphing their behavior, but their key characteristic where they differ from linear mathematics is 
that small changes in the inputs lead to unpredictable changes (which can be very large) in the 
equation’s output. 
 Manipulating these equations with only pencil and paper is challenging since there are 
not formulas that describe their behaviors—i.e., what a mathematician would call a closed form 
solution.  Instead, they need to be evaluated numerically for many different values, use the non-
linear equation to compute the outcome, and then plot the result in some kind of graph in order to 
obtain the equivalent insights that mathematicians could obtain from their beloved linear 
mathematics.  All these tasks were quite tedious until the rise of computing machines. 
 However, once mathematicians equipped with computing resources began to 
systematically explore non-linear equations, unexpected behaviors were observed.  And these 
behaviors send an additional and final shock to the system of those wedded emotionally to the 
Laplacian deterministic view of the material universe.  The key behavior of many of these 
equations (and the systems they describe) is so-called chaotic behavior—or simply termed chaos.  
 
267  Maxwell’s equations for free space in so-called point form.  
The first equation tells you everything you need or can know about electric field, the second about the 
magetic field, in spacetime.  Aren’t they beautiful? 
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As is demonstrated in the introduction to chaos in Appendix B, the crucial issue is that there is 
no way predict the behavior of a system that is best described with such a non-linear relationship. 
Extremely small differences in starting measurements, differences much smaller than our ability 
in many cases to control, yield wildly differing predictions.   A crucial aspect of chaos theory 
and where it differs from quantum mechanics is that its behavior infects the macroscopic scale, 
the scale of the world we live in, and not just the microscopic world of quantum mechanics. 
Limits to notions of Deterministic Causality 
"Prediction is difficult, especially the future." — Niels Bohr 
“I do not think that word means what you think it means” –Inigo Montoya 
 
   Let us emphasize that the limits to determinacy demonstrated in Appendix B are not due 
to quantum mechanical indeterminacy.  It is not due to some external source of random chance 
such as either a personal or impersonal force pushing or causing atoms to “swerve”.  It arises 
from the behavior of equations when we try to use them to evaluate their future state.  Chaotic 
equations cannot, not shall not but cannot, be predicted into the future in any meaningful sense 
of that word.  No matter how big our computers are or how much knowledge we assemble, our 
ability to predict is doomed.  This is all due to the sensitivity of arbitrarily small differences in 
either starting conditions or in the descriptions of current state, which are amplified into future 
uncertainty.  This is a crucial dilemma for those who believe that the mathematical 
representations of reality are connected to the underlying reality of the universe, a claim 
compatibilists implicitly accept but do not attempt to justify. 
 The limits of determinism become more challenging as one moves to the domain of the 
human brain.  Virtually any realistically complex biological system has non-linear equations 
lurking that have the potential for expressing chaotic behavior.  In particular the human brain, the 
most complex entity in the known universe, has multiple systems that demonstrate non-linear 
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behavior, ranging from “winner take all”268 neuronal networks or nonlinear “attractor”269 
mechanisms that can amplify small differences into radically different outcomes.270 When one 
adds to that intrinsic chaotic nonlinearity and take into account the incredible complexity that is 
known about just the topology of the brain circuits, ~100 billion neurons, with each neuron 
possessing between 1000 to 10,000 or more connections to other neurons,271 you have system 
where the notion of any finite entity in the entire universe being able to predict state evolution is 
not just unlikely, it is absurd.  The concept of determinism with even a completely 
materialistically based mind is simply incommensurable with empirical reality.  I want to keep 
emphasizing here that for materialists their physical representations act like ontological truths for 
the rest of us.  It is neither accurate nor necessary for the metaphysics of the freedom of 
excellence to be eroded by this practical lack of predictive capability.  But then Thomists live in 
a world that is materialist plus an immaterial reality. 
 What this means is the central bone of contention in the libertarian vs compatibilist 
debate, as to whether freedom either requires or doesn’t require same past, same future, has no 
meaning in terms of ever being able to make coherent sense of that statement in any fashion that 
involves actual observations and measurements, at least when the human brain is in view.   It is 
postulating a scenario where one could never, even in a simulation exercise, ever reproduce that 
same past.  It remains an unrealizable thought experiment. 
 
268 I am not able to concisely explain what a “winner take all” neural circuit is but its behavior has 
been recognized as nonlinear since its inception in electrical engineering circuit theory—see the 
Wikipedia page for a basic orientation if you are interested.  
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Winner-take-all_(computing). 
269 Attractors are a set of numerical values which some chaotic equations tend to evolve towards.  
They can be commonly seen in economic equations representing inflation rates or unemployment rates 
and are best understood by seeing visual representations.  See http://www.chaoscope.org/gallerty.html.    
270 S.L. Bressler, and J.A. Kelson,  “Cortical coordination and dynamics and cognition,” Trends in 
Cognitive Neuroscience 5, 2001, 26-36; H. Haken, The Science of Structure: Synergetics,  (New York: 
Van Nostrand Reinhod. 1984). 
271 Thomas M. Bartol Jr, Cailey Bromer, Justin Kinney, Michael A. Chirillo, Jennifer N. Bourne, 
Kristen M. Harris, and Terrence J. Sejnowski,  “Nanoconnectomic upper bound on the variability of 
synaptic plasticity”  eLife 2015;4:e10778. eLife Sciences Publications, Ltd. (online citation). 
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 What is reasonable to say or not to say about these kinds of behaviors?  For the 
materialist it is a given that there is a congruence between our mathematical representations and 
the true claims they are willing to make about the universe.  But chaos theory has forced such 
individuals into a corner. Materialists, including compatibilists, have no way, even in principle, 
to utilize (i.e., compute) their presumed deterministic rules to accomplish prediction when faced 
with a chaotic system.  These empties of any meaning for them the word deterministic when 
their tools, the descriptions of their causal chains, have the capability for chaotic behavior.  In 
contrast, there is nothing in the field of chaos theory that represents an impediment to a 
Thomistic view of freedom.  It is possible to concede these limitations to the fabric of 
mathematical representations, but these representations need not be confused with the real world.  
This issue is entirely a problem for the materialist. 
Internal Coherency Not Determinism 
 We would like to point out that while these developments erode the implications of what 
determinism can mean to a materialist, it particularly weakens what it means when applied from 
the third person perspective.  Specifically, we will argue that the issues of determinism so 
important to the compatibilist are less relevant in the internal world of the “I”.272  The self-aware 
intellect’s ability to reflect upon forces/events that are external to it, events that may very well be 
deterministically caused, creates secondary reflections that reminds one of Aquinas’ assertion of 
self-moving (a secondary mover downstream of the Divine first mover).  This approach is 
similar to but based on a more expansive metaphysics than that presumed by the previously 
discussed Chisholmian agent.  We agree with Chisholm that the ability of the “I” to reflect upon 
 
272 The “I” is shorthand for our self-aware sense of our self.  This perspective cannot be described in 
third person and is therefore incompatible with scientific framing which is universally third person.   
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these external events renders the external chain of events potentially neutral in terms of their 
necessitation.  
 The importance of the “I” self-reflection to order events extends to those that may be 
internally generated as well. The literature of self-reports on the state of the human mind273 
generally agree that what comes into our thoughts is a mixture of order and chaos.274  The 
reaction to this mixture as it occurs in our “I” is more analogous to a surf boarder riding a rapidly 
evolving wave rather than an orderly calm reflective picture.  But as we can attest from our 
personal experience, our intellect, our self-awareness allows us to ride the wave of the disorder 
and create order and meaning out of it.   
 The skeptics of the reality of the mind like Ryle first assert our internal inability to 
identify a transparent trail of explicit reasoning in our acts, and then use this assertion as 
evidence for of the unreality of our mental constructs.275   But even if his assertion is true, at 
least in some cases, the conclusion should have led him in precisely the opposite direction.  The 
human minds ability, a posteriori, to deal with spontaneous events within its world of cognition, 
whether due to some externally indeterminate circumstance, or the unobserved product of a 
lower level brain-based subsystem, is what leads to our sense of internal coherency.  Humans can 
make sense of things that are happening to them regardless of whether it is arising from a source 
that is apparently from within or from a source that is apparently from without.  The explanation 
is not to be found encoded in some complex rule of the universe but is based on the mystery of 
 
273 Can there be any other kind of reports on the human mind? The obvious answer to those not well 
schooled in current philosophy is that our “I” is a necessary precondition for any possible starting point in 
this discussion.   
274 By this is meant chaos in the general sense, not the mathematical sense of the word.   
275 Entities he dismisses include not just our internal experience of sensory excitation (i.e., to include 
the idea of phantom pain and not just “real” pain), but entities such as the experience of thinking of 
something, the experience of suddenly remembering.  In Ryle’s case, practically any internal mental state 
that we might associate characteristically with the sense of “I” appears to be on the chopping blocking.  
Instead, he would consider these subjectively experienced qualities to be merely an epiphenomenon of a 
sensory state and has no “I” significance. 
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our self-awareness.  It is precisely our intellect’s awareness of our internal cognitive and 
volitional movements that we have a place to stand to understand any aspect of what a free act is.  
Disqualifying these experiences because they are only available to us internally is simply to 
eliminate the possibility for philosophers to come to a coherent understanding of freedom.  They 
have excluded the very “senses” needed to determine coherency! 
 The role of the internal world versus the external world is strongly contrasted between the 
compatibilist and freedom of excellence.  Compatibilists would insist on applying determinism 
to both, by which they mean that all outcomes of the individual decision process follow these 
necessitated deterministic outcomes. They diminish the internal world, evicting almost 
everything related specifically to experiences of the “I”.  Whereas freedom of excellence with its 
rich internal world can assimilate an external world that is an apparent mixture of deterministic 
and indeterministic events because of the ability of the intellect to reflect on both the events and 
the impact those events have on the person, at least in part.  This enables the imposition of 
coherency, not as an illusion as Ryle would suggest, but as one of the fundamental characteristics 
actualizing the atomic act.  Thus, for the freedom of excellence the internal world where 
ultimately the self-reflective judgements of the human being reside is one in which coherency 
but not determinism reigns. 
Freedom of Excellence cannot be strictly materialistic 
 As we have stated earlier, a key difference between freedom of excellence and 
contemporary theories of human freedom is their comprehension of man’s final end.  While the 
Enlightenment has abandoned Aristotelean causation that formally defines the notion of final 
causes, there remains an interest in whether there can be hope for a continuity of our personal 
identity.  Therefore, the notion of a future self that is not the same “self” as our present self 
would be troubling.  On the question of what makes us us, the weight of Enlightenment, as well 
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as modern and post-modern, philosophical thought has decisively moved towards the view of the 
individual as being only the sum of their material constituents of their functioning body, 
especially their brain. Certainly, multifarious medical evidence has accumulated pointing to a 
decisive role for the healthy functioning of our neural anatomy and physiology in terms of our 
sense of self.  But on this core question of what makes us us, we can demonstrate that a strictly 
materialistic view of the human mind is inadequate and cannot support a notion of continuity of 
personal identity, a continuity that is necessary for any theory that is concerned with final ends. 
The Case of the Schrödinger Twin and Personal Identity 
 There are several variations of a classic thought experiment that challenge the idea of 
continuity of personal identity in a solely physical substrate.  For Star Trek era philosophers, the 
most well-known is that of Parfit’s transporter traveler but I will offer a slightly different 
version.276 
 The scene is that there are two free standing closets (an A closet and a B closet) standing 
side by side in a large hall that have doors you enter in,  and once inside a door you can exit from 
on the other side.  You277 enter the A closet and wait for a few seconds.  During this time an 
absolutely perfect recreation copy of your material body appears inside the B closet, but You in 
closet A are otherwise unaffected.   This copy is as exact as it is possible to be in terms of 
modern physics.  In quantum mechanical terms there is a very complex Schrödinger wave 
 
276 Derek Parfit,  Reasons and Persons, (Oxford [Oxfordshire]: Clarendon Press, 1984), Chapter 10, 
200-217;  But Parfit’s Star Trek inspired transporter examples minimize the issue of the person/body left 
behind which allows readers too much latitude in their response.  My scenario is intentionally drawn with 
a fatal denouement to provide maximum incentive to the reader to consider very carefully the 
metaphysics of the situation—after all I am arguing metaphysics are a matter of life and death.  As to the 
source of my scenario, I cannot recall reading it or being told about it, so it is possible I originated it.  In 
any case I have been using this Schrödinger Twin scenario dating back to college dorm arguments in the 
70s and so it is possible its original inspiration is drawn from the same source as Parfit’s, Star Trek. 
277 You in italics is the label for the you that transits closet A in this story. 
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function278 that encapsulates the exact state of every aspect of your material body down to the 
spin of every electron, down to the same color of every quark that has been copied and 
reproduced in closet B.279  
  At this point there are two entities that are exact materialistic duplicates except for being 
a few feet apart in space.  If materialism is true, no one in the rest of the world, including Your280 
loving spouse (if you have one) should be able to determine any difference.  A key question that 
remains for the materialist is what does this mean for Your sense of continuity of personal 
identity?  Certainly, the being in closet B would meet John Locke’s criterion for someone 
satisfying the necessary requirements for preservation of his notion of personal identity. 
This also shows wherein the identity of the same man consists: viz. in nothing but 
a participation of the same continued life, by constantly fleeting particles of matter, 
in succession vitally united to the same organized body. 281  
This scenario also arguably meets the requirement for continuity of the body demanded by some 
theologians for persistence of identity in the Resurrection.282 
 But now there is slightly twisted denouement to this scenario in order to put a very sharp 
edge on the question of continuity of personal identity.  Both You and the closet-B-you exit your 
respective closets into the hall.  There is a person facing both of you armed with a gun in his 
hand, a single round in the chamber, and a desire to shoot one of you in the head.  One of you 
 
278 Schrödinger wave functions are for the physicist a theory of everything for matter.  Every possible 
experiment a physicist could perform involves a resolution of this function.  But that does not mean 
manipulating it for complex entities is practical. 
279 The only exception to exact identity is that the closet B wave function will have coordinates in 
three spatial location terms of x,y,z,  spatially shifted (x-x0, y-y0, z) to account for the difference in 
location.  Coordinate z is unshifted since both You and closet-B-you are standing on level ground. 
280 This capitalization is intended to make clear that the question is addressed to the You we have 
previously defined that is transiting closet A. 
281 John Locke, XXVII “Identity and Diversity” in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 
(Hackett Classics. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1996) § 6. 
282 David J. Bleich, "Resurrection and Personal Identity." Tradition: A Journal of Orthodox Jewish 
Thought 45, no. 3 2012: 73-88; Robert P. George, Patrick Lee, “Material Continuity in the Resurrection” 
First Things, August 18, 2006. 
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will die.   Since You or closet-B-you would, under the presumptions of materialism, have 
precisely the same memories, same neuronal paths, same everything physical at the moment of 
this re-creation—presumably even the exact “thoughts” You were thinking as you went into 
closet A.  Therefore, under these suppositions, there should be literally no difference to the rest 
of the world as to whether the man with the gun shoots You or closet-B-you.    
 So, the question to You is—do you care whether You get the bullet in your head or 
whether it is closet-B-you that gets the bullet in the noggin?  If You do care, what is it that you 
object to?283 Effective material continuity appears to be satisfied with closet-B-you.  If 
materialism is true, then even your loved ones would be happy with closet-B-you.  But if You do 
care there is something else missing in a purely materialistic theory.  What is very clearly in your 
mind is that sense that only you have, your  “I”.   A critical aspect of this argument is that if 
indeed You prefer the closet-B-you take the bullet this is conceding that, under the best-case 
scenario that materialism has to offer in replication, there is something missing that makes the 
You distinctly and uniquely You.   
 As Libet notes there is an unexplained gap between the categories of physical phenomena 
and the categories of subjective phenomena.  As Leibniz averred, if we investigate the brain with 
full knowledge of its physical makeup and nerve cell activities, we will see nothing that 
describes our “I” experience.  Yet this ”I” is at the core of what we are and discussions that do 
not anchor their theories in its characteristic—that pretend this gap is not there or ignore its 
supreme importance—are hard or perhaps impossible to take seriously.   A statement that cannot 
be repeated too often in this context, is the assumption that the physically observable world can 
account for the experiences and functions of the “I” remains a speculative belief—not a scientific 
 
283 There is of course the trauma from seeing someone that looks just like you killed just a few feet 
away from you. 
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proposition.284   The Schrodinger Twin scenario illustrates the proper response to this challenge 
is to expand your metaphysics. 
 Freedom of excellence adopts Aquinas’ metaphysical supposition that the rational 
intellect is immaterial and persists beyond the body yet “the intellective in principle is united to 
the body as its form.”285  Contrary to the Cartesian dualism discussed in Chapter 2, wherein the 
body was one substance and the mind was another, creating the problem interactionism, the 
dualism of Aquinas integrates the concept of material and the immaterial via a form of 
Aristotelean hylomorphism.286   With hylomorphic dualism, man’s soul is the form of his body.  
There is no meaning to the question of how mind and body interact because soul and body are 
not distinct substances, they are complementary principles of one complete substance that is the 
whole being.287 The soul is not the ghost in the machine, it takes both body and soul to describe 
what man is.  Man’s form, his soul, persists through sleep, through replacement of the atoms of 
the body as it occurs normally in this life, and in the end persists through to the Resurrection.288   
The challenge of self-awareness/self-consciousness for the materialist 
 One way to minimize the problem that modern philosophy and science has in dealing 
“scientifically” with first person experiences is to minimize or deconstruct their significance.  
Ryle’s work in diminishing what we have meant by the concept of the mind has led to a 
 
284 Materialists struggle to explain continuity of identity in scenarios less sharp than this one.  How to 
explain continuity through sleep or how to explain continuity of identity in the face of the constant 
material replacement of the atoms/molecules in our body?  How fast or how much can be replaced before 
I am not me?  Some philosophers, after reflecting on their equivalent of the Twin Paradox, not only give 
up on the possibility of continuity of identity, give up on the idea of personal identity entirely. Parfit, 
Chapter 16. 
285 ST, I, q. 76, a.1, c, , 371. 
286 Pasnau, 73. 
287 Benignus, 175. 
288 It is a mistake to think that Thomas separated all “thinking” for the immaterial intellect with a 
separate non-thinking body.  He asserted a sophisticated separation of concerns where the sensory 
apparatus of the body possessed a cogitative capability that dealt with the instances of a thing while the 
intellect dealt with the universals, the former bodily and latter immaterially. 
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generation of philosophers not only denying free will but asserting that all those qualities of 
mental activity that most of us take as foundational for human experience are epiphenomena at 
best or illusions at worst.  Galen Strawson, disgusted with this approach that he considers the 
height of intellectual laziness, has publicly called out an entire generation of philosophers for this 
nihilistic conclusion such Brian Farrell, Paul Feyerabend, Richard Rorty, and Daniel Dennett 
among others.289 
 This attitude is typified by insisting that the whole idea of conscious thought is “an 
error,” evidently based on the idea that since most of the “states” associated with our brain are 
not actually visible to our “working memory”, and while conceding that it seems that there is a 
conscious experience, there isn’t really any conscious experience: the seeming is, in fact, an 
illusion.290  Strawson retorts that the trouble with this view is that any such illusion is already 
and necessarily an actual instance of the thing said to be an illusion.  
Suppose you’re hypnotized to feel intense pain. Someone may say that you’re not 
really in pain, that the pain is illusory, because you haven’t really suffered any 
bodily damage. But to seem to feel pain is to be in pain. It’s not possible here to 
open a gap between appearance and reality, between what is and what seems.291   
We seem to be conscious, we seem to be self-aware, we seem to be able to reflect on our 
cogitations.  While appearance and reality are not the same, to attempt to open a chasm between 
this appearance and reality is simply incoherent.   
 
289 Galen Strawson, “The Consciousness Deniers” New York Review of Books, March 13, 2018. 
https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2018/03/13/the-consciousness-deniers/. 
290 Peter Carruthers,  “The Illusion of Conscious Thought” Journal of Consciousness Studies, 24, No. 
9–10, 2017,  228–52; Steve Ayan,  “There is No Such Thing as Conscious Thought” December 20, 2018.  
Scientific American online, https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/there-is-no-such-thing-as-
conscious-thought/#. 
291 Strawson, 4. 
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 Perhaps the most creative attempt292 to consider how a purely materialistic physical 
substrate could give rise to self-awareness is Douglas Hofstadter.293  Hofstadter concedes the 
difficulties of explaining self-awareness when rooted only in the biology and physics of the 
human brain.  He attempts to erect on this materialistic foundation a kind of nonmaterial castle to 
support the creation of the characteristics of self that he appears to value in terms of his own 
internal subjective experiences.  His approach is not so much constructive as analogical and finds 
its inception with the most momentous event in 20th century mathematics and arguably the 
single most important development in the history of mathematics, as he takes the reader through 
the implications of the Gödel's incompleteness theorem.294  The implication of this work is 
usually communicated to the non-mathematician as the (startling) result that every formal 
mathematical system only slightly more complicated than arithmetic will contain assertions that 
cannot be evaluated as either true or false within the confines of that system.295  But Hofstadter 
points out that the real stunning characteristic of the work is the ability of such systems to 
essentially “simulate” themselves or other formal systems.296 This ability formed the foundation 
of how Gödel, in his theorem, destroyed the attempts of Bertrand Russel and Alfred North 
Whitehead in their Principia Mathematica to found all of mathematics on an impervious logical 
foundation. 
 Hofstadter tells a tale of how this cardinal characteristic of formal systems to “simulate” 
themselves could give rise to an ability of our material brain to create a simulation (and a 
simulation of a simulation in continuing regress) of “self.”  Through this approach he attempts to 
 
292 From the field of computer science. 
293 Douglas R. Hofstadter, Gödel, Escher, Bach : An Eternal Golden Braid (New York: Basic Books, 
1999); Douglas R. Hofstadter, I Am a Strange Loop (New York: Basic Books, 2007) 
294 Kurt Gödel, 1931, “Über formal unentscheidbare Sätze der Principia Mathematica und verwandter 
Systeme I,” Monatshefte für Mathematik Physik, 38: 173–198. English translation in van Heijenoort 1967, 
596–616. 
295 Gödel's work is also referred to as the undecidability theorem 
296 Hofstadter, I Am a Strange Loop, 125-161. 
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explain the intuitive characteristics of the mind we each individually experience with these 
simulations, by rooting these characteristics directly within the material brain.297   The ability of 
a formal mathematical system to simulate itself (and by extension simulate much broader classes 
of other formal mathematical systems) begins with the concept of self-reference.  Until Gödel, 
self-referentiality was best known for its ability known to create classic logic problems such as 
the liar’s paradox.  Here is a sentence representing the simplest version: 
(1) This sentence is false.   
If (1) is true, then sentence is false.  Equivalently if (1) is false then the sentence is true.298  The 
conundrum this sentence presents is not due to anything slippery in the laws of logic, it is due to 
the sentence making itself the target of the logical assertion. When we think about consciousness 
it must include this notion of awareness being able to be aware of itself being aware of itself (and 
so on ad infinitum).  A physical analog of this concept is crudely captured in Figure 15 as the 
apparently infinitely receding image in the mirror of the image in the mirror and so on: 
{   
http://noahpinionblog.blogspot.com/2015/01/priors-and-posteriors.html 
 
297 We can consider this kind of effort further evidence of the need for matter/form metaphysics.  
When you do not have an adequate metaphysical framework, you attempt to extend it within the 
limitations what you are willing to accept.  We can see this in Tse and now in Hofstadter. 
298 There is a difference between the “label” (1) that refers to sentence being true or false, and the truth 
false value as expressed “evaluating” the sentence. 
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 Hofstadter extracts from Gödel's work a notion that goes beyond basic recursing 
relationships.  He postulates that a key ability of the materialistic brain is to be able to “simulate” 
an individual.  He considers this capability crucial for successful human interactions with others, 
particularly with individuals close to us such as spouses.299  But he considers the most central 










 Figure 16 is an attempt to capture non-mathematically this idea.  Ernie Bushmiller’s 
character Sluggo is not just dreaming that he is dreaming; he is dreaming of a self that is in turn 
dreaming of a self and so on ad infinitum.  Each layer of “selfness” in the dream is a simulation 
of using their self as a substrate to simulate the next layer of “self”.  Sluggo (as are we) is aware 
in the dream that the self he is dreaming up isn’t “himself” but is a self, one layer removed.  
 
299 A sad biographical context of this work is the very premature loss of his beloved wife, an 
experience that may have served as the incipit for his deep interest in this topic. 
300 Hofstadter, I Am a Strange Loop, Chapters 13 and 15 
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 Hofstadter tags the ability of a formal mathematical system to simulate itself as “strange 
loop behavior,”301 and asserts that our brains have more than enough sufficient structural 
complexity to support this kind of “strange loop” behavior.  He ties this ability to simulate our 
selfness as the crucial capability allowing for the emergence of self-awareness.  He argues the 
brain acts as the ultimate universal representational machines capable of importing not just 
sense-events but symbols, and symbols representing symbols ad infinitum.302  Unlike the Sluggo 
cartoon, he does not believe there is a primary Sluggo who is the first level dreamer.  His view 
Figure 17.  
is closer to the well-known Escher “Drawing Hands”303 in Figure 17 where his idea of the non-
realness  of the primary self is captured by the idea that neither hand exists except as the other 
hand brings it into existence.  Only through simulation of self does true selfness come into 
existence. 
 Hofstatdter’s exposition of Gödel is a fascinating and mostly clear explanation of one of 
the densest papers in mathematics.  Discussions of self-referentiality are mind twistingly 
 
301 Hofstadter, Strange Loop, chapter 10, but the Sluggo cartoon is a more compact explanation. 




entertaining and he writes with a beautiful style.  But what exactly has he accomplished in his 
analogical argument?  His arguments admit the reality of self-awareness that we all experience, 
but founders on establishing how it actually comes into existence from a purely material base.  
Yes, if the brain could simulate self it could account for self.  This line of reasoning is much like 
the recipe for how to make a million dollars in which the first step is to start with a million 
dollars.  At best he has argued the brain might very well have the ability in some sense to 
simulate itself.   This is a substrate Hofstadter has already conceded needs additional abstractions 
constructed above it to achieve true self-awareness. 
 Hofstadter walks through Parfit’s teleportation scenario which is less crisp with regard to 
the choices facing an individual when “perfectly duplicated” in a material sense than the 
closet/gun scenario I presented in this chapter, and like Parfit, Hofstadter comes away convinced 
that not only does continuity of personal identity make no sense but that ultimately there must be 
no “I”. 
My claim is that an “I” is a hallucination perceived by a hallucination...[but] ceasing to 
believe altogether in the “I” is in fact impossible, because it is indispensable for survival.  
Like it or not, we humans are stuck for good with this myth.304 
     
 Hofstadter, like Parfit, and Dennett when faced with the ultimate choice between belief in 
a materialistic only universe and belief in their own personal identity makes what can only be 
described as an ideological, arguably even a theological choice between competing theories 
regarding what is at the very core of what makes us human.   
Revisiting the issue of predictability—Fidelity 
 We have argued that determinism in the natural world does not mean, at least 
epistemologically, what the materialists think it means.  But there is a crucial sense in which 
 
304 Hofstadter, Strange Loop, 292-93. 
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actions of our fellow human beings can not only be relied upon but that such reliability increases 
as individuals progress towards their final end.  We describe this characteristic as fidelity.  
 The best of human relationships are permeated by this quality.  Married partners can have 
a confidence born of the bonds of mutual love, the experience of a shared journey, reinforced by 
the evidence of repeated reciprocal trust that their partners will do right by their relationship 
although placed in potentially compromising circumstances.  Even young but fast friends can 
have the experience of counting on their true friends to defend them from the barbs of their 
immature peers.  Soldiers carry out their duties are willing to put their life in the hands of their 
comrades, knowing they can rely them, knowing they will cover their back and never let them 
down to the limit of their ability, even if that sometimes means giving up their lives for one 
another.  
 What accounts for our trust, our ability to count on, our ability to know what these 
individuals will attempt or accomplish regarding our need and our expectations?   The idea we 
could ‘compute’ this kind of behavior given a deep understanding of the laws of the universe is 
as we have seen absurd.  Even more absurd is the notion of applying libertarian or freedom of 
indifference to the choices relevant to this fidelity.  If such individuals were given an opportunity 
to make their decision over again given the identical circumstances, would we want them to 
choose other than to be a trustworthy loving spouse, or a true friend, or a loyal and courageous 
fellow soldier?  When they did make that same decision again and again we dispute with the 
libertarian classifying such actions as unfree since these actions violate the same past different 
outcome principle.  We would also dispute with the compatibilist that this fidelity was due to 
necessitated conformance to deterministic physical laws.  Instead, from the perspective of 
freedom of excellence, we would consider these individuals fidelity to be the highest expression 
of human freedom in pursuit of their final ends.  We would wish to be that worthy spouse, that 
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loyal friend, and that soldier willing to give their life for another.   This kind of predictability is 
not the yielding up to a deterministic constraint or taking subterfuge in some type of random 
event—it is the fulfillment of becoming the kind of people we are supposed be, and that we 
ought to be in the process of becoming.  It is the consequence of fidelity to those virtues which 




Chapter 7. Final End 
 In chapter 2 we reviewed the contemporary debate concerning man’s free will.  While 
finding aspects of that debate worthy of being assimilated into the fuller freedom of excellence, 
we ultimately agree with those who assert the contemporary debate is unlikely to be resolved 
given its present framing and current presumptions.  We presented an alternative to this 
depressing view of freedom in returning to a Thomistic foundation.  Freedom of excellence 
moves the focus beyond the isolated atomic act, and places it firmly in the development of the 
habits and virtues that constitute the process of becoming a fully realized human being growing 
towards their final end.  This view of freedom recognizes that each act results in modifications 
that fold back into the very character of the person’s will and intellect that in turn influence 
subsequent choices.  That discussion captured one of the key differences between a freedom of 
indifference or of choice between contraries by the analogy of learning.  When there is a focus 
on the accumulation of something, whether it be a skill, an accumulation of knowledge, or as 
Pinckaers describes as most central for a freedom of excellence, the acquiring of virtue, the locus 
for true freedom moves beyond an autonomous, untethered will and instead considers freedom a 
property of the whole person and all their acts. 
 It was demonstrated that Pinckaers’ assertion of a Thomistic base for his freedom of 
excellence was well supported in Aquinas.  Thomas provides a rich and nuanced view of the 
relationship between intellect and will, and the feedback between the will, the intellect and the 
virtues.  This view includes the primary role of Divine grace in the gift of the virtues, and their 
role in the proper ordering of the will and intellect.  This process of the development of freedom 
of excellence corresponds to the individual participation in the divine, the restoration of the 
image of God in the person, and that individual’s movement towards their final end in the 
beatific vision.  
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 The notion of man’s final end is in fact necessary to bring directionality to the issue of 
what freedom means.  If we apply the idea of final ends to the famous Garden of forking paths, it 
ensures that the garden is more than simply a mass of branching forks—it goes somewhere and 
that somewhere is of cosmic significance. This presumption is missing from the contemporary 
debate, lost to the Enlightenment as Baruch Spinoza ridiculed the final cause as “[turning] 
Nature completely upside down.  For what is really a cause, it considers an effect, and 
conversely.  What is by nature prior it makes posterior.”305  This is an ignorant criticism in the 
most fundamental sense, blind to the role of self-aware beings who can apprehend their final 
cause, a cause that draws the person like a lodestone attracts the needle of the compass.  The loss 
of the final cause leaves the libertarian view of freedom incoherent in its efforts, reduced to 
avoiding non-existent deterministic fate, aimlessly wandering their forking paths.  
 If it were simply a binary choice between libertarian and compatibilist views of human 
freedom, we would argue compatibilism has the stronger case.  Its arguments against the 
incoherency of the libertarian fear of comprehensible causal chains, and its recognition that our 
decision-making process is affected by our inclinations and our dispositions are to be 
assimilated.  Compatibilism’s confidence in predictability anchored on its notion of 
determination falters on the shoals of chaos, but its fatal flaw is its metaphysical amputation of 
all things non-material.  We demonstrated that persistence of personal identity is impossible for 
the materialist, a conclusion shared by many current philosophers and leading those holding to 
this truncated metaphysics to disbelieve in consciousness itself. 
 In contrast freedom of excellence is consistent with current knowledge of both science 
and mathematics.  It is robust to theories of quantum mechanics and chaos theory.  It can 
encompass views of human decision making that occur in the classic fashion of reflective 
 
305 Baruch Spinoza, Ethics I,  cited in Pasnau, 207. 
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deliberation and conscious choice—freedom of excellence is not nullified nor necessitated by a 
completely comprehensible causal chain leading up to a given decision—precisely because of the 
role of the self-reflective (and immaterial) intellect. Freedom of excellence delights in the 
comprehensibility of its self-modifying feedback system where the consequences of one act 
affects those characteristics of inclination, habit, and openness to the graces of the Spirit that will 
then in turn reinforce or mitigate future decisions.   We demonstrated the ability of freedom of 
excellence to accommodate even Jamesian (or random) acts because the connection between act 
and subsequent self-reflection provides the individual with a rear-view mirror while still steering 
forward toward a final end.  We demonstrated that continuity of personal identity is inconsistent 
with a purely materialistic view of being. Therefore, one of the desiderata of a theory of freedom 
needs to include is a non-materialistic component, a presumption built into the hylomorphic 
metaphysics undergirding freedom of excellence. 
 Freedom of excellence is not simply a philosophical view of freedom, it is a theological 
assertion about what man is intended to be, and it is a theological description about how God 
interacts with us, now and in the final vision.  It is a theory that gives Divine priority to both our 
initial enablement as self-moved movers, and as an ongoing supplier of supernatural gifts that 
make possible our participation in the Divine.  The consequence is not an arbitrary constraint on 
our intrinsic characteristics but is the restoration of what should have been and what some day 
will be.  Freedom of excellences places the meaning of freedom in its proper mooring, namely, 
in the end God has intended for us.  Its locus is in man becoming more not less, more real in 
contrast with less real, more free rather than less free, becoming something rather than becoming 
nothing.  We argued by analogy how it can be reasonable to understand this as an intrinsic 
change and one that is ontologically irreversible.   
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 C.S. Lewis captures this sense of the overflowing fullness of our final end that possesses 
all of what God ever intended for us in a passage from the final Narnia book The Last Battle. 
Narnia has been utterly destroyed, Peter, Eustace and the rest of the characters are on their final 
journey: 
“The Eagle is right," said the Lord Digory. "Listen, Peter. When Aslan said you 
could never go back to Narnia, he meant the Narnia you were thinking of. But that 
was not the real Narnia. That had a beginning and an end. It was only a shadow or 
a copy of the real Narnia which has always been here and always will be here: just 
as our world, England and all, is only a shadow or copy of something in Aslan's 
real world. You need not mourn over Narnia, Lucy. All of the old Narnia that 
mattered, all the dear creatures, have been drawn into the real Narnia through the 
Door. And of course it is different; as different as a real thing is from a shadow or 
as waking life is from a dream." His voice stirred everyone like a trumpet as he 
spoke these words: but when he added under his breath "It's all in Plato, all in Plato: 
bless me, what do they teach them at these schools!" the older ones laughed… 
It is as hard to explain how this sunlit land was different from the old Narnia as it 
would be to tell you how the fruits of that country taste. Perhaps you will get some 
idea of it if you think like this. You may have been in a room in which there was a 
window that looked out on a lovely bay of the sea or a green valley that wound 
away among mountains. And in the wall of that room opposite to the window there 
may have been a looking glass. And as you turned away from the window you 
suddenly caught sight of that sea or that valley, all over again, in the looking glass. 
And the sea in the mirror, or the valley in the mirror, were in one sense just the 
same as the real ones: yet at the same time they were somehow different - deeper, 
more wonderful, more like places in a story: in a story you have never heard but 
very much want to know. The difference between the old Narnia and the new 
Narnia was like that. The new one was a deeper country: every rock and flower and 
blade of grass looked as if it meant more. I can't describe it any better than that: if 
ever you get there you will know what I mean. It was the Unicorn who summed up 
what everyone was feeling. He stamped his right fore-hoof on the ground and 
neighed, and then cried:  "I have come home at last! This is my real country! I 
belong here. This is the land I have been looking for all my life, though I never 
knew it till now. The reason why we loved the old Narnia is that it sometimes 








 Freedom of excellence is becoming what we have been looking for all our life, it is what 
is meant to put on our full humanness by becoming what God always intended us to be.   The 
fullest possible expression of mankind is our participation in the divine.  More choices, not 
fewer, more opportunity for human expression, not less opportunity for such expression.  Is such 
a person predictable in their trustworthiness?  Is such a person reliable in their sharing of charity?  
Is such a person overflowing in their freedom?  Is this what we want from the gift of freedom? 




Appendix A.  A Brief Development of the Concept of the Will from Socrates to Maximus 
Volition, ‘tis plain, is an act of the mind knowingly exerting that dominion it takes 
itself to have over any part of the man, by employing it in, or withholding it from 
any particular action.  And what is the will but the faculty to do this?307  
The question of what exactly we mean by the term will is an entangled one when asked 
regarding its historical development, but it can minimally be viewed as a conceptual part of a 
theory of human action that is richer than a focus on mere bodily movement.308  Key associations 
with the concept of will as Locke has it includes the notion of intentionality and of its 
quantitation as a volitional property of the person i.e. a strength of will or weakness of will as 
part of its explanatory properties.  This appendix briefly traces its semantic development through 
the historical arc from Socrates to Maximus the Confessor. 
The standard view until the last few decades was that the will as a volitional concept was 
lacking in Greek philosophy, only first realized with Augustine and his On Free Choice of the 
Will AD 388-95.309  This view has been challenged with some scholars finding volitional 
conceptions of the will much earlier in the Stoics310  or much later in Maximus the Confessor.311  
There has also been increasing appreciation that the early Greek philosophers possessed will-like 
concepts even if they were not unified into the single concept of the will that became more 
ubiquitous in late antiquity into the scholastic period. 
 
307 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (Hackett Classics. Indianapolis: Hackett 
Publishing Company, 1996),  Chapter 21. 
308 A.W. Price, “Aristotle, the Stoics and the Will” in The Will and Human Action: From Antiquity to 
the Present Day, eds Thomas Pink, and M.W.F. Stone ( Routledge, London and New York, 2004), 30. 
309 Albrecht Dihle, The Theory of Will in Classical Antiquity, Sather Classical Lectures (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1982), Chapter VI. 
310 Neal Ward Gilbert, "The Concept of Will in Early Latin Philosophy," Journal of the History of 
Philosophy 1, no. 1 (1963): 22. 
311 R.A. Gauthier,  Aristote. L'Ethique à Nicomaque, Tome I, Première Partie: 
Introduction, Deuxième édition (Louvain, Publications Universitaires - Paris, Béatrice-Nauwelaerts, 
1970), VI, 360.  
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Socrates and Homer 
The hallmark of early Greek philosophy was its focus on the order and beauty that are 
established and maintained by the deities.  It looked to the external world of the universe instead 
of starting with the study of human nature.312  Its framework rested on the key role of human 
reason—the human mind must be capable of perceiving and appreciating the rational order of the 
universe.313  It is therefore unsurprising that Socrates lays out the central role that knowledge 
plays in the virtues—in fact that all virtues are simply knowledge.314  For Socrates no one ever 
errs knowingly or willingly: when a person does wrong their action is an intellectual failure, 
specifically ignorance about what is right.315    
While Socrates is unwavering in his focus on the role of reason (logos) and possession of 
right knowledge, others admit the role for other forces to explain human action, particularly for 
failures of the intellect.  In Homeric anthropology, man’s behavior emerges from the dualism of 
rational and irrational forces such as when Achilles, in being manipulated by Agamemnon, 
resolves to draw his sword after weighing it in his heart and mind.316  The rational derived from 
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Plato believed the reconciliation of the rational intent of a man with the order of reality 
only occurs in human consciousness:  “Only the human mind participates in the intelligible and 
only the intelligible is entirely real.”318  In the Timaeus, following a deterministic concept of 
nature, failures in human life are explained by deficiencies of man’s material body and his 
attached soul that is a consequence of inadequate training.319  In The Republic, Plato asserts 
matter interferes with the noetic order; the world we experience is perishable, disorderly, 
irrational and unpredictable.  Knowledge which the intellect can acquire refers to the real, is 
lasting and unchanging and structured by reason.320 
In Plato’s explanation of the human act, he describes the souls thumos (high spirited 
sometimes anger) as allied with reason in the struggle with epithumiai (the sensual appetites), 
which is sometimes on its own opposed to reason.321  Plato in discussing souls’ ‘choosing’ their 
next lives for reincarnation, uses the term haireisthai for this choosing, and makes clear this 
choice is the soul’s aitia (responsibility).  If the soul chooses virtuously, this virtue is free and 
has no adespoton (master).  Richard Sorabji asserts this is the earliest explicit reference to a 
metaphor for freedom in the context of human choosing.322  
Aristotle 
Aristotle distributed ideas that are grouped under the modern idea of will among several 
different concepts, but all of them are usually thought to lack the modern notion of intention that 
 
318 Dihle, 40. 
319 Plato, Timaeus, 81E-87A, trans. B. Jowett, Project Gutenberg 
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321 Plato, The Republic, 9, C7-D2, trans. Benjamin Jowett. 
322 Richard Sorabji, “The Concept of the Will from Plato to Maximus the Confessor” in The Will and 
Human Action : From Antiquity to the Present Day. Eds. Thomas Pink, and M.W.F. Stone (London 
Studies in the History of Philosophy: New York, 2003), 9. 
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we associate with will.323  First is a general concept of acts that are ‘voluntary’ hekousios 
(ἑκούσιος), these are actions Aristotle allows both beasts and children to have and are the 
broadest categories of acts.  This concept includes acts that we would deny acting from reason  
but that Aristotle would still attribute as “up to us.”  For example, hekousios would include the 
act of a dog biting someone, and that dog would be held responsible for the action even though 
this is not an act deriving from reason.324  Aristotle follows Socrates and Plato in understanding 
the role of logos and the knowledge it has in right action but he also has a concept, distinct from 
but associated with reason, boulēsis, which he categorizes as part of the rational soul and distinct 
from reason itself.325  In commenting on Plato’s use of this term Aristotle uses boulēsis, as 
appetite or desire for that what we really want that is good, or at least appears good.326 
Besides acts arising from reason, and acts arising resulting from the appetitive but still 
rational appetites, there is an additional concept that overlaps with the modern view of will 
which Aristotle termed prohairesis (προαίρεσις).  This is that which arises from the desire for the 
good ends of boulēsis and is the desire for the means that will lead towards those ends. This term 
is sometimes translated “choice” but it is important to consider that Aristotle did not differentiate 
between degrees of prohairesis in an equivalent fashion to the idea of weak-willed or strong-
willed. In Aristotle’s account of where individuals fail to act according to their prohairesis which 
he termed akrasia, he explains that it is the appetites that cause us to overlook the knowledge of 
the good choice and that it is reason, not prohairesis, that fights the appetites.327 
 
323 A.W. Price, “Aristotle, the Stoics and the Will” The Will and Human Action : From Antiquity to the 
Present Day. Eds. Thomas Pink, and M.W.F. Stone (London Studies in the History of Philosophy: New 
York, 2003), 30. 
324 Aristotle,  Nicomachean Ethics, 3.2 in  Books II-IV. trans. C.C.W. Taylor,  
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, Incorporated, 2006). 
325 Sorabji, 8. 
326 Nicomachean Ethics, 3.4. 
327 Sorabji, 11. 
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Shifting away from Plato’s Protagoras where sensuality and irrational impulses duel with 
moral knowledge, Aristotle’s theory of human action introduces a key concept that will survive 
to the medieval schools—the notion that the habitual inclination toward virtuous actions results 
from a process of practice, a process firmly under the control of the intellect.328  Moral progress 
for Aristotle is not simply knowledge in the abstract universal sense.  For Aristotle nature and its 
order are the kinds of knowledge that is possible to be known objectively.  But in the moral life 
the role of this kind of objective knowledge is rarely applicable.   
It is up to “practical” intelligence to come to the decisions in ordinary life as illustrated 
by the story of Alexander of Aprodisias.329  A ship’s crew finds itself amid a tempest and throws 
their cargo overseas to keep their ship from foundering and themselves from drowning.  The 
presence of the tempest overwhelms their prior intent to carry the cargo to its destination.  The 
sailors made their decision purposefully based on what they deemed best at the moment, it is an 
action tightly linked to the intellect and to cognition.  For Aristotle, it is practical intellect that 
deals with the messy empirical realities of man’s ordinary world rather than the unchanging 
universal truths of the cosmos.  Dihle argues this approach weakened the tight Socratic and 
Platonic linkage between virtue and knowledge,330 but for Aristotle this kind of practical 
knowledge is linked with the notion of a virtue emerging from a practiced sequence of actions 
under the regulation of the intellect.  
Epicureans and the Stoics 
 Epicurus and his followers were interested in the notion of freedom but not will, 
depending instead on their concept of freedom arising from a “swerving” atomic cosmology.   
However, in later Latin arguments about the lack of freedom in Stoicism, first in Lucretius and 
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later with Cicero we first see the term libera voluntas—free will appear.331  Happiness (read 
moral perfection) depends on man’s ability to insulate himself from anything that disturbs his 
emotional or moral equilibrium.  While man cannot escape being affected by the unpredictable 
movements of the universal atomic processes, he can detach himself and attain the goal of 
happiness (again read moral perfection).332 
 For the Stoics every motion, every event, every deed was predetermined by fate 
(heimarene) which was a continuous string of causes.333  Freedom, responsibility and morality 
occur only in reference to human consciousness.  Man can comprehend this strict determinism as 
rational and providential.  This knowledge enables him to adapt his intention freely to what fate 
has ordained for him.  The perfect agreement between his consciousness and nature leads to his 
moral perfection and his human happiness.334 
 An early Stoic, Chrysippus in the third century BC, contributed the notion of intellectual 
assent to a human act or sunkatathesis.335  While Stoics were materialists and saw assent as a 
change in the tension of the soul-pneuma of the heart, this concept became readily assimilated 
into Neoplatonic and Christian formulations of the immaterial soul and is viewed as a 
predecessor to the role that consensus and the command of the will plays with Aquinas.336 
 The later Stoic Epictetus, building on this concept of sunkatathesis, expands the 
semantics of prohairesis to include a broader notion of moral character that is formed by our 
day-to-day decisions.  Charles Kahn argues that Epictectus represents this as the true self, the “I” 
 
331 Lucretius, On the Nature of the Universe, 2.251-93, translated Ronald Latham,  
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of personal identity and character which stands in contrast with Plato’s principle of reason that 
offers no real basis for the kind of individuation required by a developed metaphysics of personal 
selfhood:337  
In every case, I want and prefer [mallon thelÕ] what God wants.  For I think what 
God wants is better than what I want.  I attach myself to him as servant and follower, 
I share his impulse, his desire [sunoregomai, sunhormÕ]; I simply share his will 
[haplos sunthelÕ]. 338 
This view of will presents an interesting resonance with what we will see in the Hebrew 
development of the will. 
Hebrew View of God’s Will339 
In Greek cosmology, understanding the plans of the gods and the order of the universe 
placed man’s reason at the center of decision making including those of the moral life.  But 
across the Mediterranean arose a view of God that shifted the center of this focus away from 
reason and to what will become known as the will.  Dihle argues that Hebrew and thus the early 
Christian view is of a God not bound by the order of His Universe. Instead, He is the creator ex 
nihilo.  He orders the chaotic, animates the lifeless, and sets into motion what was merely 
potential.  Contra the Greeks He transcends the order that constrains all others.340  God can 
create, change and destroy as He pleases, but this transcendence does not imply actions that are 
arbitrary towards his creatures “For the mountains may depart and the hills be removed, but my 
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steadfast love shall not depart from you, and my covenant of peace shall not be removed, says 
the Lord, who has compassion on you” (Isaiah 54:10).341  
In the view of Aristotle, Plato and the Stoics, freedom is brought about when the intellect 
has chosen the action in alignment with the true order of being, “not hindered by error, emotion 
or compulsion.”342  But Dihle argues the anthropology of the Hebrews is grounded in man’s 
ability to decide and act either for good or ill regardless of his intellectual assessment of the 
outcome of the act.  A fundamental difference in Greek and Hebrew cosmologies is illustrated by 
Seneca’s assertion “I do not obey God, I agree with Him.”343  For the Greek, Dihle argues that 
proheretic choice accompanies an image of reality where everything exists according to 
unchanging rules.  Man is able understand these rules and act on them.  In contrast Dihle argues 
for the Hebrew there is a Creator free to intervene with his creation at any time according to His 
absolute will.  The commandment of God could be obeyed or disobeyed but not proved or 
disproved, “For my thoughts are not your thoughts, neither are your ways my ways, says 
the Lord” (Isaiah 55:8).  This leads to the crucial difference in Hebrew thought:  “He [the 
Hebrew] becomes conscious of his own intention through continued acts of obedience or 
disobedience—acts of the will—by which he freely reacts to utterance of the divine will.”344 
But the Hebrew’s scripture makes clear that man can refuse to accept and obey, and this 
ability to accept or refuse is thus the basis of his moral responsibility. “It was he who created 
humankind in the beginning, and he left them in the power of their own free choice.” (Sirach 
15:14). The righteous man can become unrighteous and the unrighteous man can become 
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righteous in either the acceptance or the refusal of the call to obedience.  The Hebrew scripture 
does not provide systematic technical terminology to denote the idea of will, or obedience and 
disobedience attributed to some specific component of the human being such as their intellect or 
their emotion or their sensory apparatus.  Instead in Hebrew thought specific characteristics such 
as these voluntarist concepts are assimilated to the whole person.  
It is through divine torah that man can react responsibly to the will of God.  This is not 
done by a purely intellectual effort, but a man must consider the ends of his action in their 
relation to the commandment of God, suggesting crucial role for the intellect accomplishing this 
obedience.  That is why the just man “on his law he meditates day and night” (Psalms 1:2).  The 
view that obedience to the commandment of God, both results from and leads to such meditation 
and forms the foundation for moral progress, is apparent across the breadth of scripture.345  It 
emerges in its fullness in Second Temple Judaism exemplified by Gamaliel’s “Render your will 
His will so that He can render His will your will,”346 and Christ’s prayer in the garden “if it be 
possible, let this cup pass from me; nevertheless, not as I will (θέλω), but as you will.” (Matthew 
26:39) 
What then accounts in the Hebrew view to explain bad or evil decisions?  Whereas the 
Greeks may blame ignorance or the passions interfering, the Hebrews would refer to man’s 
‘stiffheartedness’ (Ezra 2:4).  Man has been given clear commandments but also the ability to 
ignore or even to reject these commands.  The Manual of Discipline,347 found at Qumran and 
designated 1QS, and more commonly known as the Rule of the Community, defines stiff 
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heartedness as a rejection of salutary knowledge which could cause people to go on the right 
path.348  This ability is put in tension with the Hebraic views of divine predestination expressed 
in the story of Pharaoh whose actions were not affected by Moses revelations to him, but by God 
‘hardening his heart’ (Exodus 9:12).  This belief in both human responsibility as a result of 
human act as well as predestination in association with divine omniscience recurs in the Hebrew 
scripture.  It is a tension that continues in the debate between Catholic and Calvinist theology 
and within Catholic theology in the de Auxiliis controversy.349  
The Hebrew theme of human responsibility takes on additional texture with the writings 
of Paul especially with his concept of conscience.  For Paul, conscience is distinct from the 
intellect, it indicates to its person whether an action has been or will be in accordance with the 
will of God in Rom 2:14-18.  To interfere with the conscience of someone else interferes with 
their relationship with God, as in 1 Cor 10:29,  and is therefore an attack on his freedom 
(eleutheria).350    For Paul, conscience by testifying to the will of God,  provides a motivation for 
action in the individual, regardless of the intellectual standing of that person. 
In contradistinction to the Greeks, Paul’s explanation for why man is able to do wrong is 
explained by leading life “according to the flesh.”  This concept is not to be entangled with a 
dualistic hatred of matter but is a reference to the state of man in which all his activity, including 
his religious, intellectual and moral endeavor, finds its final end in himself.  This is reflected by 
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references to concepts like pride—not the human body—that are in Paul’s mind. For Paul, this 
train of self-oriented action can only be stopped by divine grace. 
Unification of Greek Will-like semantics in the Latin 
The interaction between these Greek and Hebrew approaches to the driving forces of the 
human act, between a not-yet-fully-characterized-notion-of-will and the intellect, sets the stage 
for the next milestone.  There is scholarly consensus that a key step in the formation of the 
Augustinian view of will occurs with the translation of Greek philosophical material to Latin by 
Cicero.  Voluntas, the standard Latin rendering since the time of Cicero for the Greek boulēsis, is 
the verbal noun derived from the verb volo “I want” as boulēsis is the nominalization for the 
Greek verb boulamai.351 But the secondary connections of the Latin noun have a semantic reach 
beyond the equivalency to the Greek. Voluntate sua is to do something spontaneously of one’s 
own accord; the adjective voluntaraii is the term for volunteers in the Roman legion.352  Cicero 
also translated hekousios as voluntarius, resulting in a linguistic connection in Latin between two 
unconnected Greek concepts, hekousion and boulēsis.  Kahn and Dihle both argue that this 
linguistic foundation aided in the emergence of Augustine’s and thus Aquinas’ view of will.  
Kahn observes that when Aquinas asserts something is called voluntarium because it is 
according to the inclination of the will voluntas353 he is simply thinking in Latin.354  A final 
linguistic connection in the Latin of yet another distinct will-like Aristotelian Greek term occurs 
when Seneca translates Epictetus’ prohairesis (προαίρεσις) to voluntas:  “The body requires 
many things for health, the soul nourishes itself…Whatever can make you good is in your power.  
That do you need in order to be good?  To will it [velle].355 
 
351 Kahn, 248; Dihle, 133. 
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Neoplatonics on Pride and the Will 
 One other key precursor of Augustine’s formulation of the will comes from the influence 
of Neoplatonic school who connect the notion of pride with idea of a willing gone bad.  Plotinus 
in considering the question what is the cause of evil in Plato’s cosmology, concludes that souls 
turn away and break loose from the Father and become ignorant of the Father because of pride 
(tolma) and the willing (boulethenai) (βουλεθεναι) to belong to themselves alone.  This 
association of pride as a cosmologic explanation also occurs with the neo-Pythagorean Dyad356 
where tolma is the term used to explain the creation of the lower levels of the cosmos.   This 
association of will and pride will appear with Augustine. 
Augustine 
 Augustine inherits the rich will-like semantic associations in the Latin voluntas that tied 
together earlier but scattered Greek and Stoic conceptions, but he turns these linguistic 
connections into substantial connections that form the shape, meaning and implications of word 
“will” such that his use of the term is now entirely recognizable from our post Enlightenment 
perspective.  Augustine’s views on the will need to be placed in the context of his anthropology.  
De trinitate develops an anthropology strongly influenced by the idea of man in the image of 
God (Gen. 1:26-27), leading Augustine to describe the mind analogically from the three divine 
persons.  Augustine is keenly aware of the central role the mind’s awareness of itself plays in 
its functioning.  “The mind of man knows itself. For the mind knows nothing so much as that 
which is close to itself; and nothing is more close to the mind than itself.”357  Augustine 
asserts that this capability derives from the mind having been created in the image of God, 
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and therefore has the potential to become wise, i.e., to remember, know and love God its 
creator.358 
 Augustine’s understanding of the will plays a central role in his vivid description of the 
contrary forces he experienced during his own conversion experience: 
 I myself was longing for this very thing, yet I was bound: not by someone else’s 
iron chains but by my own iron will [voluntas]. The enemy still held sway over the 
exercise of my will, and from that had fashioned a chain for me and bound me in 
fetters. In fact, my feelings of sexual desire were formed out of the perversion of 
my will [velle meum]. While my will was in thrall to sexual desire, it grew into a 
habitual behavior: while I was capitulating to that habitual behavior, it grew into 
something I could not live without….Yet I had begun to own a new will [voluntas 
nova], a wish to worship you voluntarily [vellem]  and to enjoy you, O God, the 
only sure pleasure; but it was not yet ready to overcome my former will, 
strengthened as it was by its long duration. And so my two wills, one old, the other 
new, one physical, the other spiritual, were in conflict with one another and by their 
strife were shattering my soul.359  
These contrary forces described by Plato as reason vs thumos vs appetite, are ascribed by 
Augustine to the fragmentation of the will leading to a divided self.  For Plato, it is reason (logos 
to logistikon) which should issue commands, but for Augustine it is voluntas that gives the 
orders.360  Augustine anchors this now unified concept of the will completely in the rational soul: 
“To the rational soul also He gave memory, sense, appetite, to the rational he gave in addition 
intellect, intelligence and will.361  
 Augustine makes the will a central player in terms of all human action and as the 
explanation for why he does not always do as he thinks he should have done: 
I did so many things, then, where being willing was not the same as being able; but 
I was not doing what I was infinitely more eagerly resolved on, which as soon as I 
willed it I could attain, because as soon as I willed it I would be willing! For in that 
circumstance, the ability was identical with the will, and to be willing was the same 
as already doing. But still it was not coming to pass; instead my body was all too 
 
358 Augustine, On the Trinity. 14.21-22. 
359 Augustine, Confessions VIII.5.10, Edited and Translated by Carolyn J.-B. Hammond.  
(Loeb Classical Library; 26-27, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014). 
360 Kahn, 257. 
361 Augustine, The City of God, 5.11. 
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easily controlling the feeble will of my soul to move its limbs on demand, instead 
of the soul obeying itself to accomplish, in its will alone, its own robust will.   
 
Where does this perversion come from? And what is its purpose, I say, that it should 
will something, and it would not so command unless it willed it, and still does not 
do what it tells itself to? In fact it does not exercise its will completely. For this 
reason it does not have complete command. Insofar as it commands, to that extent 
does it exercise its will; and insofar as it does not accomplish what it commands, to 
that extent it does really will it: for the will commands into being that will, which 
is none other than itself.   So it does not have complete command, and therefore it 
cannot be identical with the things which it commands. … It is not, therefore, a 
perversion to be partly willing, and partly unwilling; but it is a sickness of the mind. 
This is because the mind cannot rise up completely by means of the truth, for it is 
already weighed down with habit. So there are two wills, because each of them is 
incomplete, and each has what the other lacks.362  
Augustine connects this will with moral responsibility:   
It makes a difference what a person’s will [voluntas is like.  If it is perverted, these 
movements will be perverted in him.  If it is upright, they will be not just blameless, 
but praiseworthy.  Indeed, the will is present in all these movements. Rather, they 
are all nothing other than acts of the will [voluntates]363  
“And I attended in order to understand what I heard, that free choice of the will is the cause of 
our doing wrong”364 a connection he makes repeatedly in De Libero arbitrio voluntatis. 
 Augustine attaches to voluntas the notion of its strength or weakness in clear distinction 
from the Stoic notions of intellectual assent (or not).  Augustine sees his will struggling against 
his sexual appetites and is willing to speak in terms of the will’s command.  And as we have seen 
he concedes that a will can be perverted.  For Augustine, whatever we do we do by will, whether 
it is partly, completely or in tension with competing “wills”.  He attributes this to a mind that is 
weighed down under the burdens of twisted habits.  But with regard to the ultimate source of evil 
in the case of the fallen angels he concludes that while the evil will is an efficient cause of the bad 
action, there is no efficient cause of an evil will.365  
 
362 Augustine, Confessions, VIII.8.20-21. 
363 Augustine, The City of God, 14.6. 
364 Augustine, Confessions, VII, translated by Richard Sorabji, 18. 
365 Augustine, The City of God, 12.6. 
129 
 
 While Augustine denies an efficient cause for an evil will, he does point to an explanation 
in quoting Ecclesiasticus: “What could the origin of evil will (mala voluntas) [be] except pride?”366  
Furthermore, Augustine follows Evagrius in applying this explanation for the fallen angels as 
well.367  But pride’s mechanism is an evil will, a will that unlike man’s will prior to the Fall now 
has no choice.368  Only through God’s grace, is the original image of God restored.369  Augustine 
insists that peace of mind comes only from reliance upon the Creator:  inquietum est cor nostrum 
donec in te requiescat,370 in continuity with the doctrine of the divine will worked out by 
Athanasius, Gregory of Nazianzus, and Marius Victorinus.371   
 Kahn argues that Augustine’s doctrine of human will plays two crucial theological 
roles.372  First, the will and its freedom of choice are an explanation, at least in part, for evil and 
sin as seen in De Libero arbitrio voluntatis. But second, the will of man is where God’s grace is 
realized: “All you asked of me was to deny my own will and accept yours.”373  Much of 
Augustine’s writings on grace and will occur in the context of his strenuous fight against the 
offspring of the teachings of Pelagius.  This context might explain the change from a voluntarist 
tone in De Libero arbitrio voluntatis to his later Answer To Simplicanus that provides the 
foundation for Calvin’s deterministic theory of predestination by grace.  We will sidestep going 
into those arguments by agreeing with Lössl that Augustine’s views in Answer should be 
 
366 Augustine, The City of God, 14.13. 
367 Augustine, The City of God, 7.3.5. 
368 Augustine,  On Free Choice of the Will, 3.10.29, Translated by Anna S. Benjamin and L.H. 
Hackstaff (Library of Liberal Arts; 150. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1964). 
369 Augustine,  On Free Choice of the Will, 3.9.28. 
370 “You have made us for yourself, O Lord, and our hearts are restless until they rest in you” 
Confessions, I.1  
371 Kahn, 257. 
372 Kahn, 258. 
373 Augustine, Confessions, IX.1.  
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contextualized by the contemporaneously written Confessions, where Augustine clearly views 
God’s grace as liberating and enabling the will to be able to do good.374  
 We began this appendix by noting recent scholarship has moved away from giving 
Augustine primary credit for formulating the modern view of the will.  But as Richard Sorabji has 
argued, this tendency to minimize the role of Augustine in the development of theory of the will 
understates the way Augustine enormously expanded the functions of the will over prior Greek and 
Latin writers.375  Sorabji points out that Augustine lays at the will’s feet the directing of 
attention,376 uniting perception with the perceptible,377 and associating memory with internal 
vision.378  And it is Augustine who asserts faith is due to will, and having belief depend on the 
assent of the will.379 
Maximus the Confessor 
 The journey from Aristotle through Augustine requires no justification for a Thomistic 
thesis since the scholarship into the roots of Aquinas writings on the will have always understood 
the substantial influence of Augustine, but why include Maximus?  Scholars of Aquinas consider 
Nemesius, whom Aquinas cites from On Human Nature as Gregory of Nyssa, John Damascene, 
and Augustine to be three of the most important and direct influences on Aquinas from the 
Fathers,380 with all three possessing demonstrable familiarity with the Aristotelian commentators 
and Stoic sources.  Although it is debated whether Aquinas had access to Maximus directly, it is 
clear John Damascene was strongly influenced by Maximus’ writings.381  Also Aquinas comments 
 
374 Josef Lössl, “Intellect with a divine purpose: Augustine on the Will” in  The Will and Human 
Action : From Antiquity to the Present Day, Editors Thomas Pink, and M.W.F. Stone, (London Studies in 
the History of Philosophy, Routledge, London and New York, 2004), 66. 
375 Sorabji, 19-20. 
376 Augustine, On the Trinity. 11.2.2. 
377 Augustine, On the Trinity. 11.3.6. 
378 Augustine, On the Trinity. 14.10. 
379 Augustine, Expositions of 84 Propositions in the Epistle to the Romans 60-1 as cited in Sorabji, 20. 
380 Osborne, Human action, 115. 
381 Osborne, Human action, 115. 
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on what he believed was Maximus’ scholia382 on Dionysius  in regard to Maximus’ views on the 
habits of angels,383 and there is recent scholarship that this scholia may be authentic Maximus.384 
 Maximus’ early writings on the will derives from the view of human nature he received 
from the Fathers––expressed pithily by Gregory of Nazianzus that “the unassumed is the unhealed, 
only that which is united to God is saved.”385  Maximus  adds to this notion of personhood his 
‘Chalcedonian logic’—person is contrasted to nature—person regards the way we are (tropos), not 
with what we are (logos).386   But our inclination (gnome) must be persuaded “to follow nature and 
not in any way be at variance with the logos of nature” so that “we are able to have one inclination 
(gnome) and one will (thelema) with God and with one another, not having any discord with God 
or one another.”387   Ian McFarland points out that for Maximus, renewal of human intention is 
required because through the Fall the devil has “separated us, with respect to our inclination, from 
God and one another…and divided nature at the level of mode of existence” leading us to “turn 
from the natural movement we once had…to what is forbidding.“388  In contrast Maximus 
describes redemption as a process by which “through love for humankind gnome embraces 
 
382 Polycarp Sherwood did not include this in his list of Maximus’ works and it is not included in 
modern critical editions of his work see Ezra Sullivan “Habituation in Virtue according to Maximus the 
Confessor and Thomas Aquinas”, 11. 
383 ST, I-II q. 50. a.6,  802. 
384 Marek Jankowiak, and Phil Booth. “A New Date-List of the Works of Maximus the Confessor”,  in 
Oxford Handbook of Maximus the Confessor eds. Pauline Allend and Bronwel Neil Vol. 1, (Oxford 
University Press, 2015), 31. 
385 Gregory Nazianzus, To Cledonius the Priest Against Apollinarius, Ep CI (101), 
http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/3103a.htm. 
386 Andrew Louth, Maximus the Confessor (Early Church Fathers. London; New York: Routledge, 
1996), 59. 
387 Maximus, PG 91:396C,  Letter 2 On Love from Ambigua ad Iohannem, translated by Andrew Louth 
in Maximus the Confessor, 86-87. 
388 Ian McFarland, “ ‘Naturally and by Grace’: Maximus the Confessor on the Operation of the Will” 
Scottish journal of Theology 58, no. 4 (November 2005),  412; Maximus, PG91:396D-397A,   Letter 2 On 
Love from Ambigua ad Iohannem, 87. 
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nature”, the final state in which this division is eliminated “is clearly not a matter of gnome, about 
which there is contention and division…but of nature itself. “389 
 Just as Augustine’s later views on free will take place in the context of his battle with the 
Pelagianism, so Maximus’ mature concerns for the will occur in his mortal battle with 
Monothelitism, the view that the two divine natures result in a single will in the Incarnate One.  
Maximus argued instead for a single person, a single hypostasis, with two wills, human and divine.  
Christ’s human will is in submission to, but not eclipsed by, his divine will.390 
 In Disputation with Pyrrhus, Maximus argues that the notion of a single will in Christ 
threatens basic Christian doctrine with the dual problem of divine passibility and Christological 
Docetism.391  Since there is no dispute regarding the divine will, Maximus’ arguments focus on the 
issue of the human will after affirming the central orthodox view not in dispute that Christ is 
indeed a single person whose unity remains undivided.  In this dispute Maximus distinguishes 
between the Christ’s human will as a natural will (thelema phusikon) from that of the gnomic will.   
 One can find a variety of shadings within Maximus’ writings with regard to meanings of 
gnome: Gnome itself is not the choice of the human act, it is a habit from which the operation that 
is choice comes.392  But in Disputation with Pyrrhus, when Pyrrhus responds to Maximus, who 
asks what he calls Christ’s single will, Pyrrhus responds ‘gnomic’393 While Maximus 
 
389 McFarland, 413; Maximus, PG91:401A, 400C,  Letter 2 On Love from Ambigua ad Iohannem, 89. 
390 Louth, Maximus the Confessor, 56; The nature of the human will in Maximus writings has and 
continues to be a point of scholarly contention in part due to textual issues regarding the work considered 
to be his mature position, Disputation with Pyrrhus. See Christopher Beeley, “Natural and Gnomic 
Willing in Maximus Confessor’s Disputation with Pyrrhus” (Studio Patristica 000, 1-00. Peters 
Publishing, 2016), 3-4. 
391 Maximus the Confessor,  The Disputation with Pyrrhus of Our Father among the Saints, 5,7, trans 
Joseph P. Farrell. (South Canaan, Pa.: St. Tikhon's Seminary Press, 1990), 3-4. 
392 Maximus, Opusculum I, PG 91:17, PG 91:16D, cited in introduction The Disputation with Pyrrhus 
of Our Father among the Saints, 5,7, Translated from the Greek by Joseph P. Farrell, xx. 
393 Disputation with Pyrrhus, 87.  
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acknowledges fluidity with regard to the meaning of this word, he replies in no uncertain terms that 
at this point it cannot be applied to Christ’s human will: 
Thus, those who say that there is a gnomie in Christ, as this inquiry is 
demonstrating, are maintaining that He is a mere man, deliberating in a manner 
unto us, having ignorance, doubt and opposition, since one only deliberates about 
something which is doubtful, not concerning what is free of doubt.  By nature we 
have an appetite simply for what by nature is good, but we gain experience of the 
goal in a particular way, through inquiry and counsel.  Because of this, the, the 
gnomic will is fitly ascribed to us, being a mode of the employment [of the will], 
and not a principle of nature, otherwise nature would change innumerable times.  
But the humanity of Christ doth not simply subsist [in a manner] similar to us, but 
divinely, for He Who appeared in the flesh for our sakes was God.  It is thus no 
possible to say that Christ had a gnomic will.394 
 For Maximus the meaning of gnomic will for fallen human beings is a picture of those 
under the influence of sin that are ‘tossed about the choices that present themselves’ and are thus 
unable to choose freely, contrasted with the deliberative willing that Christ does possess: 
And neither the freedom is the choosing.  The choosing, as I have said many times 
is a wishful aspiration of what is ours to perform, whereas the freedom is [1] the 
innate authority to perform what is ours or [2] the unobstructed authority of using 
what is ours or [3] the non-slavish aspiration of what is ours.  Therefore, the 
freedom and the choosing is not the same: if we, indeed, we aspire according to the 
freedom, we do not acquire the freedom according to what we aspire, and the 
aspiration is only choosing, whereas the freedom makes use of what is ours and 
what is [depending] on what is ours, that is, the aspiration, the decision, and the 
wish.  Because it is according to the freedom that we are wishing, deciding, 
choosing, aspiring and using what is ours.395  
In contrast, the human will of Christ has been liberated, free of the oppressive distortion of the 
‘gnomic will’ and makes the right choices with perfect freedom396 because he ‘possessed the good 
from his [human] nature’397   
  
 
394 Disputation with Pyrrhus, 87. 
395 Maximus, Opuscula I, quoted and translated in Basil Lourié, “A Freedom beyond Conflict:  
The Logic of Internal Conflict and the Free Will in Maximus the Confessor” Scrinium, Vol 14. Issue 1. 
(Brill 20 Sep 2018), 70. 
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Maximus on the Habits 
  There is a final relationship between Maximus’ and Aquinas relevant for our 
understanding of freedom of excellence that emerges from Maximus’ views on virtue and habit 
following the analysis of Ezra Sullivan398 and Andrew Louth.399  For both Maximus and Aquinas, 
the act of living the moral life and progressing in it is rooted in understanding of the role of virtue 
and the habits—  which Maximus terms hexis (ἕξις) and Aquinas habitus.  Both terms are derived 
from Aristotle’s view of hexis as an arrangement of parts and capacities such that the one 
possessing the “habit” has a certain excellence if the parts are well-arranged or a deficiency if they 
are poorly arranged.400 
 In Maximus,  “the essence of man is his rational nature, with his mind having potency for 
wisdom, when a man knows something his mind is at work in act, and when his mind is exercised 
by repeated acts of knowing with love, man develops the hexis of contemplation.”401  Maximus ties 
virtue and habit together, where habit is the result when virtue is so settled that it provides the 
stability to our being.   “Nature is changeable; but in the saints it remains unchanging through the 
unchangeable habit of virtue”402  Choice exists for accomplishing the divine purpose in us such 
“that when the soul is moved to make progress it becomes united to the God of all by imitating 
what is immutable and beneficent in His essence and activity by means of its steadfastness in the 
good and its unalterable habit of choice.”403 We accomplish this by imitating “the simple and 
 
398 Ezra Sullivan, “Habituation in Virtue according to Maximus the Confessor and Thomas Aquinas” 
https://www.academia.edu/37955370/Habituation_in_Virtue_according_to_Maximus_the_Confessor_and
_Thomas_Aquinas. 
399Andrew Louth,  “Virtue Ethics: St Maximos the Confessor and Aquinas Compared.” Studies in 
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400 Aristotle, Metaphysics, trans W.D. Ross, V.19, 1022b1-3. 
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402 Maximus, Maximus Confessor: Selected Writings, trans George C. Berthold,  (New York: Paulist 
Press, 1985),  155. 
403 Selected Writings, Scholium, 9. 
135 
 
indivisible Goodness through habitual exercise of virtues.”404  For Maximus this process, askesis,  
of man becoming divine by grace and hexis, is a struggle that results in a restoration of the virtue of 
our original created state.405  
Disciplined training (askesis) and the toils that go with it were devised simply for 
the purpose of separating from the soul in those who love virtue the deceit that 
infects it through the senses.  It is not as if the virtues have been lately introduced 
from the outside.  For they were inserted in us from creation, as has been already 
said.  Once therefor deceit has been completely expelled from us, at that moment, 
too, the soul manifests the radiance of its natural virtue.  He therefore who is no 
foolish is sensible; and he who is not cowardly or foolhardy is courageous; and he 
who is not undisciplined is chaste; and he who is not unjust is just.  By nature reason 
is wisdom, discernment is justice, the incentive faculty is courage, and the desiring 
faculty chastity.  Therefore, with the removal of what is contrary to nature only 
what is natural is accustomed to be manifest.  Just as if rust is removed, there is 
manifest the natural gleam and lustre of iron.406  
 
The goal of askesis is to be “crucified with Christ”407 as to re-order a person’s love to God.   
Louth analyzes this process as moving from love, to self-mastery, through fear of God, to 
faith in the Lord, mastery of the passions, through endurance, to hope and the separation 
from earthly inclinations, and finally back to love of God.408  Spiritual love is the core 
passion that we must cultivate, thus charity frames and undergirds all of Maximus’ 
teachings on hexis, askesis and gnome.409  
 While there are terminological differences, and differences in emphasis, Sullivan 
and Louth both argue there are few substantive differences between the core of Maximus’ 
teachings and Aquinas’ on the will and habit.410  For both Maximus and Aquinas,  charity—
 
404 Maximus, Ambiguum 7, 1097. 
405 Selected Writings, II.72. 
406 Disputation with Pyrrhus, 174-176. 
407 Maximus, Ambiguum 47,  1360. 
408 Louth, “Virtue Ethics”, 356. 
409 Sullivan, 9. 
410 In ST, I-II q. 50. a.6, Aquinas corrects Maximus’ denial that angels have habits by asserting a 
proper role for “deiform habits”.  Aquinas would prefer not to use Maximus’ word “natural virtues” but 
clarifies that moral virtues are habits that result from conscious effort and exercise.  ST I-II. Q. 63, a.2.   
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love, is at the core of the perfection of the will.411  The role of the will is to lead the 
individual into full participation with Holy Spirit in Aquinas’ vocabulary, or to their full 
deification, the full restoration of God’s image in man in the words of Maximus.  We can 
see in Maximus the outline of the more fully developed Thomistic based freedom of 
excellence, thus the roots for this view of freedom extends deeply in both East and West. 
  
 
411 ST I-II, q. 28, a. 6. 
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Appendix B.  An Introduction to Chaos Theory 
 The simplest example of a non-linear equation demonstrating chaos is Thomas Robert 
Malthus’ equation in which he predicted the doom of the Irish to starvation—his equation for 
population growth412 in discrete form is: 
(1)   xn+1 = r xn   
where the prediction for the number of people at generation n+1, let’s call that number  xn+1,    
can be predicted by the number of people in the nth generation, let’s call that number xn, 
multiplied by whatever the basic growth rate r is (r).    This is the equation Malthus used to 
predict the pessimistic view that the human race (or at least the Irish) were doomed to famine 
since for any r > 1 you will have exponential growth that will eventually outrun all resources––
most especially food.413  
 The dire implications of this equation do not in fact occur—doesn’t occur with human 
populations and it doesn’t occur with any animal population because reproductive rates change 
as the population increases (or decreases).   We can alter Malthus’s basic growth equation to 
better conform to reality with a simple adjustment in the presumptions around the growth 
multiplier. 
 
412 Thomas Malthus, An Essay on the Principle of Population As It Affects the Future Improvement of 
Society, with Remarks on the Speculations of Mr. Goodwin, M. Condorcet and Other Writers, (1 ed.). 
(London: J. Johnson in St Paul's Churchyard. 1798), 
https://archive.org/details/essayonprincipl00malt/page/n8/mode/2up. 
413Any similarity the reader may see between the alarm raised by Jonathan Swift regarding Malthus’ 
equations and current alarm raised regarding the computer models of global warming much be resisted 
lest your social media accounts get flagged as a person who does not believe in science. While it may not 
be apparent, this equation when turned into a plot of population versus time is in fact exponential growth.  
Since it is formulated as a difference equation, it is equivalent to a differential equation in calculus.  The 




 In this case let r(x) = r(1-x)  where the basic growth rate changes as the population 
increase—changes in the direction of slowing the rate of growth—which is a much more realistic 
presumption.  If we apply the equation to a rabbit population model this modification can be 
thought of as adding a predator like wolves into the equation.  Combining these two equations 
yields 
(2)       xn+1 = r xn(1-xn)  
which is the classic predator prey equation and is of the form of the discrete logistic equation.  
The algebraists among the readers will recognize (2) as a non-linear equation.  At every iteration 
there is a completely “determined” number that will emerge as the population prediction for the 
next generation of the population. It appears to be much like any other simple algebraic equation.  
But in fact, this equation hides behaviors that we can only really demonstrate by investigating its 
behavior numerically and then plotting its behavior graphically.   
 The following two graphs demonstrate that behavior of the population systems that are 
being described by this equation.414  In Figure B1. where the growth rate r is set to 3.0, we now 
see the much more realistic population growth curve we desired to avoid the unrealistic runaway 
exponential growth predicted with equation (1).   If we interpret this curve as a predator-prey 
model the ongoing oscillation reflects the natural season to season effect of the predators 
reducing the population down, followed by a reduction in their population, followed by a rise in 
the prey population and so on as predators (or other factors like disease) affect the net population 
growth.  Critical to understanding the implications of Figure B2 is that it actually shows two 
predictions (a solid blue line, a dashed red line) corresponding to two slightly different initial 
populations with only a very small difference (<.1%) is their starting conditions.  The resulting 
 
414 These two graphs were created by the author using a python/jupyter notebook implementation of 
equation (2) with plotting via the matplotlib library.  Code available on demand. 
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prediction curves demonstrate that this small difference continues through the generations such 
that the human eye cannot see the difference between their superimposed lines over the entire 
time of the prediction.   
  
Figure B1. 
 A startling behavior arises as we increase the growth rate to near 4.0 in Figure B2. This 
extremely “noisy” plot indicates extreme fluctuations in population from one generation to the 
next. But the most important item to note is that the solid red and the dashed blue, which started 
from almost exactly the same value (less than .1% different) and following the same equation 
end up very quickly wildly divergent from each other less than halfway through the generations.  
 This is a crucial point with regard to the implications of chaos theory.  It is not simply 
that Figure B2 is noisy and difficult to see a pattern in its movement (it is).  It is that even slight 
differences in starting conditions, differences we cannot in general prevent from occurring in any 
real world scenario, lead to complete different outcomes, thus the futility in “predicting” 
anything once we have trespassed into the domain of chaotic equations. 
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Figure B2. 
  This is the fundamental characteristic of chaotic equations—their extreme sensitivity to 
changes in initial conditions.  Small changes, like the loss of a nail from a horseshoe, has 
consequences that cannot be predicted, but while subject to energy constraints, can be arbitrarily 
extreme.  Hence the alternative labeling of these chaotic systems with the term “butterfly” effect. 
 Lest one think that this badly behaving equation is uncommon and only limited to 
relatively uninteresting problems like rabbit populations, consider the classic three planetary 
body problem that has been recognized since the days of Newton.  Hopefully, school children 
learn the basic and very non-chaotic equations governing the relationship of two planetary 
bodies, where m1 and m2 are the respective masses of each planetary body, r is the distance 
between them that with a constant G determines the force F of attraction between them that will 




This is the equation governing Isaac Newton’s story of the falling apple from the apple tree.415  
But by adding just one more planetary body to the mix yields no analytically solvable equation 
and even this conceptually simple problem is in fact a chaos generator as seen in Figure B3.416   
 
https://www.wolframscience.com/nks/notes-7-4—three-body-problem   
Figure B3. 
 Thus, the very equations describing our solar system, can with mild alterations in initial 
starting conditions yield startling and absolutely unpredictable outcomes as seen in Figure B3.  
This behavior derives from the fact that only finitely expressed numbers can be used—in other 
words numerical representations and their calculations must use finite arithmetic, and the non-
linear behavior means that no matter how many digits of precision you use the characteristics of 
these nonlinear relationships amplify the “noise” that exists at the limits of whatever precision 
 
415 Newton’s apple falling from a tree is a simple case of two bodies in orbit around each other.  In this 
case the apple and the earth.  It is just that the earth’s outer diameter interferes with the apple completing 
its orbit around the earth. 
416 Noson S. Yanofsky, The Outer Limits of Reason : What Science, Mathematics, and Logic Cannot 




you are using.  You will always get wild results like Figure B2 and B3, only the scale or the 
number of iterations will be affected.417  
 It is not that such systems, such as our solar system will fail to arrive at some specific 
state in the future.  It is that there is no conceivable (finite) observer that can, even in principle 
regardless of their intellect or the availability of an entire universe of computational equipment, 
determine what that state will be beyond some number of iterations into the future. The solar 
system can clearly find its way into the future, but it is simply impossible for us to predict what 
the future will be except by going along for the ride and observing what it will do.   
  
 
417 Real attempts at prediction require a real computation machine to compute and such machines can 
only use some finite number of digits.  Such numbers are called rational and were considered by the 
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